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Abstract 
 
The academic debate about European cooperation on immigration has focused on big 
treaty negotiations, presented an undifferentiated picture of the subfields of immigration, 
and has only recently begun to make use of the abundant literature on national 
immigration policies. As a macrostructure, this study uses a bureaucratic politics 
framework to understand the preference formation of national governments on liberalising 
economic migration policies. This allows unpacking the process of preference formation 
and linking it to a number of causal factors, which, by influencing the cost and benefits 
distribution of the relevant actors – intra-ministerial actors, employer associations, trade 
unions, and other sub-state actors – shape the position of the government. The influence 
of the causal factors is underpinned by different theories derived from the literatures on 
Europeanisation, immigration policy-making, and foreign policy. Germany is used as a 
longitudinal case study with four cases within it, as it has undergone a U-turn in a way no 
other relevant Member State has, from a keen supporter of EU involvement to being highly 
sceptical with regard to economic migration policies at the EU level. The empirical data is 
based on 43 open-ended interviews, archival research and newspaper analysis. 
 
The bureaucratic politics framework supplanted with the theoretical strands of domestic 
politics and foreign policy concerns provides a number of themes that can explain why and 
under what conditions a Member State supports liberalising economic migration policies at 
the EU level from 1957 until the Treaty of Lisbon. The thesis argues that if the European 
policy measure applies to a particular group of sending countries and the domestic 
salience of immigration is low, sending countries can lobby Member State governments to 
support EU-level liberalisation of immigration policies. The misfit between the existing 
national regulations for economic migration and European-level policies cannot be 
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significant as otherwise the economic and political adaptation costs for actors involved are 
too high. A heated national debate on immigration is negatively related to governmental 
support for such measures as the political costs of support skyrocket. Conversely, if the 
decision-making process happens bureaucratically, this helps to attain governmental 
support as the political costs of doing so are kept minimal. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
The European immigration policy debate gained momentum in the mid-1990s, through 
developments aimed at establishing the free movement of persons within the EU; these 
were sparked by the signing of the Single European Act (SEA) in February 1986, the 
objective of which was to create a Single Market by 31 December 1992. The inclusion of 
immigration in the three-pillar structure created by the Maastricht Treaty, which entered 
into force on 1 November 1993, was an important development towards a common EU 
immigration policy. The debate further intensified when the Amsterdam Treaty came into 
force on 1 May 1999; this communitarised immigration policy and moved it from the 
intergovernmental third to the supranational community pillar. 
 
To understand these developments, we must go back a few steps and look at the role of 
the free movement of workers and persons in the EU. The Treaty of Rome enshrined the 
commitment to establishing the free movement of workers in the European project from 
the very beginning, made a reality in 1968 by the adoption of the Regulation 1612/681 and 
Directive 68/3602 (Jacobs, 1999: 4). At the beginning of the 1980s, developments were 
under way to create the Single European Market and remove restrictions on the movement 
of persons. However, disputes between Member States with regard to the scope of the 
internal market concept had led to a deadlock of policy developments that aimed at 
abolishing internal border controls (Hailbronner, 2000: 126). France and Germany initiated 
a pressure group of some Member States to create an area without internal frontiers in an 
intergovernmental effort. The initiative led to a bilateral Franco-German agreement on the 
“gradual reduction of controls along the German-French border” in July 1984. Shortly after, 
                                                
1 Official Journal L257/13, 1968 
2 Official Journal L257/13, 1968 
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the already existing passport union among the Benelux countries joined the group 
resulting in the Schengen Agreement, signed in June 1985 (Menz, 2009: 40). 
 
The Schengen Convention implementing the agreement was not signed until June 1990; 
the abolishment of international frontier controls between the Schengen States took 
another six years (Geddes, 2000: 81). The Schengen Convention comprised a detailed set 
of provisions on visas and border controls, connected measures on asylum requests, other 
forms of cooperation, and the creation of the Schengen Information System (SIS) (Peers, 
2000: 66). The Commission intended to establish an external borders regime within the 
framework of the Maastricht’s third pillar that would have succeeded the intergovernmental 
Schengen regime. This effort did not reach consensus in the Council. It was not until the 
Amsterdam Treaty that the Schengen regime was finally integrated in the EU structure and 
consequently supranationalised. Although an internal EU matter, the free movement of 
persons cannot be entirely separated from an EU immigration policy for third country 
nationals (TCNs), because the free movement of EU nationals within the common market 
had implications for issues of entry, movement and residence of TCNs. This necessitated 
further supranational legal and political competencies to make sure that the free 
movement of persons had the full effect (Geddes, 2000: 43-44). Thus, internal free 
movement generated a spillover effect that gave impetus to initiatives to develop a 
common EU immigration policy for TCNs (Geddes, 2000: 65). 
 
What followed from the debate of the 1990s was that the European Council gave the 
Commission the mandate to propose immigration and asylum legislation at the Tampere 
European Council in October 1999, which is known as the Tampere Programme. 
Academic contributions, mostly in political science, mushroomed over the developing EU 
 
 
17 
asylum and immigration policy (see, for instance, Geddes, 2000; 2003: 8; Guiraudon, 
2000, 2005; Lavenex, 2001a; Lavenex & Uçarer, 2002; Lavenex & Wallace, 2005; Stetter, 
2000). In addition, legal scholars have given the subject considerable attention (see, for 
instance, Groenendijk, Guild, & Minderhoud, 2003; Guild, 2001, 2007; Guild & Staples, 
2003; Niessen, 1996; Peers, 2000; Peers & Rogers, 2006; Ryan, 2007). However, 
economic migration policy as a distinct subgroup of migration policy did not receive a great 
deal of attention. Both strands of work treated immigration policy as a whole, without 
differentiating between the sub-policy areas, such as economic migration, asylum and 
refugees, irregular migration, and integration. If they did single out economic migration 
policies, they did not feature a rigorous analysis of the political processes, but remained 
mostly descriptive (Mitsilegas, 2006; Ryan, 2007). Apart from an analytically sophisticated 
treatment, the approach did not consider debates about liberalising immigration policy 
measures at the EU level before immigration policy moved into the first pillar of the EU. 
Both the Association Agreement with Turkey (Ankara Agreement), and the Association 
Agreements with the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) contained 
provisions that liberalised immigration policy at the EU level. 
 
This dissertation fills this temporal gap by analysing EU involvement in immigration policy 
since the Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community in 1957. It 
shows what can be learned from extending the timeframe backwards, thereby looking at 
developments beyond the Tampere Programme of 1999. The period under investigation 
stops with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. While the main findings of this study 
will also be applicable to developments after the Lisbon Treaty, changes in the institutional 
set-up, in particular the adoption of qualified majority voting, and their effect on preference 
formation are outside the scope of this study. The shift from unanimity voting to qualified 
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majority voting is likely to make it easier to pass legislation in the policy domain of 
economic migration. However, the structure of the process of national preference 
formation as analysed in this study is expected to remain stable. The process is dependent 
on the misfit between national and EU-level regulation, the political salience of migration, 
the foreign policy value, and the pressure of a sending country. 
 
Research Question 
The dependent variable is the preference of an EU Member State’s government, as 
expressed through its position on EU-level liberalisation of economic migration. The 
question this dissertation addresses is: Why, and under what conditions, does a Member 
State support EU-level liberalisation of economic migration policies for third country 
nationals? The study explains the process of how a Member State government arrives at 
its respective preferences, by considering the positions of all relevant actors within the 
Member State according to their respective distribution of costs and benefits and their 
political weighting. In explaining this, the dissertation makes use of three principal 
independent variables: the misfit between the relevant national legislation and the policy 
measure proposed at the EU level; the political salience of immigration; and the foreign 
policy value of a relevant sending country. 
 
Puzzle 
The question is based on a multi-layered puzzle. Since the European Economic 
Community was founded in 1957, there have been a number of occasions that can be 
classified as liberalising measures when Member States agreed to delegate competencies 
on regulating economic migration to the EU level. These measures include the provisions 
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on freedom of movement and the right of establishment in the Association Agreements 
that the EEC concluded with Greece in 1961 and Turkey in 1963. In addition, the EEC 
agreed to include provisions on freedom of movement and the right of establishment in the 
Association Agreements with the Central and Eastern European countries that eventually 
became members of the EU in 2004 and 2007. Since those instruments were put in place, 
Member States have found it difficult to agree to liberalise immigration measures at the EU 
level. Correspondingly, developments from the mid-1990s onwards have had a restrictive 
logic and focused on restricting access for immigrants wishing to enter the European 
labour market. In public debate, cooperation on immigration policies was framed in such a 
way that it was only reasonable to cooperate at the EU level if it contributed to sealing off 
the EU’s labour market from third-country workers. Analysts recognised that the notion of a 
‘Fortress Europe’ was the credo of the day that applied to the bulk of migrants, the most 
highly qualified constituting an exception (see, for instance, Bigo, 1998; Geddes, 2000). 
Thus, efforts intended to create EU competencies in regulating a controlled intake of 
immigration failed to attain enough Member State support to have been adopted (such as 
the Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third country nationals for the 
purpose of paid employment and self-employed economic activities (COM(2001) 386 
final)). 
 
Seemingly obvious explanations that come to mind, including most notably, differences in 
economic climate, do not provide a sufficient explanation for the variation in EU policy 
outcomes. For instance, at the beginning of the 1990s, when the Association Agreements 
with the CEECs were concluded, economic developments in the Member States were far 
from satisfactory. Taking into account earlier developments on common liberalising 
measures on economic migration together with recent developments, including the 
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adopted Blue Card Directive, shows that cooperation in this domain is possible. 
Consequently, under certain conditions cooperation is achievable; however these 
conditions have not been identified and analysed in an adequate way by the relevant 
literature. 
 
Case Selection 
The dissertation focuses on the Federal Republic of Germany and four particular policy 
measure case studies (see Table 1). The case selection is discussed in detail in Chapter 
Three. 
 
Table 1: Sub-case studies 
 Sub-Case Study Time Period 
1 Association Agreement between the EEC and 
Turkey (Ankara Agreement) 
July 1959 – September 
1963 
2 Association Agreement between the EC and 
Poland (Europe Agreement) 
November 1990 – 
December 1991 
3 Economic Migration Directive July 2001 – November 
2003 
4 Blue Card Directive October 2007 – May 2009 
 
Definitions 
Geddes provides a useful general definition of international immigration as “permanent or 
semi-permanent movement of people across state borders” (Geddes, 2003: 18). The 
author also notes that “the growth of short-term, rotation or contract migration shows how 
the distinction between permanent and temporary becomes blurred” (Geddes, 2003: 18). 
At the time of migration, the migrant may not have decided between migrating permanently 
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or temporarily (Black, Hashimzade, & Myles, 2009). In addition, even though the literature 
tends to treat economic migration and asylum as distinct categories, the concepts do not 
allow for that. In practice, people may apply for asylum but their motivation to migrate is 
largely economic. Thus, the distinction between economic migration (presumed voluntary) 
and asylum (presumed involuntary) becomes blurred (Geddes, 2003: 18). Economic 
migration is a form of legal migration and refers to migration through legal channels for the 
purpose of work, including employed and self-employed economic activities. It is also 
important to clarify the meaning of migrant. It can either refer to “foreign born”, i.e., a 
person born outside the host country regardless of his/her citizenship, or to “foreign 
national”, i.e., a person without the citizenship of the host country. “Foreign national” can 
denote either persons that have settled and hold a permanent residence status or persons 
that do not have long-term residence rights. The latter group is not automatically free to 
move within the labour market (Ruhs & Anderson, 2010: 13). For the purpose of the thesis, 
migration denotes the movement of persons that are not citizens of the host country and 
have no permanent residence rights in the host country. 
 
The Concise Oxford English Dictionary defines liberalise as “to remove or loosen 
restrictions on (something, typically an economic or political system)” (The Concise Oxford 
English Dictionary, 2011). In this context this means to remove or loosen restrictions to 
economic migration. Liberalisation of immigration policy is understood here in the 
economic sense, i.e., policies that facilitate the intake of new immigrants compared to the 
status quo –not predominantly liberalisation in terms of bestowing further rights to 
immigrants, although this can be a side effect of economic liberalisation. Consequently, 
the term liberalisation used in this dissertation refers to legislation intended to increase the 
number of economic migrants by removing or loosening restrictions on their movement. 
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Competency delegation to the EU level refers to delegating powers with regard to 
regulating economic migration to the European Union, or one of its predecessor 
organisations, such as the European Community (EC) and the European Economic 
Community (EEC). This can happen in a number of ways through secondary legislation 
that is binding in nature. Hence, competency delegation to the EU level includes 
Association Agreements as well as directives. Member State refers to a member of the 
respective organisation (EEC, EC, or EU). 
 
Third country nationals comprise all nationals that are not citizens of the EU (or EC and 
EEC). 
 
In terms of preferences, Moravcsik’s definition is used: “Preferences reflect the objectives 
of those domestic groups which influence the state apparatus; they are assumed to be 
stable within each position advanced on each issue by each country in each negotiation, 
but not necessarily across negotiations, issues, or countries” (Moravcsik, 1998: 24). The 
preferences are understood here as relating to a certain policy measure. 
 
Themes 
All necessary factors to explain when liberalisation at the EU level happens can be 
clustered in three themes. The theoretical model of bureaucratic politics is used as a 
macrostructure for analysing how costs and benefits are distributed across actors and how 
the final governmental preferences emerge from the preferences of the different actors 
involved (Allison, 1969; Allison & Halperin, 1972; Allison & Zelikow, 1999; Brummer, 2009; 
Halperin, Clapp, & Kanter, 2006). The first theme relates to domestic politics and 
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recognises the domestic dimension of governmental preference formation on immigration 
matters. Determining who may access the labour market is an important privilege and is 
seen as fundamental to national sovereignty. Any regulation that differs fundamentally 
from the national policies or legal framework would constitute significant costs. Hence, 
there needs to be a good fit between the relevant national regulations or preferences, and 
the measures that are proposed for the EU level (see, for instance, Börzel, 1999; Börzel & 
Risse, 2000; Cowles, Caporaso, & Risse, 2001; Duina, 1999; Héritier, Knill, & Mingers, 
1996; Meyers, 2000; Mitchell, 1992; Rosenblum, 2004a, 2004b; Rudolph, 2003, 2006). In 
addition, there is a negative relationship between the political salience of immigration and 
the propensity of a government to agree to liberalise economic migration at the EU level 
(cf. Caviedes, 2010; Héritier, 1996). 
 
The second theme relates to foreign policy factors (see, for instance, Meyers, 2000; 
Mitchell, 1992; Rosenblum, 2004a, 2004b; Rudolph, 2003; Rudolph, 2006). If a sending 
country (or a group of sending countries) can be identified to which the EU-level policy 
initiative relates, this has the potential to significantly influence the stance of the respective 
government. If the foreign policy value of the sending country is high (for instance, by 
constituting an important ally in the fight against a real or perceived threat or by offering 
incentives such as a new market) and the political salience is low, foreign political 
considerations can play an important role. In particular, in that constellation, a sending 
country has the opportunity to directly contact the Member State government in an attempt 
to lobby the government to support a more open immigration policy at the EU level. This 
further increases the likelihood that a Member State will support EU-level liberalisation of 
economic migration. 
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The third theme concerns labour shortages. The discussion in Chapter Two will show that 
labour shortages cannot be taken as a direct causal factor for EU-level liberalisation of 
economic migration policies – and indeed not for liberalisation of economic migration 
policies on the national level either. What matters for determining the EU-level 
liberalisation of economic migration policies is what kind of national legislation exists in the 
Member State. However, it is important to note that there are different ways of having or 
introducing liberal immigration policies that are not necessarily compatible with each other. 
For instance, a supply side measure, such as a points-based system of admission, might 
not go well together with a demand-based system that requires an existing job offer and 
restricts the work permit to a particular profession or region. 
 
Existing literature 
The relevant existing literature can be divided into several fields: European integration, EU 
policy-making, immigration policy-making and domestic politics, and German immigration 
policies. Each cluster has its own merits and deficiencies for explaining a Member State’s 
support for liberalising immigration policies at the EU level. 
 
Theories of European integration are concerned with the process of first-instance 
competency delegation and treaty revisions, whereas this study is concerned with the 
processes of creating concrete secondary legislation. Hence, theories of European 
Integration have only limited applicability to this study. This applies in particular to 
neofunctionalism, which offers little value in explaining reluctance to European Integration 
(Haas, 1958, 1961, 1964; Lindberg, 1963; Lindberg & Scheingold, 1970). However, in the 
late 1980s and 1990s, a few authors tried to revise the neofunctionalist logic that was 
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inspired by the entry into force of the Single European Act in July 1987 (Burley & Mattli, 
1993; Sandholtz & Zysman, 1989; Stone Sweet & Sandholtz, 1997). The Single European 
Act was seen as holding an immense spillover potential (Rosamond, 2000: 99; Tranholm-
Mikkelsen, 1991: 12). Accordingly, the most important proposition of neofunctionalism for 
this research is that the abolition of internal borders creates a functional need for a 
common EU policy on legal economic migration (see, for instance, Callovi, 1993: 358; 
Geddes, 1995: 205; Koslowski, 1998: 160-165; Moraes, 2003: 117; Niessen, 1996: 21-22). 
 
The concept of multilevel governance focuses on the supra- and sub-national levels (Hix, 
2005; Marks, 1993; Marks & Hooghe, 2001, 2004; Marks, Nielsen, Ray, & Salk, 1996). In a 
policy domain in which concerns about sovereignty are high (and that has been ruled by 
unanimity vote in the Council of the EU), however, this approach is only useful to a limited 
extent. The high political sensitivity of migration and concerns about losing control over the 
admission of migrants make state-centric dynamics very prominent in this domain. Hence, 
the two-level approach is more useful than the complex web of overarching policy 
networks to explain EU-level liberalisation of economic migration policies. 
 
Liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik, 1993, 1997, 1998, 1999; Moravcsik & Nicolaidis, 
1999) offers a well-developed theory of national preference formation. It focuses on 
negotiations of the big treaties rather than day-to-day EU decision-making. This is useful 
as a macrostructure for this study, but fails to provide a methodical structure for the intra-
ministerial coordination and the interplay between the government and relevant interest 
groups. In addition, liberal intergovernmentalism overestimates the significance of 
employers and political economy explanations. 
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Institutionalist approaches regard the respective institutional configuration as the chief 
determinant of political outcomes and have been regularly used to explain EU policy 
outcomes (see, for instance, Jeffrey Lewis, 2003; Peterson, 1995; Pierson, 1996; Pollack, 
1996; Pollack, 1997). Generally, the institutionalist literature is subdivided into historical, 
rational choice, and sociological variants (Hall & Taylor, 1996). The study takes on board 
the claim that institutions structure the behaviour of actors. This is conceptualised as the 
rules of the game. However, the institutionalist literature on EU policy-making tends to 
focus on high-profile bargaining scenarios and neglects how governments form their 
preferences and adjust these over time. 
 
The literature on the development of a common EU policy on migration has mushroomed 
since the conclusion of the Single European Act in 1986 and, most notably, since the 
launch of the Tampere Programme in 1999. A number of authors analyse directly why EU 
cooperation on immigration policies happens. However, they concentrate on the big 
treaties rather than secondary legislation (Niemann, 2006, 2008; Stetter, 2000) and do not 
differentiate between different kinds of migration policies, such as asylum and refugees, 
irregular migration, integration, and economic migration (Lu, 1998; Messina, 2007; 
Moraes, 2003; Trendell, 1996). Another study assesses the utilisation of expert knowledge 
by the European Commission to advance a common migration policy (Boswell, 2008b). 
Consequently, the works are too broad in their analyses or ask different questions. Studies 
that also focus on developments beyond the big treaties remain of a descriptive nature 
(Papademetriou, 1996). A few authors have studied intra-EU migration (Bigo, 1998; 
Huntoon, 1998), or looked at public opinion towards EU policy harmonisation of migration 
policies (Lahav, 2004b). Some works provide a general account of the nature of the 
emerging EU migration policy (Butt Philip, 1994; Degen, 1994). Givens and Luedtke 
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analyse the political dynamics of common EU policies on migration with the lens of liberal 
intergovernmentalism, and by drawing on the concept of political salience and its impetus 
toward restrictive immigration policies (Givens & Luedtke, 2004). These general works on 
EU immigration policy were pioneering insofar that they applied concepts of the EU policy-
making literature to migration policy, established a number of factors explaining EU-level 
cooperation on migration policy, and sketched out the empirical developments of the 
nascent common EU policies on migration. However, they remain conceptually too broad 
or too descriptive and are thus of limited use to provide a detailed explanation of Member 
State preferences on liberalising economic migration at the EU level. One work focuses on 
analysing Member State preferences on EU migration and asylum policies, and the role 
public opinion plays in influencing them (Fouse, 2005). While the focus on Member State 
preferences is useful, the study attributes the reluctance of Member States to cooperate 
on immigration matters to a restrictive public opinion. As this dissertation will show, this 
link is exaggerated and not as strong as suggested by Fouse. It does matter but only in the 
context of domestic political salience and as part of a bigger complex of causal factors. 
 
In addition, work on the policy outputs of the developing EU migration policies has also 
started to differentiate between the different kinds of immigration policy. A part of the 
literature deals with EU cooperation on asylum policy (Guiraudon, 2000; Lavenex, 2001a, 
2001b; Thielemann, 2003a, 2003b, 2005; Thielemann & Dewan, 2006; Uçarer, 2001), 
refugee policies (Lavenex, 2001a, 2001b), irregular migration – however mostly from a 
legal perspective (Cholewinski, 2001; Mitsilegas, 2002; Samers, 2004) – or analyses the 
legally non-binding Open Method of Coordination for co-ordination of immigration policy 
(Caviedes, 2004). Most of the work makes use of concepts that are less useful for the 
liberalisation of economic migration, such as venue shopping (Guiraudon, 2000) or burden 
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sharing (Thielemann, 2003a, 2005). Guiraudon’s (2000) venue shopping approach is very 
useful for the analysis of asylum policy. However, regarding economic migration policy, 
immigration policy experts have less incentive to meet at the EU level to bypass national 
institutions, such as Courts, that might give further rights to asylum seekers as desired by 
policy makers. In the domain of economic migration, national immigration policies tend to 
be more restrictive than EU-level proposals – this is particularly the case for Germany. The 
notion of policy frames as applied by Lavenex (2001b) is useful for understanding how 
immigration can become politicised domestically. Guiraudon and Geddes (Geddes & 
Guiraudon, 2004) show how linking an issue to a broader consensual agenda and framing 
it in a way that is acceptable to both EU insiders and key Member States can lead to the 
successful adoption of EU policy measures. This is helpful to demonstrate the significance 
of framing in garnering support for certain EU policy measures – in the case of this article, 
anti-discrimination. However, the applicability of the argument to issues of labour market 
access is unsure. Given the high importance of access to the labour market it is likely to be 
more difficult to link EU initiatives to a broader consensual agenda. 
 
A few authors explore the nature of the emerging migration policy, for instance, in light of 
regime theory (Koslowski, 1998), analyse its restrictive traits as well as potential future 
development (Koslowski, 2001-02), or examine the nature of the EU immigration regime 
and its restrictive elements from a political geography perspective (Leitner, 1997). While 
these studies are helpful in establishing the empirical context of common EU 
developments on migration policy, they are less useful in directly answering the research 
question of this study. 
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Many of the works either do not differentiate between the different kinds of migration 
policies, or focus on asylum, refugees and irregular migration; few works deal directly with 
economic migration. However, a few recent political economy studies explore the new 
paradigms in labour migration, and the role of the EU therein since 1990, with a focus on 
interests groups (Menz, 2009). The emerging paradigm mixes the controlled intake of 
desired labour migrants with ever more restrictive policies with regard to asylum seekers. 
Related works focus on the roles of employers in a critique of the varieties of capitalism 
framework to explain different labour migration policies (Caviedes, 2010) – however, with a 
focus on explaining national economic migration policies, not EU-level initiatives. Caviedes 
(Caviedes, 2010) highlights that the national varieties of capitalism do not function to the 
exclusion of sectoral differences, which are often more influential in stimulating employer 
action. These works focussing on interest groups offer highly valuable insights into interest 
group dynamics. However, they do not include an in-depth analysis of the processes within 
the government bureaucracy that lead to Member States’ preferences on liberalising 
economic migration policies at the EU level. This dissertation attempts to complement 
these works by analysing the intra-government dynamics that lead to the formation of 
governmental preferences on liberalising economic migration policies at the EU level. 
 
A further strand of literature assesses to what extent the EU is now regulating migration 
policies together with national governments, and the policy outcomes of this new mélange 
(Geddes, 2000); how EU immigration policy realises domestic migration policy goals 
(Boswell, 2003), or propagates the notion of selected entry (van Houtum & Pijpers, 2007) 
as well as the consolidation of restrictive national asylum policies (Lindstrøm, 2005). A 
number of authors also address what European cooperation on immigration policy means 
for the migrants in terms of rights and inclusion (Favell & Geddes, 1999). In addition to the 
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domestic effects of common EU policies on migration, there is also a literature that 
analyses the external effects of an EU policy on migration (Lavenex, 1999, 2001c; 
Lavenex & Uçarer, 2002). These analyses provide useful background information but 
address different questions, which renders them relevant only to a limited extent. 
 
A discipline that has focused on the EU’s efforts to establish a common migration policy is 
law (see, for instance, Elson, 1997-1998; Groenendijk, et al., 2003; Guild, 1996, 1999, 
2001, 2007; Guild & Staples, 2003; Hailbronner, 2000; Halliday-Roberts, 2002; Niessen, 
1996, 2001, 2002; Niessen & Schibel, 2003; Peers, 1995, 1996; Peers, 2000, 2001a, 
2001b, 2002a, 2002b, 2003, 2004a, 2004b; Peers, Barzilay, Groenendijk, & Guild, 2000; 
Peers & Rogers, 2006). Numerous authors have analysed relevant secondary EU 
legislation and its implications on migrant rights. These studies provide important 
background information about the legislative developments of common EU measures on 
economic migration, with regard to both the content of the policy measures and the 
political processes that led to their adoption. 
 
An additional field of literature has investigated the sources of European immigration 
policies. While distinct from common developments on migration, this literature looks at 
similar issues from a different perspective and can inform work on common EU migration 
policies. Several studies have looked into the securitisation of immigration policies (see, 
for instance, Gebrewold, 2007; Gündüz, 2007; Huysmans, 2000; O'Neill, 2006) or its 
absence (Boswell, 2003, 2007, 2009). Other authors explore the challenges migration 
posed to the nation-state in terms of sovereignty over entry and expulsion as well as 
membership (Guiraudon & Joppke, 2001; Joppke, 1998b). In addition, a number of studies 
analyse European migration policies from a comparative perspective (Geddes, 2003; 
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Hammar, 1985; Thränhardt, 1996a) – notably, a big body of work describing and analysing 
immigration policy in Germany (see, for instance, Bade, 2005; Esser & Korte, 1985; S. 
Green, 2004, 2007; Katzenstein, 1987; Kesler, 2006; Klusmeyer & Papademetriou, 2009; 
Korte, 1985; Kruse, Orren, & Angenendt, 2003; Menz, 2001; Rotte, 1998, 2000; 
Schönwälder, 2001; Takle, 2007; Thränhardt, 1996b, 1999; Trumann, 2004; Zimmermann, 
Bonin, Fahr, & Holger, 2007). These studies provide useful concepts that have been used 
to explain the formation of national immigration policies, some of which are also relevant to 
EU policy developments, such as securitisation. In particular the studies on Germany give 
important empirical insights into German immigration politics that constitute the context of 
preference formation on EU-level migration policies. 
 
Work on national immigration policies is abundant and includes a plethora of different 
approaches, theories and concepts useful for the study of EU immigration policies. 
However, so far these bodies of work have not spoken to each other. Some authors 
concentrate on the role interest groups play in immigration policy (Freeman, 1986, 1995, 
2006, 2007; Freeman & Kessler, 2008). Other works are concerned with explaining the 
continuing immigration to liberal democracies (Hollifield, 1992). Other works explain 
immigration policies (Cornelius, Martin, & Hollifield, 1994; Hollifield, 1997, 2000, 2004a, 
2004b; Katzenstein, 1987; Lahav, 1997, 2004a, 2004b, 2006; Lahav & Guiraudon, 2006, 
2007; Messina & Lahav, 2006). However, this literature does not address the 
supranational dimension, i.e., when and why a national government agrees to delegate 
competencies on liberalising economic migration to the EU level. Nonetheless, this 
literature still provides a number of interesting insights with regard to the political 
processes of immigration policy-making and the tension between economic and political 
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goals, most notably the distribution of costs and benefits across actors and their potential 
link to particular modes of political contestation. 
 
There is no work that specifically tackles why Member States support the liberalising of 
economic migration policy at the EU level covering the entire period of the EU (and its 
predecessor organisations). Moreover, no single framework is capable of addressing this 
question and delivering a satisfactory answer. Including the entire period of the history of 
modern European Integration allows the comparing of policy dynamics across time. 
However, it also poses questions of comparability as the rules of the game that determine 
policy-making on economic migration policies have changed over time or vary between 
different kinds of EU policy proposals, most notably, between Association Agreements and 
EU directives. The study will show that despite changes over time or between policies, the 
themes of this thesis, i.e., domestic politics, international politics, and labour market 
concerns as well as the bureaucratic politics framework are relevant to all periods of the 
European project and define the political space for liberalising policies at the EU level. 
 
Alternative Explanations 
This section discusses three alternative explanations to answer why and under what 
conditions a Member State supports EU-level liberalisation of economic migration policies. 
The discussion shows why the approach taken by this study is superior. First, the 
explanation linking support of a national government for a liberalisation of economic 
migration policies at the EU-level to the party (or parties) that is (are) in power is not 
satisfactory. Generally, it is expected that parties located on the left of the political 
spectrum are more supportive of liberal immigration policies and of delegating 
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competencies to the EU level, whereas parties of the political right are more anti-
immigration and nationalistic and therefore more reluctant to delegate competencies to the 
EU (see, for instance, Ireland, 2004). Some arguments used to support this proposition 
assert that the left expects immigrants to vote for them (Breunig & Luedtke, 2008) whereas 
the right tries to gain political ground by catering to anti-immigration sentiments parts of the 
population might hold. Another argument concerns social equality and posits that the left 
generally attempts to increase social equality and improve immigrant rights (Lahav, 
2004a). Furthermore, with regard to European Integration, leftist parties are more likely to 
embody a progressive stance, whereas the right will hold national sovereignty dear. At the 
same time, there is evidence which suggests that immigration does not follow party lines, 
but rather, is orthogonal to the Left-Right continuum (Breunig & Luedtke, 2008: 141). This 
is also the case for economic migration in particular (Interview CDU/CSU Fraction). A look 
at the parties in power in Germany during the relevant time periods confirms this picture 
(Interview Migration Expert). Indeed, when Germany supported the freedom of movement 
provisions in the Ankara Agreement and in the Europe Agreement with Poland, a centre-
right coalition was in power. However, when Germany opposed the Economic Migration 
Directive proposed in 2001, it was ruled by a centre-left coalition government. In particular, 
the social democratic Minister of the Interior, Otto Schily, adopted a rather conservative 
view on immigration issues after 2003 (Klusmeyer & Papademetriou, 2009: 283). 
Consequently, this casts doubts on the validity of the party in power as a main 
independent factor for explaining EU-level developments on liberalising economic 
migration. 
 
Secondly, the influence and power of supranational institutions might play a significant role 
(see, for instance, Hix, 2005; Marks, 1993; Marks & Hooghe, 2001, 2004; Marks, et al., 
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1996; Peterson, 1995). Supranational institutions, such as the Commission, can exert 
influence on the decision-making process on a certain EU measure, by, for instance, 
evaluating national preferences and identifying possible red lines ahead of finalising the 
proposal, exploiting differences in Member State preferences to avoid the Council rejecting 
a proposal, or in order to push through a proposal closest to its own preferences (Pollack, 
1997: 129). Other supranational actors, such as the Presidency of the European Council 
can exert pressure on Member State delegations to reach a compromise on a contested 
proposal. Even though the presidency consists of a national government, it is obliged to 
represent the interests of the Union and possesses diplomatic room for manoeuvre and 
agenda-setting powers, and should thus be classified as a supranational actor. Most 
decisions are taken on decision levels that are below the Council of Ministers (see, for 
instance, Hix, 2005: 83). Some authors even suggest that around 70 percent of decisions 
are made at working group level (Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace, 1995: 562). A Council 
Presidency can make use of this by manipulating the negotiations at this level. 
Accordingly, it can positively influence the conclusion of a proposal by, for instance, fixing 
an ambitious agenda of meetings with groups at different levels. Influence of supranational 
actors is greatest in the negotiation process when Member States articulate their 
preferences and where supranational actors can try to influence the bargaining process 
(see, for instance, Schmidt, 2000). However, their influence on the actual domestic 
preference formation is very limited. Indeed, there is no evidence that the red line which 
denotes the point beyond which a government is not willing to make any compromises can 
be influenced by supranational actors. Instead, it is determined by other factors such as 
the existing national legislation and foreign policy factors mediated by domestic political 
dynamics. As Pollack states: 
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[W]hile supranational institutions cannot act without regard to the preferences of 
the member governments, they can operate creatively within the constraints of 
those preferences to act autonomously, avoiding sanctions from – and setting the 
agenda for – the member governments in the Council. 
 
Hence, an intergovernmentalist take, i.e., Member State preferences are formed by and 
large without the influence of supranational institutions, is most appropriate for analysing 
the economic migration policies (see, for instance, Moravcsik, 1993; Moravcsik, 1998, 
1999). 
 
A third possible explanation relates to differences in the EU decision-making process over 
the years and the procedural differences between adopting directives and association 
agreements. However, the setup of the research project excludes this explanation as the 
dependent variable is national preferences, which under the two-level game assumption 
are formed at the domestic level (cf. Moravcsik, 1998; Putnam, 1988). Governments form 
those preferences by considering the costs and benefits of the measure being debated. 
Preferences are formed through the domestic political process. Even though international 
factors, such as foreign policy, also play a role in the process, the limit of concessions a 
Member State is willing to make is not determined by the influence of other Member States 
or supranational institutions on the preference formation process. Hence, how the rules of 
the negotiation process take place – if Member States can exercise their veto or be 
overruled by the majority of others, for instance – is secondary. 
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Aims, Goals, and Objectives 
The aim of this project is to theoretically develop, empirically test, and discuss a number of 
hypotheses that taken together can explain why a Member State government agrees to 
support the liberalisation of economic migration policies at the EU level. The idea is that 
these hypotheses are able to provide a comprehensive explanation of the position of a 
Member State government on policy measures that seek to liberalise economic migration 
at the EU level. The study will uncover how causal processes affect the positions of the 
actors involved and how they are finally aggregated to form the preference of a national 
government. 
 
Contribution 
The thesis makes several conceptual and empirical contributions to the literature on EU 
policy-making, preference formation, migration policies, German politics, and bureaucratic 
politics. Conceptually, the theoretical unpacking of a Member State’s preference on 
liberalising economic migration policies at the EU level is a notable contribution of the 
dissertation. The study uses the framework of bureaucratic politics (Allison, 1969, 1971; 
Allison & Halperin, 1972; Allison & Zelikow, 1999) and tests its applicability to the domain 
of economic migration and cooperation at the EU level. This framework has been 
acknowledged as one of the best approaches to explain governmental decision-making 
(see, for instance, Michaud, 2002), but has never been applied to preference formation on 
EU economic migration policies. It is used as a guiding structure, supplemented by an 
array of different themes that are all conceptually well-founded. For the conceptual 
underpinnings, different strands of literature are brought into play: the Europeanisation 
literature on compliance with EU regulations with regard to the misfit concept (see, for 
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instance, Börzel, 2002; Börzel & Risse, 2000; Çelenk, 2009; Duina, 1999; Grotz, 2005; 
Héritier, 1996; Knill & Lehmkuhl, 1999; Sbragia, 2000; Schüttpelz, 2006), international 
relations scholarship on foreign policy (see, for instance, Meyers, 2000; Mitchell, 1992; 
Rosenblum, 2004a; Rosenblum, 2004b; Rudolph, 2003, 2006), and the literature on 
national immigration policies (see, for instance, Cornelius, et al., 1994; Geddes, 2003; 
Guiraudon & Lahav, 2006, 2007; Hammar, 1985; Hollifield, 1997, 2000, 2004a, 2004b; 
Lahav, 1997, 2004a, 2004b; Messina & Lahav, 2006; Thränhardt, 1996a). Thus, the 
strengths and weaknesses of the respective concepts are applied to the case of 
liberalising economic migration policies at the EU level and thereafter discussed. In 
building its hypotheses, the study links concepts from these different literatures, bringing 
together works that have so far lived distinct lives. 
 
The systematic mapping of national preferences according to the relevant actors’ costs 
and benefits distribution, which is guided by the bureaucratic politics framework, allows the 
unpacking of what is often simplistically labelled national sovereignty concerns, a label that 
lacks a clear definition, and tends not to be questioned (see, for instance, Leitner, 1997; 
Niemann, 2008; O'Neill, 2006; Stetter, 2000). By tracing for each case the causal 
processes the independent variables have on the cost and benefits distribution of actors 
involved in the decision-making process, the dissertation reveals the analytical limitations 
of the concept of national sovereignty concerns (and with it the assumption that economic 
migration is always a national sovereignty concern and beyond the reach of the EU). The 
thesis further paints a detailed picture of how the causal processes have worked in the 
four case studies. This can then be used to shed light on decision-making processes in 
other countries and even policy areas. By providing a valuable approach to explain the 
formation of governmental preferences, the study shows the importance of evaluating 
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national preferences for investigations of EU policy-making on immigration, which has to 
date been neglected by the relevant literature. 
 
Specifically, the most important conceptual contributions of the dissertation are the 
following five. First, the dissertation highlights the so far neglected importance of foreign 
policy factors for the liberalisation of economic migration policies at the EU level. By so 
doing, it discusses the relevance of the literature on foreign policy factors and migration to 
EU immigration policy (see, for instance, Meyers, 2000; Mitchell, 1992; Rosenblum, 
2004a, 2004b; Rudolph, 2003; Rudolph, 2006). The dissertation highlights the importance 
of the foreign policy value of third countries and their ability to influence a Member State 
government’s preference formation of economic migration policies at the EU level. In 
addition, the dissertation shows why the concept of political salience is important for 
understanding when a Member State supports the EU-level liberalisation of economic 
migration policies. 
 
Second, the dissertation assesses the value of the bureaucratic politics framework for the 
study of EU economic migration policies. It shows in relation to the modes of politics 
framework (Freeman, 2006) that there is less variation in the modes of politics than the 
framework suggests, even though the distribution of actors’ costs and benefits vary. Thus, 
the rules of the game concept determines the mode of politics for the cases under review. 
According to the bureaucratic politics framework, the rules of the game preselect the major 
players, determine their points of entrance, and distribute power resources, i.e., they 
provide the structure within which the political contestation on a certain issue takes place 
(the concept will be discussed in detail in Chapter Two). Related to that point, the 
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dissertation shows that the pattern of preference formation was more cooperative and less 
a hard-nosed bargain, as the bureaucratic politics framework suggests. 
 
Third, with regard to the misfit concept of the Europeanisation literature, the dissertation 
shows that the concept is useful for the analysis of governmental preferences. It further 
specifies that for the cases under investigation, the misfit between national legislation and 
the relevant EU policy measures needs to be zero in order for a government to agree to 
the liberalisation of economic migration policies at the EU level. 
 
Fourth, it shows that the government’s perception that labour shortages need to be filled 
contributes indirectly to EU-level liberalisation of economic migration policies. One might 
think that a Member State would support a common EU policy on economic migration 
because it offers a more effective regulation than on the national level (an argument that 
the Commission has made repeatedly, for instance, in the Economic Migration Directive3 
and the Blue Card Directive4). However, this is not the case. The study shows that the 
perceived need of a government to fill labour shortages only affects preferences on EU-
level regulations indirectly. This means perceived labour shortages can lead to the 
implementation of national-level economic migration regulations that reduce the misfit in 
relation to the policy measures proposed at the EU level, thus indirectly contributing to 
Member State support for the EU-level regulation of economic migration. 
 
Finally, the dissertation creates a framework that can be used to explain governmental 
preferences on liberalising economic migration policies since the Treaty of Rome. No other 
explanatory framework has embarked to explain these preferences for the entire period of 
                                                
3 COM(2001) 386 final 
4 Council Directive 2009/50/EC 
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the European Integration project. The study’s framework involves linking the dependent 
variable (governmental preferences on liberalising economic migration policies at the EU 
level) to certain independent variables, and tracing the causal processes that lead from the 
independent variables to the particular outcome of the dependent ones. 
 
Empirically, the study demonstrates that the liberalisation of economic migration policies at 
the EU level has indeed already happened – and long before the recent, i.e., post-
Tampere, era characterised by restrictiveness rather than liberalisation. In addition, the 
dissertation provides a detailed account of the historical development of Germany’s 
preferences on EU measures on legal economic migration since the Community was 
founded in 1957. A comprehensive study on the development of Germany’s preferences 
concerning EU measures on legal economic migration does not yet exist. Such an account 
is an important part of scholarship on European Integration as well as German migration 
policy. The dissertation hopes to serve as a cornerstone for further work in these areas. 
Furthermore, the dissertation demonstrates the relevance of the Ankara and Europe 
Agreements for the study of a common EU economic migration policy, an assessment that 
has hitherto been disregarded by the literature. In fact, the study shows what can be 
learned from the liberalisation of economic migration policies at the EU level by means of 
the Association Agreements to explain developments since the Tampere European 
Council in 1999. Most notably, this is the importance of foreign political factors and the 
Foreign Office for making a Member State government more inclined to support the EU-
level liberalisation of economic migration policies. 
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Outline of the Dissertation 
Chapter Two discusses the relevant literature and assembles three hypotheses, deploying 
a number of different literatures, namely those on Europeanisation, migration policy-
making, international relations, and political economy. Chapter Two is divided into three 
themes: domestic politics, international politics, and labour market concerns. The empirical 
part of the dissertation consists of four chapters. 
 
Chapter Three presents the methodological approach of the dissertation, i.e., case study 
selection, gathering and analysis of the primary data, the Federal Republic of Germany’s 
domestic immigration history to contextualise the sub-case studies, comparability of the 
sub-case studies, and the operationalisation of the independent variables. 
 
Chapter Four analyses the Ankara Agreement and shows that the freedom of movement 
provisions of the Agreement were contested and not, as wrongly asserted by the relevant 
literature, only taken from the Treaty of Rome without causing any disagreement. The 
chapter shows the primary importance in the foreign policy value of Turkey and the efforts 
of the Turkish government to lobby for the inclusion of the provisions in the Agreement. 
However, the fit between national regulations also played a direct role (which nonetheless 
was slightly secondary to the foreign policy factors) as the national regulations were more 
specific than the ones proposed in the Ankara Agreement. This meant that German 
decision-makers did not have to compromise Germany’s national immigration policy 
because of supporting the Agreement. With its more specific and liberal provisions than 
the Ankara Agreement’s, the bilateral agreement continued to regulate migration from 
Germany to Turkey and reduced the misfit to quasi zero.  
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Chapter Five shows why Germany supported the Association Agreement the EC 
concluded with Poland. While foreign political dynamics also played a role, this chapter 
shows that the fit with the national legislation needed to be guaranteed and was the most 
important factor as decision-makers were not willing to compromise German national 
regulations. In addition, the political salience of immigration was relatively high. However, 
the Europe Agreement was not linked in public debate to opening up a new route for 
immigration from CEEC to Germany. This contributed to the German government agreeing 
to include the provisions on freedom of movement and establishment in the Agreement, 
thereby affecting the distribution of costs and benefits and the nature of the decision-
making process. The bureaucratic and largely intra-ministerial decision-making facilitated 
support for including the provisions in the Agreement. The chapter demonstrates that the 
Agreement had real implications for German national law and thus should be regarded as 
a liberalising measure at the EU level. The existing literature misses this point. 
 
Chapter Six analyses why the German government did not support the Economic 
Migration Directive. The Directive was a policy proposal that would have liberalised 
immigration policy at the EU level. In that case, foreign political factors did not play a role 
as the proposed initiative could not be considered relevant to a particular country (or a set 
of countries). In addition, the political salience of immigration was high and preference 
formation on the Directive coincided with a heated domestic debate about immigration, 
fuelled for instance by discussions about reforming domestic immigration law, the link 
between immigration and security, and what EU enlargement could mean for immigration 
to Germany. Hence, the high political salience of immigration made bureaucratic and 
objective decision-making on the Directive very difficult. Moreover, the misfit between the 
Directive and the German national legislation was significant and was further multiplied by 
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the high political salience of migration. Thus, the high political salience was the most 
important factor in this case, closely followed by the misfit. 
 
Chapter Seven discusses how the German government arrived at the conclusion to 
support the proposed EU Directive on the admission of highly qualified workers (Blue Card 
Directive). As in the preceding chapter, foreign policy considerations did not play a role 
and were thus missing as a factor that could influence German decision-makers to support 
the proposal. The most important factor was that the Directive did not thwart any of the 
new national immigration measures the German federal government had adopted. Had the 
Directive overruled those regulations, the political costs would have been high. However, 
as the regulations were not infringed upon by the Directive, the misfit was low. Another 
point that secondarily contributed to the position of the German government was that even 
though migration was a topic present in public debate, the political salience was less than 
with regard to the Economic Migration Directive. In addition, ongoing domestic debates 
about the need for highly qualified migrants also played a role in making the German 
government support the Blue Card Directive. 
 
The concluding chapter of the dissertation finds that foreign policy factors are the most 
important to push for Member State support of liberalising economic migration at the EU 
level. However, for them to play a role, the policy measure needs to relate to a particular 
country (or countries) that has (have) a high foreign policy value (shaped significantly by 
the wider international political context – e.g., post-war/Cold War, post-1989); the 
government (governments) of the respective sending country (countries) needs (need) to 
actively lobby the Member State government; and the domestic political salience needs to 
be low. There is no direct link between labour shortages and Member State support for 
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EU-level regulation of economic migration. In the cases analysed by this dissertation, the 
existence of labour shortages did not induce a government to support EU-level 
liberalisation of economic migration. The most important factor in inhibiting support is the 
misfit between the national regulation and the proposed EU-level policy measure. If the 
misfit is too high, support is impossible. The study also finds that the mode of politics was 
less useful to analyse if a government is likely to agree to a certain policy measure or not. 
This is because the mode of politics stayed rather constant across the cases. The 
important point is whether the decision-making happens bureaucratically or is more 
politically loaded. However, this is not determined by the mode of politics but by the 
externally induced political salience, i.e., by domestic political developments such as 
immigration law reform or problems of integrating migrants. High domestic political 
salience is another important factor that makes Member State agreement to liberalise 
economic migration at the EU level less likely. However, the causal importance of 
domestic political salience is less than that of the misfit concept. 
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Chapter Two – Theoretical Framework: Bureaucratic 
Politics, Foreign Policy and Labour Markets 
 
Introduction 
This chapter discusses the theoretical themes and analytical concepts relevant for 
determining why and under what conditions an EU Member State agrees to delegate 
competencies on economic migration to the EU level. It is built around three themes that 
relate to three hypotheses. The first theme, covering labour market factors, provides the 
context for the other two; the second theme is domestic politics and comprises two 
hypotheses. Hypothesis One refers to the misfit between the national legislation and the 
policy proposed at the EU level. Hypothesis Two covers the importance of a bureaucratic 
debate and low political salience, or the fact that the proposed policy measure is not linked 
to political salience. The third theme concerns international politics and foreign political 
factors. Accordingly, Hypothesis Three incorporates the importance of foreign policy value, 
political salience of immigration, and the lobbying effort of a relevant sending country. 
 
The dependent variable the study explains is the preference of an EU Member State’s 
government. The dissertation addresses the question: Why and under what conditions 
does a Member State support EU-level liberalisation of economic migration policies for 
third country nationals? The study explains the process of how a Member State 
government arrives at its respective preferences by considering the positions of the 
relevant actors according to their respective distribution of costs and benefits. 
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Bureaucratic Politics 
The theoretical model of bureaucratic politics provides an analytical lens to examine how 
costs and benefits are distributed across actors, and how the final governmental 
preferences emerge from those of the different actors involved. The model was developed 
to explain foreign policy decisions made by the US political system (Allison, 1969; Allison 
& Halperin, 1972; Allison & Zelikow, 1999; Brummer, 2009; Halperin, et al., 2006). It was 
first spelled out in full detail by Allison (1971), who presented a revised version in 1999 
responding to some of the criticism the model had attracted over the years (Allison & 
Zelikow, 1999). Allison and Zelikow based the 1999 version of the bureaucratic politics 
framework on the works of Neustadt, Darman and George (Darman, 1996; George, 1980; 
Neustadt, 1990). 
 
The model was either applied to or analysed by a plethora of studies (see, for instance, 
Fuhrmann & Early, 2008; M. A. Smith, 2008; S. Smith, 1985; Wagner, 1974), but also 
attracted a great deal of criticism (see, for instance, Art, 1973; Bendor & Hammond, 1992; 
Bernstein, 1999, 2000; Brower & Abolafia, 1997; Caldwell, 1977; Christensen & Redd, 
2004; Hollis & Smith, 1986; Krasner, 1972; Michaud, 2002; Rhodes, 1994; S. Smith, 1980; 
Welch, 1992). Although the model has been developed using the presidential system of 
the US, and for decision-making on foreign policy only, there is nothing that contradicts its 
applicability to other countries. Consequently, several authors have tested the model’s 
applicability elsewhere, for example, Canada (Blanc, 1989; Desrosiers & Lagassé, 2009). 
The bulk of literature that makes use of the framework relates to issues of foreign policy. 
This does not mean that the model cannot aptly be applied to domestic political processes. 
A number of authors have used the model to analyse other policy areas, for instance, 
security institution reform in Germany (Brummer, 2009), pension reform in Korea (Yang, 
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2004), welfare state reform in Sweden (Dahlström, 2009), and the EU’s capacity to 
manage homeland security in the case of a crisis (Mark & Boin, 2009). 
 
The model as presented by Allison is extremely rich and consists of many detailed 
provisions. Accordingly, it has been criticised for being too complex (Bendor & Hammond, 
1992) and for being difficult to operationalise (Michaud, 2002). In order to use it in a 
systematic way, it is useful to reduce the model to three main propositions. First, the 
actors’ position in a bureaucracy influences their preferences, as the mission of the 
bureaucratic players is generally to foster the interest of their organisation (Allison & 
Zelikow, 1999: 307; Brummer, 2009: 504). Thus, different departments or units are likely to 
perceive costs and benefits varyingly, and consequently differ in their conclusions about 
certain policy issues. Moreover, actors prefer policies that they believe will improve the 
position of their respective organisation (Halperin, et al., 2006: 38). Second, actors differ in 
terms of power, i.e., their ability to effectively influence government decisions and actions. 
Power can be structural, stemming from the particular organisation of the bureaucracy, or 
based on certain skilled individuals, i.e., individual power capabilities (Allison & Zelikow, 
1999: 300; Brummer, 2009: 504-505). As the following chapters show, in this study, power 
relates to being in charge of the file, or the power of individual arguments, rather than to 
differences in structural power. Third, the contestation is structured by the rules of the 
game; they determine the action-channels. Allison (1999: 300) defines action channels as 
“a regularized means of taking governmental action on a specific kind of issue.” They 
preselect the major players, determine their usual points of entrance into the game, and 
distribute particular advantages and disadvantages. The game is seen as a process of 
political contestation. As Allison and Zelikow (1999: 294-295) put it: 
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The decisions and actions of governments are intranational political resultants: 
resultants in the sense that what happens is not chosen as a solution to a problem 
but rather results from compromise, conflict, and confusion of officials with diverse 
interests and unequal influence; political in the sense that activity from which 
decisions and actions emerge is best characterised as bargaining along 
regularised channels among individual members of the government. 
 
In this dissertation, the framework is used to arrive at the respective actor preferences by 
looking at three themes – labour market needs, international factors, and domestic political 
factors. The rules of the game for government preference formation on liberalising 
economic migration at the EU level can include actors that are not part of the executive for 
which the bureaucratic politics model was coined. Allison and Zelikow acknowledge that 
beyond what they call the “central arena”, relevant non-executive actors, such as 
legislators, lobbyists for interest groups, foreign officials, the press, NGOs, and the public 
can join in the decision-making process (Allison & Zelikow, 1999: 255, 258). The analysis 
does not discuss in detail the role of non-executive actors, but if the rules of the game 
include non-executive actors, they are part of the decision-making process. Most 
importantly however, the framework fails to consider how non-executive actors, in 
particular, foreign government officials that are not included in the rules of the game, enter 
the process of decision-making. 
 
I. Immigration and labour market needs 
This section discusses the causal link between labour shortages and governmental 
support for the EU-level liberalisation of economic migration. It shows that the literature 
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suggests there is no direct causal link between labour shortages and neither the 
dependent variable of this dissertation nor more liberal economic migration policies at the 
national level. 
 
Economic benefits of immigration 
Economic considerations play an important role in the formulation of immigration policies – 
especially liberal ones aimed at bringing immigrant workers into the country. In order to 
analyse the effects of migration, Straubhaar (1992: 465) suggests separating them 
according to allocational consequences that refer, first, to the most efficient use of the 
scarce production factors, and, second, to the distributional effects of a country’s economic 
output. 
 
Most economists agree that migration tends to improve the cumulative income of a country 
(Brücker, Frick, & Wagner, 2006: 141). Generally speaking, it is suggested that economic 
prosperity instigates states to accept more immigrants. Conversely, during recessions, 
states are more reluctant to admit migrants, which can damage bilateral ties between 
sending and receiving countries (Miller, 2000: 36). Meyers (2004: 12) suggests that the 
economic situation impacts immigration policy through the interest group channel and, 
mostly in times of economic crisis, also through the partisan channel. During periods of 
strong economic growth, employers are eager to hire additional workers and they employ 
their resources to lobby for liberal immigration policies. Domestic workers do not mind 
immigration inflows as long as immigrants take low-paid jobs, or do not compete for scarce 
ones; this allows domestic workers to improve their social position, and does not depress 
overall wages too heavily (Meyers, 2004: 12). 
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These rationales are based on a liberal economic model developed by Lewis (1954). The 
model is disaggregated, i.e., it has more than one sector and more than one factor of 
production (Kindleberger, 1967: 6). Continued supply of labour keeps firms’ wage bills low 
and profits up, ensuring a favourable climate for investment, improved productivity, low 
inflation, and increased consumption. This model predicts – optimistically – strong 
economic growth and increasing wages (facilitated by larger profits and boosted 
employment) as long as labour supplies are unlimited and demand is increasing (Hollifield, 
1992: 104; Kindleberger, 1967; W. A. Lewis, 1954). Income per capita increases for capital 
owners, land owners, entrepreneurs, non-competing workers, but also for competing 
labour (Kindleberger, 1967: 14). In addition, immigration is seen as having a positive effect 
on innovations (Perry, 1978: 171). Both Lewis and Kindleberger’s writings hail from a 
particular time, the post World War II economic boom. Immigration was largely viewed 
then as beneficial for both receiving and sending countries, because scant labour 
resources were more efficiently deployed, or yielded higher wages (Papademetriou & 
Martin, 1991: 30). 
 
Nonetheless, the economic benefits of economic migration are not unambiguous. 
Williamson (Williamson, 2005: 9-11) points out that using a simplified model that 
presupposes one type of output and one type of labour, the total gain for society as a 
whole is small and the distributive effects are unequivocal: wage earners lose while 
employers profit. Hence, according to this model, employers tend to favour open 
immigration policies, while employees are induced to prefer restrictive policies. The more 
sophisticated the model, the more complicated the implications. For instance, if markets 
fail to clear by means of wage adjustment, then, in the short run at least, immigrants add 
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more to the labour force than to employment. This can result in crowding out, i.e., 
immigrants pushing natives out of employment or vice versa (see, for instance, Hatton & 
Williamson, 1998: 28). By and large, actors who offer production factors that become 
relatively rare gain, while actors providing production factors whose supply has increased 
due to immigration encounter disadvantages (Zimmermann, et al., 2007: 55). This means 
that workers, especially those (and the organisations presenting them) who have the same 
skills as a certain group of immigrants, face fiercer competition for jobs and lower wages. 
Consequently, they tend to oppose policies that make it easier for such immigrants to 
enter the country. These groups are often catered to by right-wing politicians who try to stir 
up fears and reap electoral gains. 
 
This leads us to the fiscal implications of migration. If more immigrants are out of 
employment, they are supported by the native population – given that there is a functioning 
welfare state in place. If the employment among immigrants is higher than for natives, the 
immigrants tend to support the residents. A study conducted by Borjas (1994: 28) 
suggests the former scenario is the case for the US. By 1990, immigrant households made 
up 10.1 percent of all households that obtained public assistance and drew upon 13.1 
percent of the total cash assistance, although only 8.4 percent of the households in the US 
were foreign born at that time. Borjas suggests that the annual net gain of immigration is 
small: less than 0.1 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the US. In the late 
1990s this added up to a net benefit of $10 billion annually for the native population as a 
whole, or less than $30 per person (Borjas, 1999: 90-93). 
 
Moreover, with regard to the wage reducing effect of immigration due to increases in the 
labour supply that the Kindleberger model presupposed, Hatton and Williamson (1998: 
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171) point out that this effect can be reduced if the native population is mobile enough to 
seek jobs in other regions of the economy. Thus, there is the need for macroeconomic 
analysis rather than local labour market analysis when assessing the impact of 
immigration on wages (Hatton & Williamson, 1998: 174). 
 
The analysis suggests that immigration is not beneficial per se. It is beneficial when it 
closes gaps on the labour market that the host country is unable to close with its existing 
labour resources. The more immigrants compete with natives for jobs, the more losers of 
immigration emerge, and the wealth creation effect of immigration is reduced while the 
redistributive effect increases. This puts labour shortages in the limelight. However, the 
task of identifying labour shortages is methodologically challenging. This is discussed in 
detail below. 
 
General vs. sectoral labour shortages 
It is important to distinguish between general labour shortages, i.e., labour shortages in all 
areas of the economy by (near) full employment and partial labour shortages, i.e., a 
shortage of labour that only affects certain qualifications, companies, sectors, and regions 
but is a structural phenomenon (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, 2002: 30). Partial labour 
shortages are also referred to as labour market mismatches. Labour market mismatches 
can also occur because of a lack of information between supply and demand (Boswell, 
Stiller, & Straubhaar, 2004: 5), but that is likely to be only a short-term occurrence. 
 
Structural labour shortages can crop up because of a combination of social, demographic, 
economic, and political factors. For instance, low birth rates, restructuring of the labour 
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market into primary and secondary sectors, relative high growth of the secondary labour 
market, manpower needs by natural resource-rich and exporting economies, and the 
emergence of new industries requiring specialised skills (Papademetriou & Martin, 1991: 
13-14). Labour shortages can appear both for high- and low-skilled jobs. For instance, on 
the one hand, the rise of the IT industry affected the relative increase of demand for high-
skilled labour in OECD countries, and thus the widening of “skill differentials”, i.e., the ratio 
of high- to low-skilled wages (Chiswick, 2005: 2). On the other hand, developments such 
as demographic aging and the increased incidence of working couples have given rise to 
demand for domestic care takers and nursery teachers. 
 
The existence of labour shortages is independent from overall economic growth. Even if a 
country is in economic difficulties, unemployment is rising, and state budgets are heavily 
strained, there tend to be labour shortages, mostly for specialised jobs (see, for instance, 
Boswell, et al., 2004: 5). These vary by labour market but in European countries are 
reported in the engineering, information technology, pharmaceuticals, healthcare, and 
education sectors (European Commission, 2007a: 10). 
 
With a lack of labour, wages and prices go up, profits decline, investment is hampered, 
and the balance of payments becomes adverse (Kindleberger, 1967: 16). Targeted 
immigration can limit economic losses that might occur due to excess demand, and 
immigrant workers do not steal jobs from natives as they lack the required skills 
(Zimmermann, et al., 2007). However, we need to keep in mind the problems associated 
with this. Most notably, immigration should not be used as a substitute for structural 
adjustment measures aimed at decreasing gaps in the labour market in the long run, as 
otherwise labour shortages might persist, necessitating continuous immigration. In 
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addition, crucial investment might not be made, impeding economic advancement. 
However, structural adjustment measures need more time to show any results. Thus, 
immigration lends itself to lessening these shortages with immediate effect. 
 
These political economic models provide great value in explaining why certain actors might 
support open policies. However, they run into difficulties in accounting for the political 
processes that aggregate different actors’ preferences and translate them into those of the 
governmental decision-makers responsible for final migration policies (Freeman & Kessler, 
2008: 665; Hollifield, 1992: 117). The main disadvantage of using economic models to 
explain immigration policies is “their extreme parsimony” (Freeman, 1998: 17). They make 
use of generalisations and abstractions which are analytically useful; however, they may 
be too broad for an adequate analysis of immigration politics in a particular context 
(Hollifield, 2000: 146-147). 
 
Link between labour shortages and liberalisation of economic migration policies. 
 
The above section has suggested there are incentives for governments to implement 
liberal immigration policies if labour shortages are reported (Hollifield, 1992; Kindleberger, 
1967; W. A. Lewis, 1954). However, the links between labour shortages and liberal 
economic migration policies are not as direct as one might assume. This is for three main 
reasons. First, labour shortages are very difficult to identify in a methodologically rigorous 
way that does not rely only on employer data. The problem with employer data is that 
employers may have an incentive to exaggerate the numbers of vacancies they cannot fill. 
Second, immigration is only one amongst a large arsenal of other possible measures to 
reduce labour shortages. Thus, theoretically, labour shortages can be reduced by policy 
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measures other than immigration. Third and finally, factors other than labour shortages 
may play a role in governmental preference formation on national immigration policies and 
the implementation of certain immigration policies to regulate economic migration. 
Assuming that national preferences on immigration policies are only driven by labour 
shortages would be oversimplifying the issue, and would disregard many other possible 
causal factors. For instance, as the preceding section’s discussion has shown, foreign 
political factors can play a significant role in national immigration policy-making (Mitchell, 
1992; Rosenblum, 2004a, 2004b; Rudolph, 2003, 2006). Other factors identified by the 
literature as potentially influencing economic migration policies include: the lobbying of 
trade unions and, in particular, employer associations (Menz, 2009); sectoral demands 
articulated by firms (Caviedes, 2010); the distribution of costs and benefits across actors in 
society (Freeman, 2002, 2006); public opinion (Castles, 2004); the entrenchment of certain 
institutional arrangements (R. Hansen, 2000); and the party system and the extreme right 
(Schain, 2006). 
 
This dissertation is concerned with whether there are existing national-level economic 
migration policies that are liberal in the sense of opening routes for economic migrants to 
enter the country. Why they have been adopted is not relevant for the explanation put 
forward here, and beyond the scope of this dissertation. Accordingly, the above discussion 
of labour shortages and their relationship to national economic migration policies also 
supports Hypothesis One, i.e., a Member State will support EU-level liberalisation of 
economic migration if the proposed measures are similar to its national policies, or at least 
do not thwart them. 
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II. Domestic Politics 
The role of national legislation 
Fit/Misfit 
In order to analyse the role of national legislation, two concepts are introduced – the fit 
between national legislation and the uploading of national preferences to the EU level. 
These are borrowed from the Europeanisation literature, without however entering the 
definitional debate on what Europeanisation constitutes (see, for instance, Börzel & Risse, 
2000; Featherstone, 2003; Grotz, 2005; Radaelli, 2000, 2003). This approach perceives 
EU policy-making as a two-level game, in which national decision makers attempt to 
reconcile national with international obligations (Putnam, 1988). Menz (Menz, 2009) 
provides a useful discussion of Europeanisation in relation to migration policies, and points 
out that Europeanisation, in relation to Putnam’s two-level game, is best conceived as a 
two-way process comprising both top-down and bottom-up processes. This gives rise to 
dynamic games played out in numerous arenas (Menz, 2009: 80). 
 
The concept of a legislative misfit or mismatch gained prominence in the Europeanisation 
literature on compliance and implementation of EU legislation by Member States (see, for 
instance, Börzel, 1999; Börzel & Risse, 2000; Çelenk, 2009; Duina, 1999; Grotz, 2005; 
Héritier, et al., 1996; Knill & Lehmkuhl, 1999; Sbragia, 2000; Schüttpelz, 2006). In order to 
analyse the domestic impact of the EU, the concept of a misfit or mismatch between the 
national legislation and the proposed EU policies is used for both gauging the degree of 
change induced by the EU policies, and the different compliance or implementation 
trajectories of Member States (Börzel & Risse, 2000). Cowles et al. (2001: 6-9) identify the 
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degree of adaptation pressure a country experiences by the degree of fit between the 
Europeanisation process and the national institutional settings. In their framework, they 
refer to the goodness of fit to conceptualise this. 
 
All these concepts refer to the difference between the national and EU level with regards 
to hard legislation, rules, or regulatory practices. Two simplified antipolar scenarios are 
identified. First, the adaptation pressure to adjust national and EU-level legislation or 
regulation is low and only little adaptation is required. As adaptation costs are low, 
domestic actors easily implement the changes induced at the EU level. Second, if the 
adaptation pressure is substantial, European institutions induce a collision with national 
regulatory principles, practices and laws. In this scenario, adaptation costs can be very 
high; consequently they might lead to national resistance to the proposed changes and a 
poor implementation record (Cowles, et al., 2001: 8; Duina, 1999: 117). While the literature 
is chiefly concerned with explaining domestic change, these concepts are applicable more 
widely. In light of this study’s analysis, another dimension needs to be presented, namely 
the domestic attempts to influence and actively shape what is concluded at the European 
level. 
 
In the context of environmental policy, a number of authors (Andersen & Liefferink, 1997; 
Börzel, 2002; Héritier, 1995, 1996; Héritier, et al., 1996; Richardson, 1994) refer to 
differences between the regulatory style of a Member State and the adjustment costs it 
must bear in case the proposed EU policies correspond to another regulatory style. 
However, the authors do not use the concept of misfit or fit to conceptualise these 
differences. Importantly, they establish the link between the national regulation and the 
EU-level policy by pointing out that highly regulated Member States seek to influence 
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European legislation by imposing their regulatory style and philosophy on the other 
Member States in order to reduce their own adaptation costs. The authors assume that 
high-regulating countries are likely to take on a leadership role in shaping EU legislation 
according to their ideas and interests (Héritier, 1995: 301). This includes soft styles and 
philosophies of regulation, as well as hard legislation on institutions for environmental 
legislation. 
 
However, findings are elaborated in the field of environmental policy, and do not 
automatically pertain to other kinds of EU policy or policy process (Menz, 2009: 14). 
Differences exist between policy-making on environmental issues and immigration. 
Regulating the access to the national labour market tends to be extremely sensitive, and 
the need for EU involvement in this area was seen as less important. In addition, until the 
Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, Member States had the right to veto policy measures 
in the Council of Ministers, while qualified majority voting had been the established mode 
of decision-making for environmental policy since the Maastricht Treaty (Andersen & 
Liefferink, 1997: 1). Thus, taking a leadership role in pushing for a certain kind of 
immigration policy was less pronounced as Member States could veto policy proposals 
they did not like. Nevertheless, the ambition to avoid adaptation costs is useful for 
examining immigration policy. Börzel (2002: 196) conceptualises this dynamic by using the 
concept of uploading: Member States attempt to upload their national policies to the EU 
level (see also, Blavoukos & Pagoulatos, 2008; Orbie et al., 2009). They intend to 
maximise their own benefits and minimise the costs of European policies. The better the fit 
between European and domestic policy, the lower the costs in the implementation process 
(Börzel, 2002: 196). Radaelli suggests an important addition to this conceptualisation. He 
argues for “differentiating between the process leading to a certain policy” and the 
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“reverberation of that policy in national arenas” (Radaelli, 2003: 34). Otherwise, there 
would be no difference between the concept of uploading and the EU policy process. 
Radaelli cautions that using two concepts, i.e., Europeanisation and EU policy process, for 
the same phenomenon is contrary to what parsimony suggests (Radaelli, 2003: 34). 
Hence, this study uses the concept of uploading only in the particular context of trying to 
minimise adaptation pressures resulting from a misfit between national and EU-level 
legislation. 
 
We would expect the analysis of economic migration policy to depart from the dynamics 
portrayed as dominant in the field of environmental policy. In addition to avoiding 
adaptation costs, a potential benefit of uploading a policy is the creation of favourable 
conditions for domestic industries. For instance, if a highly regulated country’s standards 
are made to be upheld EU-wide, this can create a competitive advantage for industries of 
that country; firms from other countries might need some time to adapt to the new norms. 
A second benefit is the advantages of a more effective European regulation regime for 
complex issues that transcend national boundaries. The first of these two incentives to 
upload policies does not apply to economic migration as industrial advantages can be 
entirely neglected. Regarding the second incentive, the story is more complex. Proponents 
of a common EU policy on economic migration tend to propagate that there is a significant 
European value added for EU-level regulation; for instance, the need for comprehensive 
EU-level regulation of external migration because of the borderless Schengen area (see, 
for instance, Koslowski, 1998: 160-165; Moraes, 2003: 118; Niessen, 1996: 21-22). Yet, 
this benefit is generally not accepted by national policy makers, as they want to retain the 
national prerogative of deciding who can legally enter the labour market. Thus, the second 
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benefit of more effective regulation also does not generally play a role in the national 
decision-making process. 
 
Because of the lack of incentives, it is less likely for a Member State to upload a particular 
kind of policy for the sake of reaping certain benefits, like environmental policy, for 
instance (however, this is not to say that it cannot happen). Rather, the focus is on 
avoiding adaptation costs, which makes the misfit concept more useful for this study than 
uploading. Given that keeping control over who enters the national labour market is a 
priority matter for national governments, any EU legislation that infringes upon this 
capacity would constitute extremely high costs for national governments. Hence, national 
governments are likely to be unwilling to accept any EU-level regulation of economic 
migration if the misfit is too high. The Europeanisation literature on misfit/uploading 
focuses too heavily on the final result of the governmental preferences, and does not take 
into adequate consideration the process of how these preferences are formed, the actors 
involved in the process, and that the context within which they are formed can change over 
time. This study unpacks the black box of governmental preferences in tracing the causal 
processes that crystallise them. Thus, we can formulate Hypothesis One as follows: 
 
A Member State will support EU-level liberalisation of economic migration if the proposed 
measures are similar to its national policies, or at least do not thwart them. 
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Bureaucratic Debate and Political salience 
Policy Frames 
In order to map out the costs and benefits that lead an actor to favour a certain preference, 
we need to distinguish between perceived and actual costs (and benefits). For example, if 
workers oppose immigration because they worry about immigrants taking their jobs, 
consequently catapulting them into a prolonged period of unemployment, then these can 
be perceived costs based on stipulations of right-wing politicians and conservative 
newspapers intending to gain popularity on an anti-immigration platform. It does not 
necessarily follow that these costs will actually accrue. Immigrant programmes might only 
admit migrants with skills different to native workers’, and thus do not stand in direct 
competition with the domestic work force. Cases where migrants indeed crowd out the 
native population or depress wages are also possible. Whether this happens or not is less 
important for the preferences of relevant actors. What matters is that actors perceive they 
will incur certain costs (or benefits). To capture this, the concept of policy frames proves 
useful. 
 
Lavenex (2000: 4) provides a brief definition, regarding policy frames as “the ideational 
core of a particular field which contains the dominant interpretation of the underlying social 
problem and expresses guideposts for action.” This is based on the work of Rein and 
Schön (1991: 264) who state in a more detailed fashion how policy frames guide actors’ 
behaviour: 
 
Mental structures, appreciations, world making, and framing are terms that capture 
different features of the processes by which people construct interpretations of 
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problematic situations, making them coherent from our various perspectives and 
providing ourselves with evaluative frameworks with which we can judge how to 
act. No one is exempt from the need for framing. Personal, scholarly, and political 
practice all depend upon it. 
 
This conception is strongly related to what Hall (1993: 279) calls policy paradigms. He 
points out that the importance of the framework is very high because so much is taken for 
granted and unamenable to probing. The policy frames become institutionalised in public 
policies and thus gain the status of ideational institutions. Because of this, they have the 
potential to influence the distribution and perception of benefits and the imposition of costs, 
even after the social power relations that gave rise to this pattern of distribution have been 
altered (Coleman, 1998: 634). 
 
What these considerations neglect, however, is the political side of the concept and how a 
particular policy frame becomes dominant. To attain this, we need to differentiate between 
individual framing, i.e., the tendency for individuals to frame issues differently, and 
collective framing, i.e., the “process of competition and mutual monitoring within 
communities of professions [that] keeps policy communities in a collective equilibrium most 
of the time” (Baumgartner & Mahoney, 2008). Here we enter the terrain of the classical 
power struggle for political influence. McAdam et al. (1996: 6) capture the political 
dynamics of the concept in referring to policy frames as “conscious strategic efforts by 
groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that 
legitimate and motivate collective action.” Hence, political actors attempt to frame a certain 
issue to serve their respective interest. Whoever has the most resources – more people, 
better strategies, or better access to the media – is more likely to establish his or her 
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favoured policy frame as the dominant one. This is linked to an increase in political leeway 
and control (see, for instance, Stone, 1989: 283). However, glancing back on the 
distinction between individual and collective framing, it is clear that different frames can 
continue to exist in parallel across different individuals and collectives. These differences 
might never be resolved. 
 
Frames as used by this study relate to particular issues and are thus more specific than a 
paradigm or Weltanschauung, which refer to sets or systems of values, beliefs and 
assumptions. Policy frames are important in order to grasp how perceptions can structure 
behaviour and how they can be manipulated by political actors. Hence, a policy frame 
gives perceptions a political dimension. Actors act according to how they interpret reality. 
Hence, whether a certain policy indeed benefits a certain group or not is less important for 
the formation of certain actors’ preferences on the issue; they form their position according 
to what they believe the policy result will be. In the long run, this perception might change, 
of course, if a different policy frame becomes relevant. However, this is a long process; 
new policy frames are not established overnight. The emergence of a new policy frame 
can be correlated to the actual cost or benefit starting to manifest itself in a clear way, 
which then changes the current policy frame that was based solely on perceptions. The 
point here is that actors’ motives are filtered by perceptions of reality. Policies have 
substantive content, but various actors perceive the effects of these policies differently 
(Lowi, 1964: 686-691). 
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Modes of politics 
To capture the various processes at work on forming governmental preferences, a liberal 
institutionalist perspective that combines institutions with interest groups is useful. 
Institutionalism concentrates on actors such as state bureaucracies, political parties, the 
set up of political institutions and the relationships between them (J. Hansen & Lofstrom, 
2003; R. Hansen, 2002; Money, 1999; Soysal, 1994). Interest group approaches examine 
the interplay of groups during the making of immigration policy (Freeman, 2006; Joppke, 
1998b; Richardson, 1993). Interest groups influence governmental preferences in a 
number of ways. However, empirically establishing their actual impact is not 
straightforward. Some authors even argue that the likelihood of a political organisation to 
directly affect policy outcomes is only around 50 percent, and impact significantly 
decreases if public opinion is taken into account (Burstein & Linton, 2002). If the public is 
very concerned with an issue, for the elected public official it is more likely that his or her 
actions will have an impact on voters’ party choice. Hence public opinion is the main 
trigger for political action (Burstein & Linton, 2002: 384). But this postulation is problematic, 
as public opinion is a very porous concept and there is usually not a single fixed public 
opinion to which office holders try to cater. Rather, there are different groups of voters, 
whose interests might be represented by certain interest groups, such as the two classic 
pairings: workers by trade unions and employers by business associations. Even though 
interest groups do not capture the entire electorate, they play an important role in the 
process of governmental preference formation. 
 
Dür (2008: 1221-1223) puts forward four different pathways for interest group influence: 
access, selection, voice, and structural coercion. As interest groups make use of several 
or all of these pathways, all of them need to be considered in order to map the overall 
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influence of a certain interest group (Dür, 2008: 1223). Access denotes the possibility of 
direct expression of demands to decision makers, most effectively if they have a “seat at 
the table”. However, there are other interest groups likely to have the same opportunity as 
they also have a “seat at the table”. Therefore, access does not automatically translate into 
influence. Rather, influence is a political process that also depends on factors such as 
resources and effective communication. Yielding influence over the selection of decision 
makers – for example, in the form of election campaigns or the selection of certain 
bureaucrats and judges – interest groups can try to select officials that are sympathetic to 
their own preferences. The voice pathway refers to “making noise”, for instance, through 
manifestations, rallies, petitions, public debates, media statements, and influencing 
referenda or citizen initiatives through campaigning. Finally, the term structural coercion 
refers to the power to decide about making investments. This capacity is only at the 
disposal of business groups. They might decide to invest where they feel policy makers 
share or at least take into account their preferences (Dür, 2008: 1221-1223). While this list 
might not be exhaustive, it represents a useful conceptual frame to analyse the influence 
of certain actors on a national government’s preferences. 
 
Table 2: Freeman’s Four Types of Policy and Mode of Politics. 
Policy type Mode of politics 
Concentrated distributive (concentrated 
benefits and diffuse costs) 
Client 
Diffuse distributive (diffuse benefits and 
diffuse costs) 
Majoritarian 
Redistributive (concentrated benefits and 
concentrated costs) 
Interest group 
Regulatory (diffuse 
benefits and concentrated costs) 
Entrepreneurial 
 
Source: Freeman (2006: 230) 
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Freeman offers a well developed framework, clustering immigration politics in four different 
modes of politics, according to their distribution of costs and benefits (Freeman, 1995, 
2006). The model is summarised in Table 2. If benefits are concentrated and costs are 
diffuse, client politics will emerge, consisting of small, rather homogenous constituencies 
that try to make their interests heard. Freeman labels these kinds of policies concentrated 
distributive policies (Lowi, 1964). Client politics tend to be producer-dominant and involve 
small and easily organised groups. They usually take place largely out of public view and 
with little external intervention (see, also, Joppke, 1998a: 16-18). This dynamic can be 
counteracted by the emergence of “watchdog” associations whose actions are focused on 
a certain lobby and are independent from the mobilisation of people adversely affected by 
a certain policy (Wilson, 1980: 369). Diffuse distributive policies comprise goods with 
unlimited supply, generating diffuse benefits and costs. The result is majoritarian politics. 
Interest groups have little incentive to mobilise around such policies as the majority of 
society anticipates to gain or to bear the costs. No particular group, such as an industry, 
an occupation, or a locality, is affected in a particular way that would merit taking action 
(Wilson, 1980: 367). Societal support or opposition to such policies would require the 
mobilisation of large majorities, made up of diverse groups and individuals that only care 
half-heartedly about the issue at stake. Such mobilisation is not very likely; more likely is a 
scenario in which no interest groups form. Bureaucratically-supplied policies that cause 
little public interest or disagreement are the result (Freeman, 2006: 230). Redistributive 
policies bring about concentrated costs and benefits. Actors have clear motivations to 
organise and the general public believes it is not affected to a degree that would merit 
getting organised; interest group politics are the result. Finally, regulatory policies involve 
diffuse benefits and concentrated costs; the consequence is entrepreneurial politics 
(Freeman, 2006: 229-230). Wilson (1980: 370) argues that entrepreneurial politics will 
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occur if a policy confers general (though perhaps small) benefits at a cost to be borne 
chiefly by a small segment of society. Due to a pronounced incentive for the opposition to 
organise, and with little incentive for proponents to fight for such a policy, this kind of 
legislation is unlikely to be passed. Consequently, the policy measure needs a policy 
entrepreneur that mobilises dormant public sentiment in support of the initiative. This can 
happen by revealing a scandal or scandalising a crisis which, for instance, forces the 
opposition to justify their resistance. Examples of such initiatives are anti-pollution and 
auto-safety bills that are intended to make the air cleaner or cars safer, and hence serve 
the public good while imposing (even though only temporarily) costs on certain industry 
segments (Wilson, 1980: 370). 
 
Freeman’s work is not without criticism. With regard to his earlier work (Freeman, 1995, 
1998, 2002), Statham and Geddes (2006) have lamented that in the case of the UK, the 
direction of immigration policies is not an outcome of organised interest group lobbying, 
but is shaped in a rather autonomous way by political elites. The outcome of the 
immigration policies reflects the political elites’ stance and will. Civil society engagement is 
weak. Hence, they argue that Freeman overestimates the power of the organised public 
compared to political elites. While this is a solid point, the framework might still have value 
by making predictions about the political dynamics certain policies induce. However, there 
are further problems with the framework, most notably, dividing immigration policies into 
certain policy types (concentrated distributive, diffuse distributive, redistributive, and 
regulatory) and then linking them to specific modes of politics. This holds especially for 
economic migration as it first involves both economic and political costs and benefits; for 
instance, the economic benefits of filling vacancies that cannot be filled domestically, or 
the political benefits of reinforcing such popular fears by radical politicians in order to win 
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votes on the right fringe. Second, we need to distinguish between the perceived and actual 
costs of interest groups involved. Although Freeman (2006: 229) acknowledges with 
reference to Lowi (1964: 390-391) that the key issue is how actors perceive a certain 
issue, this relativity is not incorporated into his framework. Freeman (2006: 229) contrasts 
Lowi’s “constructivist stance” with Wilson’s (1980) work, who according to Freeman (2006: 
229), “assumes that policies have objective distributional consequences. Benefits can be 
concentrated or diffuse, resulting in four modes of politics.” However, in his work Wilson 
(1980: 384) states: 
 
[b]y far the largest number of regulatory issues discussed in this book arose not 
because of a fundamental shift in technology or prices, but because perceptions 
about what constituted a problem changed. As we have already seen, OSHA 
[Occupational Safety and Health Administration] was created because the rate of 
industrial accidents became an issue even though that rate had been generally 
declining. 
 
The quote suggests that Freeman underestimates Wilson’s aptitude to acknowledge that 
perceptions of issues can change and that policies may not have objective distributional 
consequences. In the empirical discussion, Freeman does take into account the relativity 
of actors’ perceptions, as the following citation shows (Freeman, 2006: 236): 
 
The role of policy entrepreneurs in non-immigrant visa policies can best be 
understood in the context of transitions, in the perceptions of key actors, from one 
type of policy to another. Non-immigrant visa policy is, in its normal state, a diffuse 
distributive policy that operates largely below the radar of contentious politics. 
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When the policy becomes more politically salient, due to complaints about 
backlogs in processing applications, for example, the normally quiescent clients of 
the visa process may be energised, moving visa politics into the concentrated 
distributive category. 
 
However, he does not discuss the implications of this conceptual difference for the 
analytical significance of the political salience concept. This study uses the definition put 
forward by Rosenblum (2004b: 40-41): “the level of popular attention to immigration 
issues.” How popular attention exactly arises is a complex phenomenon in which 
immigration flows and socio-economic conditions interact with events and media coverage 
of the issue (Rosenblum, 2004b: 40-41). As discussed above, with help from the concept 
of policy frames, the actual or objective benefits of a particular policy do not shape actors 
preferences, but perceptions thereof. Consequently, migrants might perceive more liberal 
immigration policies aimed at certain migrants to involve costs for them in terms of 
increased competition for jobs – thoughts that are easily nourished by populist politicians. 
But then again, these apprehensions might indeed not be fulfilled because the migrants 
brought in are highly specialised and only fill labour shortages that cannot be filled with the 
domestic labour supply. Third, the stakeholders of economic migration literally span the 
entire society, and if the topic becomes politically salient, it can mobilise a great part of 
society, as, for instance, the November 2009 referendum about minarets in Switzerland 
demonstrated. Stakeholders range from employers, workers, migrants, politicians, the 
media, and human rights organisations to ordinary citizens who feel the consequences of 
a tough economic climate, or observe the effects of immigration in the increasing number 
of foreign-born football players in the national team or the number of foreign-owned shops 
in certain areas of town. Hence, new actors can appear, potentially altering the political 
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dynamics and the mode of politics. In addition, the allocation of costs and benefits is 
subject to regular changes, such as the business cycle, or exogenous shocks, such as 
9/11 or the 2008 financial and economic crisis. 
 
These factors create a web of accruing costs and benefits, and are constantly in flux and 
too complex (even with regard to a specific policy proposal) to be captured by just four 
policy types. This poses another problem: the link between the types of policies and the 
modes of politics. If immigration policies cannot be captured by these policy types 
(concentrated distributive, diffuse distributive, and redistributive regulatory) it does not 
make sense to link them to particular modes of politics in the way Freeman’s model does. 
However, the link between the dispersal of costs and benefits and certain modes of 
immigration politics is analytically useful. Hence, looking at the distribution of costs and 
benefits and linking it to certain political dynamics promises to help identify how 
governmental preferences are formed, and even to make predictions about the likelihood 
of a policy proposal finding governmental support. However, there is a conceptual tension 
within the rules of the game proposition that is put forward by the bureaucratic politics 
framework and Freeman’s propositions. According to Freeman’s logic, the mode of politics 
is flexible and can change according to the cost and benefit distribution the relevant actors 
experience. Conversely, the bureaucratic politics framework suggests that the decision-
making process happens according to fixed rules of the game that are intrinsic to the 
respective political system and do not change for the same policy proposal. This 
confrontation exposes the weakness of Freeman’s approach: it does not travel to 
executive politics that tend to be regulated more heavily than interest group politics. In 
addition, it has difficulties being applied to political systems that regulate interest group 
involvement more strongly than the US system does. The coordinated market economy of 
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Germany is a good example. The modes of politics framework contains a number of 
interesting propositions, in particular, the linking of actor preferences to the distribution of 
costs and benefits. However, it is not the right framework to be applied to a policy domain 
that relies heavily on executive decision-making. Hence, its role for explaining the 
liberalisation of economic migration at the EU level is only a secondary one. 
 
Relationship between political salience and public opinion 
Public opinion is a prominent concept, however, there is no generally accepted definition 
of public opinion, and its meaning has been subject to lengthy discussions in the literature 
(see, for instance, Kepplinger, 2008: 192-193; Price, 1992: 1-2; Shamir & Shamir, 2000: 2; 
Splichal, 1999: 4). A general and workable definition is provided by Brooker and Schaefer, 
who define public opinion as “the expressed attitudes and views of ordinary people on 
issues of public concern” (Brooker & Schaefer, 2006: 5). 
 
Kepplinger divides the various approaches into three groups, referring to public opinion 
either as a quantitative, qualitative or functional concept. The quantitative concept regards 
public opinion as the distribution of individual opinions within a population which can be 
measured with opinion polls. Public opinion as a qualitative concept is understood to 
constitute the opinion of interested and well-informed citizens on political issues. Public 
opinion as a functional concept is seen as a mechanism that reduces the unlimited number 
of possible topics to a limited number of issues that can be discussed in public 
(Kepplinger, 2008: 192-193). 
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The relationship between public opinion and the media, and public opinion and policy-
makers, is also not a clear one. Both depend on the adopted definition of public opinion. 
For instance Kepplinger claims that with regard to the qualitative concept, “the coverage of 
the (leading) news media and public opinion are more or less identical” (Kepplinger 2008: 
193). He concludes that public opinion must be derived from media coverage and personal 
contacts with reporters and editorial writers. Where the quantitative approach is 
concerned, media coverage can be viewed as an independent variable, and majority 
opinion as a dependent variable. Regarding the functional concept, public opinion is seen 
as an intervening variable, influencing individuals to take a stand in public. This in turn 
influences public opinion (regarded as the opinion perceived by individuals as the 
dominant opinion). The quantitative approach assumes a linear relationship between 
media coverage and public opinion, but recent research has revised this linear 
relationship, favouring more complex notions (see, for instance, Justin Lewis, 2001: 83; 
Roessler, 2008: 205). The functional approach assumes a more complex relationship in 
which media coverage plays an important role (Kepplinger, 2008). Price (1992: 81) 
captures this poignantly in asserting: “[T]he media allow the attentive public to keep track 
of political actors (surveillance) and organize its responses to them (correlation).” 
 
Of course, there is also a qualitative component of what the public debate on a certain 
issue constitutes, which stands in a dynamic relationship with the level of attention. 
However, for the purpose of this study, the level of political salience is of greatest 
importance. This is because of the effect political salience has on the nature of the debate 
about a certain issue. The level of politicisation changes how an issue is discussed at the 
political level and how the process of preference formation takes place. This has an impact 
on the final outcome of the national preferences. The above discussion shows there is a 
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close relationship between media coverage and public opinion. Consequently, measuring 
political salience by means of media coverage must be seen as a robust way of measuring 
the concept. This is discussed in detail in Chapter Three. 
 
Nature of the Decision-Making Process 
In light of the hypothesis, it is argued that if preference formation is sheltered from the 
attention of the masses, the debate is more bureaucratic than political. If this is the case, 
the debate is more likely to give more prominence to the potential benefits of immigration, 
for instance, filling labour shortages or establishing a strategic partnership with a third 
country. Caviedes notes: “Only labor migration policy that manages to pass under the 
radar of the general debate over immigration is immune from the caprices of public 
opinion.” (Caviedes, 2010: 3). If a regulatory policy question is complex and technically 
orientated, it is easier to disconnect the debate from distributive questions, and the 
discussions are likely to develop into a conversation of national experts in the respective 
regulatory policy field (Héritier, 1996: 155). If the issues at stake are technically and legally 
complex, if they are not straightforwardly accessible to the public at large, and if the 
political salience and the possibility of political mobilisation are low, a bureaucratic rather 
than a political debate is probable. Conversely, if the issues raised entail the redistribution 
of costs in an obvious and easily noticeable way, the discourse is likely to be more 
politically loaded (Héritier, 1996: 159). The absence of urgent political salience shields the 
debate from being framed in an anti-immigration way and from taking a restrictive turn. 
Increased political salience changes the interest group dynamics. As more interest groups 
become active, the government is forced to take more interests into account. This, in turn, 
is likely to reduce the importance of the arguments in favour of the policy, and the effect of 
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the attempts to influence by interest groups supporting the policy (Mahoney, 2007: 50-53). 
Hence, if the debate is technical and bureaucratic, it is easier and more probable for a 
Member State to delegate competencies to the EU level to realise the benefits they 
promise to offer. Accordingly, Hypothesis Two states the following: 
 
A Member State will agree to liberalise economic migration policy at the EU level if the 
decision-making process proceeds in a bureaucratic way and political salience of 
immigration is either low or not linked to the policy proposal. 
 
III. International Politics 
Foreign policy considerations 
This section focuses on analysing how the desire to attain certain foreign policy goals 
impacts on national immigration policies, i.e., how immigration policy can be deployed as a 
tool of foreign policy. The literature on EU immigration policy development tends to make 
the link the other way round. For instance, Boswell (2008a: 491) notes: “The idea was to 
adjust the Union’s foreign policy and development cooperation to advance EU goals on 
migration management. Since then, there has been a variety of initiatives to implement 
and expand this agenda, most recently in the form of the 2005 Global Approach.” In order 
to analyse how immigration policy might be used for foreign policy ends, a number of 
questions need to be answered: What is the link between foreign policy and immigration 
policy? How does the impact manifest itself and what kind of immigration policy does 
foreign policy impact? When does a country or a group of countries become relevant? 
Why would a sending country be interested in the open immigration policies of a host 
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country (or a group of host countries)? How can a third country or a group of third 
countries impact the preferences of a Member State? 
 
Foreign policy has not featured prominently in scholarship on migration, and if so, it has 
often been analysed by international relations scholars in the context of the bearing certain 
immigrant groups may have on a country’s foreign policy (see, for instance, Christol & 
Ricard, 1985; Koslowski, 2005; Tucker, Keely, & Wrigley, 1990). The impact certain 
immigration policies may have on foreign policy considerations has also been explored 
(see, for instance, Délano, 2009; MacPherson, Gushulak, & Macdonald, 2007). 
Comparative politics research, by and large, neglects foreign policy considerations as a 
factor that informs governmental preferences on immigration policy. Mitchell (1992: 6) 
defines foreign policy aptly as “a set of concerns and actions in relation to foreign 
governments and societies, focused on the goals of security, prestige, and economic well-
being.” 
 
A number of scholars argue that countries are generally willing to accept immigrants from 
particular countries for the sake of foreign policy goals, such as fostering relations with 
allies, sustaining political links established in the past, or to pry open a country’s foreign 
political isolation (Díaz-Briquets, 1995: 161; Gatev, 2008; Meyers, 2004: 15; Oltmer, 2005: 
423; Schönwälder, 2004; Stanton Russell, 1995 61-70; Thränhardt, 1996a: 254; Zolberg, 
1995: 120-121). 
 
To be more precise, a country or a group of countries need to bear a certain foreign policy 
relevance for a government in order for these concerns to influence immigration policy. 
Using the US as a case study, Mitchell suggests a number of factors that make such a 
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scenario more likely; for instance, the sending country should be important (at least 
momentarily) for the country’s foreign policy, the migration flow out of the country should 
be sizeable, and changes in migration policy should promise to advance foreign policy 
goals (Mitchell, 1992: 23). 
 
The link between immigration policy and security- or military-motivated considerations has 
been used in the literature to explain national immigration policies (Meyers, 2000; Mitchell, 
1992; Rosenblum, 2004a, 2004b; Rudolph, 2003, 2006). This is in accord with realist (see, 
for instance, Morgenthau, 1978) and neo-realist writings (see, for instance, Waltz, 1979) 
on International Relations, putting forward a simplified model of the state as a unitary actor 
behaving rationally in the pursuit of maximising its power, and attributing the highest 
importance to security issues on the foreign policy agenda (Hollifield, 2004a; Meyers, 
2000: 1263).5 While realist approaches are seen as having only marginal value in 
explaining international migration policies (apart from refugee policies) (Meyers, 2000: 
1265), this study shows that foreign policy considerations are also relevant for other sub-
areas of immigration policy. This is because the economic benefits promised by emigration 
may induce a sending country to embark on a lobbying campaign that in turn might 
influence the immigration policy of a receiving country. 
 
Rudolph offers a theoretical model explaining different outcomes of migration policy by the 
primary independent variable structural threat environment (Rudolph, 2003: 605-607; 
2006: 29-40). His threat hypothesis predicts there is a positive relationship between the 
occurrence of external threats to geopolitical security and the openness of a state’s 
                                                
5 For a discussion of the problems of realism and neo-realism see: Allison, G. T., & Zelikow, P. (1999). 
Essence of decision: explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (2nd ed.): Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers.. 
For a discussion of International Relations theory in light of international migration see: Rudolph, C. (2006). 
National Security and Immigration: Policy Development in the United States and Western Europe Since 1945. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press.. 
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migration policy – both in terms of numbers and type. Facing such a threat, a state will 
have more open policies in order to maximise material power through the economic gains 
that result from increased labour mobility and reduced domestic instability. Rudolph’s 
hypotheses also predict that if under these circumstances migration flows are associated 
with a military adversary, more restrictive policies for those migrants will result (Rudolph, 
2003: 606-607). Problematic with this approach is the simplistic assumption that migration 
is necessarily beneficial. As the following discussion of immigration and labour market 
needs will show, more immigration does not necessarily lead to increased welfare and 
domestic stability. It will only do so if it aids to fill labour shortages. If it fails to do so, 
immigration can be economically harmful as it might have negative distributional effects. 
Most useful are Rudolph’s insights in combination with Mitchell’s works discussed above: if 
a country can ameliorate a certain security threat, it is important from a geopolitical 
perspective. This increases the likelihood that the foreign policy with regard to that country 
affects the immigration policy. 
 
While this is certainly a critical point, there are other factors that amplify the foreign political 
importance of a country, such as the density of trade relations, military alliances and 
diplomatic ties, and sustaining political links that have been established in the past (e.g. 
former colonial ties) (Meyers, 2004: 15; Rosenblum, 2004b: 41). 
 
To provide a richer and more precise insight into when foreign policy matters and with 
regard to which countries, an additional framework proves useful: Rosenblum (2004b) 
combines insights of the international relations literature with domestic politics, and comes 
up with a framework that predicts under what domestic conditions foreign policy factors are 
most likely to shape migration policies. The author uses the US as a case study. In order 
for foreign policy to play a role in immigration policy-making, the country needs to attach 
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significant weight to foreign policy. While generally foreign policy has a higher standing for 
the US than for many other countries, the major EU host countries all attribute significant 
importance to foreign policy – France and the UK because of their status as nuclear 
powers, members of the UN Security Council, and their history as colonial powers; and 
Germany in light of the Cold War, as copula between Eastern and Western Europe. 
Although none of the EU countries are military superpowers like the US, foreign policy is 
generally an important policy field. Thus, the framework’s parameters are likely to travel to 
other countries beyond the US. 
 
By using two variables, foreign policy value and domestic political salience, and displaying 
a striking similarity to Freeman’s work (Freeman, 1995, 2002, 2006), Rosenblum’s 
framework distinguishes four possible modes of immigration policy making (Rosenblum, 
2004b). For this reason, the approach is informed by international considerations but also 
captures how they are filtered by domestic politics. Foreign policy value is defined as “the 
importance of migration to U.S. bilateral relations with particular states and the importance 
of those states for the overall U.S. foreign policy agenda” (Rosenblum, 2004b: 41). The 
more important the sending state, the higher the foreign policy value. The importance is 
relative and depends on the respective host country. In contrast, as spelled out in the 
preceding section, political salience is marked out as “the level of popular attention to 
immigration issues” (Rosenblum, 2004b:41). Foreign policy considerations are likely to 
play out most drastically when the foreign policy value of a country is high and the political 
salience of migration in the host country is low. Put differently, under these conditions we 
would expect foreign policy consideration to shape governmental preferences on 
immigration policy to a sizeable extent. 
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As for the causal link between foreign policy and immigration policy, we can distinguish 
two dimensions of influence. First, direct influence, and second, issue linkage. Direct 
influence of migration policies refers to the direct impact of a receiving country’s migration 
policies on a certain sending country (or certain sending countries), and how these policies 
relate to foreign policy goals. For instance, a government might decide to embarrass or 
weaken a hostile regime, to stabilise less radical but unstable regimes, and to support 
regimes in line with its foreign policy objectives. Accordingly, migration policies towards 
adverse countries can under certain conditions be more generous and open than towards 
friendly regimes, as argued by Mitchell (Mitchell, 1992). He makes this claim by examining, 
for instance, the open US immigration policy towards Cuba and Nicaragua in the 1960s 
and 1970s, which were at that time “adversary” governments. He contrasts these cases 
with US attempts to deter migrants who declared political motivations and originated from 
friendly regimes, such as El Salvador (Mitchell, 1992: 23-24). With regard to the second 
dimension, concessions on migration policies are used in a bargaining scenario to attain 
particular benefits in a foreign policy domain (Rosenblum, 2004b: 29), for instance, the 
pledging of allegiance of a sending country (or a group of sending countries) against an 
opponent regime. 
 
If a sending country (or countries) has (or have) a vested concern for more open 
immigration policies in a particular receiving country (or a group of receiving countries), the 
sending country might lobby to push for its objectives. Why would a country care about 
more open policies? Emigration countries generally advocate open policies because of the 
prospects to secure remittances (Miller, 2000: 36), decrease domestic unemployment, 
raise wages, obtain new workers’ skills (that then can be used in the home country upon 
return), and draw level with neighbouring countries with which a historical rivalry exists 
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(Rosenblum, 2004a).6 The more a sending country cares about a receiving country’s (or a 
group of receiving countries’) immigration policy, the more likely it is to make an active 
effort at influencing and in turn to be successful with its attempts (Rosenblum, 2004b: 99). 
Sending countries affect immigration policy indirectly by lobbying parliament or the 
government. These efforts may include providing host state officials with information or 
attempting to shape public opinion. Another form of influence might be to mobilise 
expatriates living in the receiving country (Mitchell, 1992: 287; Rosenblum, 2004b: 28-29). 
Further ways of influence include the setting up and maintaining of a network of support 
organisations for emigrants in the host countries by bilateral labour recruitment 
agreements that may enable sending countries to partake in the political processes of the 
host countries. The main rationale of these networks is the promotion of long-term 
temporary migration (Schmitter Heisler, 1985: 77-78). Thus, Hypothesis Three can be 
formulated as follows: 
 
If the foreign policy value of a country (certain group of countries) is perceived as being 
high, domestic political salience of immigration is low, and if the sending country 
(countries) exert(s) relevant pressure on the host government(s), a Member State will 
support relatively open immigration policies with regard to this country (those countries) 
both at the national and EU-level. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
Three hypotheses are now in place to explain the political processes that lead to a 
Member State agreeing to delegate competencies on regulating economic migration to the 
                                                
6 For instance, Turkey might want to export a similar number of workers as Greece with which it has a long-
held competitive relationship. 
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EU level. In order to make predictions about how they bring about the final outcome of the 
governmental preferences, a bureaucratic politics approach is used. The hypotheses are 
structured into two different themes, domestic politics and international politics, which are 
informed by an additional theme, labour market concerns. Regarding domestic politics, the 
study presents two hypotheses. Hypothesis One states that the misfit between the EU 
policy and the national policy cannot be too pronounced in order for support of EU-level 
liberalisation of economic migration policy to happen. Hypothesis Two proposes that 
support is likely if the decision-making process takes place in a bureaucratic and apolitical 
way. Hypothesis Three relates to foreign policy and proposes that EU-level liberalisation 
will happen if the foreign policy value of a sending country (to which the measure relates) 
is high, political salience is low, and if the government of the sending country lobbies for an 
EU-level liberalisation of economic migration policies. The first theme contextualises 
Hypothesis One. It discusses the concept of labour shortages and issues of measuring 
them. This includes the ambiguity of the concept, the important and delicate role of 
employers, the absence of straight-forward and objective ways of measurement, and the 
resulting importance of using a multitude of carefully selected sources. 
 
The hypotheses are tested empirically in the chapters to come. Each hypothesis is 
discussed in all case studies to shed light on their relevance; the analysis shows that the 
explanatory power of each varies by case study. This suggests that the causal importance 
of the factors under investigation differs. As each hypothesis relates to specific causal 
factors, the hypotheses in their entirety establish a number of conditions necessary for a 
Member State to support EU-level liberalisation of economic migration policies. 
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Chapter Three – Methodology 
Approach and Methodology 
The dependent variable is the preference of an EU Member State government – in this 
case Germany. As defined in Chapter One, the preferences of a government are regarded 
as an aggregate comprised of the individual preferences of several actors. The 
dissertation starts with a number of hypotheses that each relate to an independent 
variable. The independent variables are the misfit between the relevant national legislation 
and the policy measure that is proposed at the EU level; the political salience of 
immigration; and the foreign policy value of a relevant sending country. The independent 
variables are then used as a starting point to link them to the dependent variable via the 
relevant actors. This process is structured by a bureaucratic politics framework that 
provides an analytical lens for how different actors coordinate or assert their respective 
positions and interests (Allison, 1969; Allison & Halperin, 1972; Allison & Zelikow, 1999). 
The dissertation uses the method of process-tracing to identify the causal mechanisms 
between the independent variables and the dependent variable. It divides the causal chain 
between these variables into several steps; this allows establishing a number of 
intervening variables. Intervening variables are affected by the independent variable and in 
turn have a causal impact on the dependent variable (see, for instance, Bryman, 2008). 
The intervening variables of this study are the preferences of relevant actors, namely, 
different government ministries, employer associations, trade unions, the German 
parliament, the Länder, and governments of relevant sending countries. No data could be 
found regarding the notable influence of further actors, such as non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs). Each step is supported by theory or an analytical narrative (cf. 
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Checkel, 2005; George & Bennett, 2005). According to Roberts (1996: 66), this 
microcorrelation is “the minute tracing of the explanatory narrative to the point where the 
events to be explained are microscopic and the covering laws correspondingly more 
certain.” In addition to the independent variables and the intervening variables, the role of 
labour shortages is discussed to provide a further context for the causal chains analysed 
by this dissertation. 
 
The investigation starts with the prerequisite that legislative measures that would liberalise 
economic migration policies at the EU level need to be put on the agenda. The policy 
proposals need to come from somewhere, particularly because Member States do not take 
the initiative to lobby for common EU policies on economic migration. The policy-making 
process of the EU foresees a number of avenues for a policy initiative to be proposed. 
Before 2004, the right of legislative initiative was shared between the Commission and 
Member States (Hix, 2005: 355). With regard to economic migration, no Member State has 
made use of this right. After 2004, the Treaties foresee an important role for EU institutions 
to propose a certain policy proposal, namely, for the European Commission, which holds 
the right of legislative initiative (see, for instance, Wonka, 2008: 1145). However, the 
impetus for a certain policy proposal can come from elsewhere. Member States, the 
Council, and the European Parliament regularly attempt to influence the Commission to 
come up with a particular policy proposal (Hix, 2005: 223; Princen, 2007: 23). The most 
straightforward possibility is a proposed Directive that comprises issues of economic 
migration. Where the idea of an initiative originates is less relevant for this investigation, 
and is often hard to establish. Thus, how Council conclusions – those of the Tampere 
European Council in 1999, for instance – come into being, or what motivates them, is 
beyond this study’s scope. With the same effect, a common policy can also arise from the 
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initiative of a third country, for instance, in the form of filing an application to become an 
associate member. This presumes that immigration provisions are part of the Association 
Agreement. Hence, policy needs to be on the agenda as a precondition for a Member 
State to support EU involvement in liberalising economic migration. 
 
Case Study Selection 
Selection of Germany as case study 
Owing to the longitudinal perspective of the puzzle, the time frame of the analysis spans 
from the beginning of the European Integration project until the entering into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009. Germany has been selected as case study for a 
number of reasons. 
 
For a study investigating developments from the founding of the EEC, in 1957, to 2009, 
only the EEC’s six founders are possible options: Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, 
Italy, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany. Of these countries, the most 
interesting ones, analytically, are France and Germany. For much of the 20th century these 
two countries have been a dominant force in Europe, referred to as the Franco-German 
axis of European Integration (see, for instance, Dinan, 2004; Hailbronner, 2000: 126). By 
improving our understanding of preference formation on economic migration in these two 
countries, we will better understand what drives European cooperation on economic 
migration policies, and EU cooperation in general. Thus, the analytical leverage of the 
findings is likely to be greater if France or Germany is used as a case study, compared to 
Italy and the Benelux countries. Comparing France with Germany, Germany is the better 
choice for two chief reasons. First, the variation of the dependent variable is greater for 
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Germany; this increases the determination of the research design (see discussion below). 
Second, Germany is emblematic of the guest worker recruitment era. This makes 
discussions about what drove the German government’s preferences with regard to EU 
involvement on economic migration likely to shed light on motivations behind guest worker 
recruitment in general. It marks an important part of recent European history whose 
consequences still resonate in the present day. German immigration history and its 
relationship to the sub-cases of this dissertation are discussed in a later part of this 
chapter. 
 
It is important to first discuss the variation of the dependent variable and the 
methodological implications in more detail. In the early period of European Integration, 
Germany was extremely enthusiastic in supporting European involvement in liberalising 
economic migration policies; the Ankara and the Athens Agreements are of particular 
significance here. However, since the European Council pushed forward with the Tampere 
Programme, Germany has been sceptical with regard to delegating competencies for 
regulating migration to the EU level, in particular, when that meant a liberalisation. This U-
turn is the most drastic amongst the founding members of the EEC and consequently 
promises the most significant causal inferences. It is also more pronounced in direct 
comparison with France, which, in regard to the Association Agreement, held a much more 
sceptical stance to conclude the Agreement, and favoured one as minor as possible 
(Council of the European Economic Community, 1961, 1962). Hence, France as a 
case study is missing an instance where it can be said it held significant support for 
liberalising economic migration policies at the EU level. With regard to the Economic 
Migration Directive, where Germany, along with Austria, was the most sceptical Member 
State, French reservations were less pronounced, as the relevant minutes of the Council 
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Working Party on Migration and Expulsion show.7 Consequently, the variation of the 
dependent variable across the four sub-case studies is greater for Germany than for 
France, which makes Germany the more valuable case analytically. In addition, Germany 
shows a great variation of the three independent variables (misfit, political salience, and 
foreign policy value). 
 
According to King et al. (1994: 129-130), variation of the dependent variable increases the 
quality of the research design. However, selecting the dependent variable also risks the 
danger of introducing selection bias. If the dependent variable varies, this can happen if 
the variation is truncated, i.e., if the observations are limited to less than the full range of 
variation on the dependent variable (King, et al., 1994: 130). 
 
Taking this warning into account, Germany is still the strongest choice out of the cases 
available. Judging from the existing information, it allows for the greatest variation of the 
dependent variable, reducing any potential selection bias as far as possible. If selection 
happens on the dependent variable, and independent variables are not taken into account, 
selection bias only occurs if the values of the dependent variable are truncated. If the 
dependent variable varies fully, there is no selection bias, as Collier and Mahoney state: 
“In the special case of a selection procedure designed to produce a sample that reflects 
the full variance of the dependent variable, the selection procedure will not be correlated 
with the underlying error term, and will not produce biased estimates” (Collier & Mahoney, 
1996: 62-63). 
 
                                                
7 See, for instance, Council doc 13954/03 and Council doc 7557/02. 
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As the research question dictates that the relevant time period spans from 1959 until the 
present day, we cannot know what scope for variation exists beyond what be can 
observed for these years. Germany supported EU-level measures for the Ankara 
Agreement but rejected such measures with regard to the Economic Migration Directive. 
Hypothetically, it could be possible that Germany might show even greater support for an 
EU-level measure than it did for the Ankara Agreement, which would mean the variation of 
this study’s dependent variable is truncated. It is important to be aware of this when 
discussing the generalisability of the study’s findings. However, the selection bias is likely 
to be small; if the variation of the variable stretches from rejecting EU-level liberalisation of 
economic migration to supporting EU-level liberalisation of economic migration, then the 
variation of even stronger support is unlikely to constitute a much greater overall variation. 
 
In addition, the dangers of selecting the dependent variable might be overstated by King et 
al. (1994), who write from the perspective of quantitative researchers, and do not apply to 
qualitative studies to the same extent, as a number of authors claim (Collier & Mahoney, 
1996; George & Bennett, 2005). George and Bennett note: 
 
In other words, in statistical studies selection bias always understates the strengths 
of the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. This is why 
statistical researchers are admonished not to select cases on the dependent 
variable. 
In contrast, case study researchers sometimes deliberately choose cases that 
share a particular outcome. Practitioners and analysts of case study methods have 
argued that selection on the dependent variable should not be rejected out of hand. 
Selection of cases on the basis of the value of their dependent variables is 
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appropriate for some purposes, but not for others. Cases selected on the 
dependent variable, including single-case studies, can help identify which variables 
are not necessary or sufficient conditions for the selected outcome. 
(George & Bennett, 2005: 23). 
 
Moreover, George and Bennett state the following: “The most damaging consequences 
arise from selecting only cases whose independent and dependent variables vary as the 
favoured hypothesis suggest, ignoring cases that appear to contradict the theory, and 
overgeneralising from these cases to wider populations” (George & Bennett, 2005: 24). 
This pitfall has been avoided as case studies have been chosen to guarantee the greatest 
possible variation of the dependent variable and the independent variables, without 
ignoring potentially contradictory cases as the hypotheses suggest. Because of the small 
number of EU-level policy initiatives on economic migration, it was possible to include all 
relevant cases as sub-case studies. The hypotheses have been constantly refined in an 
iterative process that meant going back and forth between data and theory (Bryman, 2008: 
11-12). 
 
Even though the dissertation focuses on Germany, the research design is not a single 
case study as it includes four sub-cases within Germany. This can be characterised as a 
longitudinal case, which is given as a rationale by Yin for focussing on a single case that is 
studied in four different points in time (Yin, 2003: 39-42). The four sub-cases make sure 
that the dependent variable varies, which increases the determination of the research 
design, as discussed above (King, et al., 1994: 129-130). In addition, Van Evera argues for 
selecting cases with large within-case variance in the value on the independent and 
dependent variables for building a theory. If the value of the variable to be studied varies, 
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i.e. the dependent variable for this study, the causes and effects of this variable should 
also vary widely in such a case, in line with the dependent variable. This makes the 
causes easier to be identified against the case background (Van Evera, 1997: 82). 
 
In addition, concentrating on one country has the chief merit of controlling for the 
institutional framework and thus obviating institutional explanations of the research 
question. Certainly, between the 1960s and the present day countries have been subject 
to endogenous and exogenous changes. However, they are difficult to control for, as each 
country is subject to particular changes and these variations are still smaller than 
discrepancies between different countries. 
 
Sub-case studies 
Table 3: Sub-Case Studies 
 Case Study Time Period 
1 Association Agreement between the EEC and 
Turkey (Ankara Agreement) 
July 1959 – September 
1963 
2 Association Agreement between the EC and 
Poland (Europe Agreement) 
November 1990 – 
December 1991 
3 Economic Migration Directive July 2001 – November 
2003 
4 Blue Card Directive October 2007 – May 2009 
 
The country case is complemented by four sub-case studies to ensure within-case 
variation. Like the country case, the sub-cases have been selected according to variation 
in the outcome of the dependent variable and constitute the entirety of key cases. In other 
words, they guarantee the greatest possible variation of the dependent variable for 
Germany. The cases are different policy initiatives, such as Directives or Agreements that 
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aim at regulating some aspect of economic migration at the EU level. Some initiatives 
have been supported by Germany while others have been opposed. Given the relative 
scarcity of instances where a liberalising measure was adopted – or at least discussed – at 
the EU level, the study includes an example of each kind of liberalising measure on 
economic migration that has occurred at the EU level between the foundation of the EEC 
and the Treaty of Lisbon. 
 
Case Study One is the EEC – Turkey Association Agreement, which was concluded in 
1963 and had as one of its objectives to establish freedom of movement for workers 
between Turkey and the EEC. Germany supported the Agreement. The EEC had 
concluded a similar agreement with Greece two years before the Agreement with Turkey. 
However, the Ankara Agreement is the more interesting case analytically, because 
migration-relevant provisions were more contested, and the Agreement had a more 
significant impact on Member States’ immigration and integration policies due to a number 
of important decisions by the Association Council as well as several weighty rulings by the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ). 
 
Case Study Two is the Association Agreement the EC concluded with Poland in 1991. The 
Agreement is part of several agreements the EC completed with most Central and Eastern 
European countries (CEECs) – Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, 
Bulgaria, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – in the early and mid-1990s, the so-
called Europe Agreements (EAs). The provisions relevant for the movement of workers are 
almost identical across the agreements. With regard to the freedom of movement 
provisions, Poland was the most active of all CEECs in influencing the negotiations 
(Auswärtiges Amt, 1991a; Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 1991a, 1991j). As a 
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consequence, the process of negotiations between the EEC and Poland also affected the 
content of the freedom of movement provisions of the other agreements. Thus, to explain 
why the provisions relevant for migration are included in the way they are, it is instructive 
to study the EA with Poland. Germany supported the Agreement that granted access to 
the Member States’ labour market for self-employed CEEC nationals, and thus opened a 
loophole for employed workers disguised as, for instance, one-man companies. 
 
Case Study Three is the Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third country 
nationals for the purpose of paid employment and self-employed economic activities 
(COM(2001) 386 final). The European Commission proposed the Directive in 2001; it was 
the first post-Tampere endeavour that sought to liberalise economic migration policies at 
the EU level. However, it was not adopted by the Council as it did not find enough support 
amongst Member States. Germany was opposed to the Directive. The Directive presents 
the instance where Germany was most opposed to EU-level regulation of economic 
migration. Consequently, its inclusion is important to guarantee the maximum possible 
variation of the dependent variable. 
 
The fourth and final case study is the Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of 
third country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment, the so-called Blue 
Card Directive. With the aim to facilitate access to the EU labour market for highly qualified 
third country nationals, this Directive was the first post-Tampere measure supported by the 
Council, including the German government, that intended to liberalise economic migration 
policies. 
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The study is concerned with admission policies and not with policies regarding immigrants 
already in the EU. Hence, for instance, the Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 
2003 concerning the status of third country nationals who are long-term residents does not 
qualify as a case study for this dissertation. In addition, the European Commission 
proposed a directive in 1976 with the aim to combat illegal migration.8 However, this policy 
initiative does not qualify as a case study, as studying illegal migration is beyond the scope 
of this project. As a consequence, the selected sub-case studies cover all relevant 
initiatives and guarantee the greatest possible variation of the dependent variables. 
 
Strengths and limitations of the data 
 
The data used to test the hypotheses and forge the empirical argument was collected from 
a number of archives, namely, the German Federal Archive (Bundesarchiv) in Koblenz, 
Germany; the Historical Archives of the European Union in Florence, Italy; the Political 
Archives of the German Foreign Office (Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts) in 
Berlin, Germany; and the Newspaper Archives of the State Library of Berlin, Germany 
(Zeitungsarchiv der Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin). The archives are used for the empirical 
part of the chapter that focuses on common European efforts on labour migration in the 
young European Community. The files on the Ankara Agreement have been reviewed 
before, for investigating the processes that led to the entire Agreement. However, this has 
never been done with a particular focus on the freedom of movement provisions. 
 
With regard to the Europe Agreement, archival material of the Federal Ministry of 
Economics was used. This was the first time the material was used, and special 
                                                
8 COM/76/331FINAL. 
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permission was necessary to access the files because the 30-year archival retention 
period had not yet expired. To gather data on the period which falls within the 30 year 
archival retention period and for which no special permission could be obtained, or to 
provide additional contextual information to complement the archival research, the 
dissertation relies on 43 semi-structured open-ended elite interviews and six personal 
communications. For the interviews, a list of specific questions was used, but the 
respondents had a lot of leeway in how to reply to the questions. In addition, questions did 
not always follow the outline on the interview guide, and they did not always exactly follow 
the list of questions. This flexibility was needed to explore the underlying dynamics of 
preference formation that were seen as an internal governmental matter and regarded as 
sensitive. Consequently, it was important to dig deeper into a certain topic or aspects of a 
topic that might have come up unexpectedly but seemed important for the research. 
Interviewees included a wide range of policy makers and experts, such as governmental 
officials, ministerial directors, heads of units, policy officers, trade union representatives, 
business association representatives, European Union officials (European Commission, 
Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, and the European Parliament), Brussels-
based diplomats, representatives of EU-level trade unions and business associations, and 
German parliamentarians. 
 
The above sources are triangulated with official government documents, agreed policy 
measures (e.g. EU directives or national Parliamentary acts), government or interest group 
statements, committee reports, press agency articles, newspaper articles, minutes of 
meetings and parliamentary plenary sessions, and public opinion surveys. In addition to 
the above qualitative indicators, a number of quantitative indicators are used, such as 
economic indicators (real GDP growth rate and unemployment rate), and figures of 
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immigrants in Germany. The primary data is supplemented by scholarly literature of 
relevant fields. 
 
Selection of interviewees 
With regard to qualitative research based on interviews, most methodology scholars 
recommend using purposive sampling or snowball sampling. In purposive sampling, the 
researcher strategically selects interviewees who are relevant to the research question 
(Bryman, 2008: 458). Bryman adds to this the approach of theoretical sampling, which he 
includes as a sub-group of purposive sampling. When using this approach, an emerging 
theoretical framework is used to select interviewees until theoretical saturation is achieved. 
The main idea of theoretical sampling is that interviewees continue to be selected until a 
category has been saturated with data (Bryman, 2008: 426, 459). 
 
This study has followed a purposive sampling approach informed by theoretical 
considerations. The only exceptions are a few exploratory interviews from the early stages 
of the research project. When conducting exploratory research on the Economic Migration 
Directive chapter of the study, the minutes of the Council meetings in which the Directive 
had been discussed were not available to the public. Hence, a number of people were 
consulted to establish the main issues in the discussions. Accordingly, interviews were 
conducted with the Permanent Representation of the United Kingdom to the European 
Union (Brussels, 04/07/07), Permanent Representation of Finland to the European Union 
(Brussels, 04/07/07), and with a diplomat who prefers to stay anonymous (30/04/2008). 
When later the full minutes of the Council meetings became available, the data was 
complemented. These interviews also served to get a feeling for how well the questions 
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flow and to get some experience with the process of conducting interviews (see, for 
instance, Bryman, 2008: 443). 
 
For the other interviews, the rules of the game concept was used to select the relevant 
interview partners. According to the bureaucratic politics framework, the rules of the game 
determine which actors play a role in the process of preference formation. The rules of the 
game for the case of Germany are the rules of internal procedure of the German federal 
government (Bundesgeschäftsordnung der Bundesministerien or BGO). They determine 
which actors have to be part of the decision-making process, namely, which ministry is in 
charge of coordinating the process, and if and how the social partners and the parliament 
are to be included. Consequently, the relevant representative or representatives for each 
actor were tried to be identified. In some cases this was straightforward. For instance, the 
BGO clearly assigns the Ministry of the Interior as the ministry responsible for coordinating 
preference-formation on immigration matters. It has the power of discretion to decide 
which other ministries need to be included in the process, i.e., which other ministries’ 
areas of responsibility are being affected. Thus, not all relevant actors can be identified 
from the rules of internal procedure. Snowball sampling was therefore employed to identify 
all relevant actors, or respondents that could provide information about relevant actors, 
such as representatives of research institutes and academics. Bryman defines snowball 
sampling as follows: “With this approach of sampling, the researcher makes initial contact 
with a small group of people who are relevant to the research topic and then uses these to 
establish contacts with others” (Bryman, 2008: 184). 
 
The interview selection was stopped when neither the conceptual frameworks used in the 
study nor respondents suggested there were further relevant interview partners that had 
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not been interviewed. While the majority of chosen persons were willing to be interviewed, 
a few high ranking German politicians were not willing or did not have the time to take part 
in an interview. However, I was referred to people in charge of immigration policy-making, 
who were often even better qualified to comment on the preference formation of the 
German governments with regard to liberalising economic migration policies at the EU 
level. This is because dealing with issues relevant for this study was or is part of their daily 
routine, whereas for high-level decision-makers the subject of this study is only one 
amongst many other issues which can make it difficult to recall all the details involved in 
the decision-making process. This is particularly likely if the issue was not seen as 
controversial or sensitive at the time of decision-making. 
 
Interview Questions 
When selecting questions and compiling the interview guide a number of points were kept 
in mind. Bryman (2008: 442) suggests considering, “[w]hat do I need to know in order to 
answer each of the research questions I’m interested in?” as a guide to devising the list of 
interview questions. In addition, the author suggests a number of basic elements to steer 
the process of choosing questions. These include establishing some sequence in the topic 
areas to which the questions refer, in order to make sure the interview flows nicely; 
avoiding asking leading questions; and relating the questions as closely as possible to the 
central research question of the study (Bryman, 2008: 442). The interview guide contained 
some contextual introductory questions about the general developments surrounding the 
respective proposal, and, as the interview progressed, more specific questions digging 
deeper into dynamics of the decision-making process of the German government. In case 
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an important thread emerged, follow-up and probing questions were asked to dissect more 
information about the relevant processes. 
 
Archival Resources – some considerations 
Archival resources are an important source of primary data. Often they are the principal or 
only way to reconstruct certain aspects of decision-making processes that took place a 
long time ago. Consequently, they can provide a longitudinal perspective of a certain topic 
or policy area. In addition, they can give clear and detailed insights into governmental 
decision-making, particularly if the archival material consists of declassified documents. 
This is because they can comprise a plethora of information that interviewees might 
withhold for reasons of confidentiality or sensitivity. However, archival research involves a 
number of pitfalls that need to be kept in mind and addressed by the researcher. 
 
The collections of certain archives may have important documents missing – either 
because they have been lost, accidentally destroyed, or removed intentionally 
(Trachtenberg, 2006: 157). Archival documents could also have been subject to purposeful 
manipulation. This could reflect a certain agenda of policy-makers, for instance, portraying 
their actions in a certain light, or attempts to make specific actors believe that their points 
of view have been taken into account in the process of decision-making, while in truth the 
decision has been made by a senior governmental figure without considering all 
appropriate actors (George & Bennett, 2005: 101-102; Trachtenberg, 2006: 159). In 
particular, intentional misinformation or manipulation of the sources poses the danger of 
creating bias that might lead the researcher to draw the wrong conclusions. However, 
there are a number of possible ways to deal with the weaknesses of archival research. 
 
 
98 
 
Archival sources should be considered with the wider historical context in mind that 
provided the background to which the documents were produced. This includes the 
examination of contemporary public sources, such as media, secondary literature, 
alternative archival resources, or even interviews if possible (George & Bennett, 2005: 
111; Milligan, 1979: 196; Trachtenberg, 2006: 158). It is important to analyse the same file 
or document from different sources, for instance, to compare different minutes of the same 
meeting obtained from different sources. Trachtenberg (2006: 159-160) suggests that 
earlier versions of documents often contain less bias, as manipulation of documents tends 
to happen with later final versions. If certain documents are seen as politically sensitive, 
governments may decide carefully which documents to make available to the public for 
later consultation (Trachtenberg, 2006: 157). In addition, George and Bennett suggest that 
lower level actors are often the better source of information. This is because they have a 
better recollection of what happened since they were dealing with the matter on a daily 
basis. Conversely, senior officials have to deal with a plethora of issues simultaneously 
and might find it more difficult to put together the details of a particular issue (George & 
Bennett, 2005: 103). Moreover, lower-level officials carry less political responsibility, which 
reduces the incentive for manipulating the documents according to a certain political 
agenda. 
 
It is important to go through archival research with certain questions in mind but to keep an 
open mind to challenge established information and mind-sets (Brooks, 1969: 91-92; 
Trachtenberg, 2006: 146). Even though archival resources may not provide the complete 
list of documents, they still can serve to establish the processes that happened in the past. 
In the words of Trachtenberg: “Every piece of evidence is a window into the same 
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historical reality, and you don’t need to look through every window to get some sense for 
what the historical reality is” (Trachtenberg, 2006: 158). Finally, the advice of King et al. 
also applies to addressing the weaknesses of archival research: “The most important rule 
for all data collection is to report how the data were created and how we came to possess 
them” (King, et al., 1994: 51). 
 
This dissertation reduces the weaknesses posed by archival research by using different 
sources. Archival research is complemented by consulting newspapers, interviews (where 
possible), other historical accounts, and different archives. With regard to the Ankara 
Agreement, for instance, the Federal Archives in Koblenz, the Political Archives of the 
Foreign Office, as well as the Archives of the European Union in Florence are used. With 
regard to the Europe Agreement case study, only one archival resource was available (the 
files of the Federal Ministry of Economics at the Federal Archives in Koblenz), but careful 
attention has been paid to consult newspaper accounts and other relevant scholarly work 
to compare and provide the historical background. In addition, with regard to the Ankara 
Agreement, within one archive, the files of different ministries are examined, which have 
been recorded and archived separately. Most documents have been compiled by lower-
level civil servants. In addition, several documents are included with more than one 
version or in different archives or files which increases the validity and reliability of the 
data, as discussed above. In particular, with regard to the Ankara Agreement case study, 
the sensitivity of the freedom of movement provisions was low, reducing the incentive and 
thus the likelihood of a manipulation of the records. 
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Analysis of data 
To analyse the data from interviews and archival research, the qualitative research 
software NVivo was used.9 The content was coded according to themes that emerged 
while doing the research. A major advantage of using qualitative data analysis software is 
that data from interviews can be coded together with data from archival, newspaper, and 
government sources as well as secondary sources. This enables a direct comparison and 
triangulation of the different data sources. Coding is the starting point for most forms of 
qualitative data analysis (Bryman, 2008: 550). The process of making sense of the 
empirical data has been guided by some of the points that Bryman, with reference to 
Lofland and Lofland (1995), lists as a general guide to coding (Bryman, 2008: 550). These 
points advise to consider of what general category the item of data is an instance; what the 
item of data represents; what question about a topic does this item of data suggest; what 
sort of answer to a question about a topic does this item of data imply; and what kind of 
event is going on here (Bryman, 2008: 550). The data was coded during the process of 
transcribing the interviews and analysing archival and newspaper sources. Codes have 
been constantly reviewed in light of the developing conceptual framework and modified if 
necessary. Importantly, after the coding of the data the findings were interpreted in light of 
the research question and related to existing theoretical concepts. 
 
Criticism of using coding as a tool for analysing qualitative data include the danger of 
losing the context of what is said, and the fragmentation of data leading to the loss of the 
narrative flow to what interviewees have said (Bryman, 2008: 553; Coffey & Atkinson, 
1996: 23). These criticisms are addressed by keeping the general context in mind by 
                                                
9 The NVivo software provides a platform where several different sources, such as interview transcripts, notes 
of archival material, pictures of archival documents, newspaper articles, and journal articles can be uploaded 
and coded according to certain themes. 
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constantly triangulating the information with other sources. The second criticism is of less 
relevance to this study as the research question is not particularly conducive to the in-
depth analysis of narratives (Bryman, 2008: 554). This is because of the plethora of actors 
involved in the decision-making process and the regulated decision-making environment 
leaving not much leeway for individuals to shape the process single-handedly. 
 
Generalisation 
The theoretical framework explains the liberalisation of economic migration measures for 
the case of Germany and thus intends to explain why and under what conditions the 
German government agrees to liberalise economic migration policies at the EU level. In 
addition, the study hopes that the findings elaborated for the case of Germany can be 
generalised to the type or class of cases of which Germany is a member (see, for 
instance, George & Bennett, 2005: 110). As discussed above, in the most narrow sense, 
the class of cases are the other founding members of the EEC, i.e., Belgium, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. The cases differ on a number of variables, but still 
share many commonalities, such as the main characteristics of parliamentary and 
governmental institutions, the organisation of the economy, geographic situation, history of 
economic migration, immigrant stock, organisation of the economy, and being subject to 
similar foreign policy demands with several other countries (see, for instance, Hall & 
Soskice, 2001; Lijphart, 1999). Hence, the risk of mistaken inferences is relatively low. 
 
More broadly, the findings of this study may travel to other EU Member States. Compared 
to the original six, by including all 27 EU Member States there is more variation with regard 
to the relevant causal variables because of the greater diversity of country characteristics. 
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This increases the likelihood that other variables that have not had a causal impact with 
regard to Germany might play a role. However, some countries, for instance, Austria, 
share a great deal of common characteristics with Germany, which increases the 
likelihood of the findings for Germany also being applicable. In the broadest sense of 
generalisation, the findings might provide insights into the preference formation on 
economic migration for any country. However, claiming that this is definitely the case risks 
the danger of overgeneralisation and must be treated with caution. As the characteristics 
of countries outside the EU differ greatly, and also if we regard preference formation on 
economic migration in general, i.e., without the EU context, many variables may change or 
new variables become relevant. Thus, the generalisability of the findings on this general 
level is likely to be small – but still possible. 
 
In addition, the findings may also be applied to future policy proposals on economic 
migration. Very important for this is the broad nature of the explanatory framework. By 
including a number of different causal factors in the bureaucratic politics framework, the 
explanatory framework of this dissertation is likely to be flexible enough to allow for 
changes in the EU and national decision-making procedures. The latter is particularly 
relevant, as the Treaty of Lisbon changed the voting procedure on legal migration from 
unanimity voting to qualified majority voting. Here the value of having used different kinds 
of policy measures on economic migration might show.  
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Immigration background of Germany: domestic context 
This section provides the immigration context of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
focussing on key developments that shaped immigration to Germany and the Republic’s 
young history, relating these to the four sub-cases of the dissertation. 
 
Gastarbeiter recruitment 
Shortly after the end of the Second World War, an export-driven boom led the German 
economy to expand significantly. To maintain high growth rates, more workers than the 
German working population could provide were required; consequently, from the mid 
1950s the German economy experienced labour shortages. In addition to robust economic 
growth, this was for a number of reasons: The working population was still rather small, 
attributable to wartime loss of life; furthermore the rearmament of the Federal Republic 
meant that over 500,000 workers were no longer available on the labour market (S. Green, 
2004: 32). As the Iron Curtain cut off the most obvious possibility to recruit people from 
East and Central European countries, which had strong cultural ties with Germany, labour 
recruitment focused on Southern European countries (Katzenstein, 1987: 213). Bilateral 
labour recruitment agreements were concluded with Italy in 1955, Spain and Greece in 
1960, Turkey in 1961, Morocco in 1963, Portugal in 1964, Tunisia in 1965, and Yugoslavia 
in 1968. Labour shortages were further increased because the building of the Berlin Wall 
in 1961 stopped the inflow of workers from the German Democratic Republic (Thränhardt, 
1996b: 202-203). This period of labour recruitment influenced the history of the Federal 
Republic like few other developments. Immigration was ostensibly temporary and the 
(in)famous term Gastarbeiter (guest worker) was used to stress this (seemingly) temporary 
dimension. Foreign workers were supposed to return to their home countries after a few 
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years of work, not integrate into German society. Hence, no policies were put in place to 
provide a smooth transition to continued residence in Germany and most guest workers 
lived segregated from the German population (Thränhardt, 1996b: 206); neither were there 
policies implemented to provide foreign workers with an incentive to return to their 
countries of origin. In retrospect, the Gastarbeiter policies are largely seen as a massive 
failure, and the idea that workers would return to their respective home countries after the 
job was done turned out to be an illusion (Korte, 1987: 164). The first sub-case of this 
dissertation falls in this period of enthusiastic labour recruitment. In addition to guest 
worker recruitment, this era was also characterised by the political and economic tensions 
between the Soviet Union and the Western world. 
 
Recruitment Stop (?) 
The guest worker recruitment period came to an end in 1973, when the German 
government implemented the recruitment stop (Anwerbestopp) in November of that year. 
This happened in the context of the oil crisis of October 1973 and the worsening economic 
situation in Germany. 2.6 million guest workers were living in Germany and the labour 
market was saturated (Bundesministerium des Innern, 2011). However, the recruitment 
stop did not bring to an end the inflow of foreigners. It did discontinue the inflow of 
workers, but immigrants kept coming to Germany, most notably in the form of family 
reunification or persons seeking asylum. Hence, the recruitment stop of 1973 could be 
more appropriately termed labour recruitment stop. As a consequence, in 1980, 4.5 million 
foreigners lived in the Federal Republic of Germany (or seven percent of the total 
population) (Münz & Ulrich, 1997: 83). 
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“Germany is not an immigration country” 
Immigration did not cease in the 1970s, and the social challenges that the large numbers 
of foreigners in the Federal Republic posed became apparent. The most striking problems 
were those of the education system coping with the increased number of immigrants 
(organisationally and educationally), and the housing issues, i.e., foreigners tended to live 
under worse conditions than Germans, and in certain areas, which meant a segregation 
between the foreign and native population (Klusmeyer & Papademetriou, 2009: 97-98; 
Korte, 1987: 168-1976). In addition, the unemployment rate of foreigners had risen 
proportionally higher than that of the native population, which created concerns about 
foreigners posing a burden to the German welfare state (Martin, 2004: 232). These issues, 
combined with the worsening of the economic situation after the oil shock in 1979/1980, 
gave rise to a wave of xenophobia mainly targeted at the Turks, the largest group of 
foreigners in Germany (Thränhardt, 1996b: 210-211). Migration had become a massive 
political issue. 
 
In an attempt to establish a new policy framework, a joint federal-Länder commission was 
put into place in August 1976; it presented its report in April 1977. The commission was 
supposed to develop policies that reflected the fact that Germany was not and should not 
be “a country of immigration”. The recommendations of the Commission entrenched the 
dictum that Germany is not a country of immigration (“Deutschland ist kein 
Einwanderungsland”) in German migration politics and political debate. It determined 
political thinking about immigration policy by German policy-makers for more than twenty 
years (S. Green, 2004: 38). The dichotomy between the reality of a large stock of 
immigrants and the continued inflow of foreigners (Germany’s foreign population increased 
from 4.6 million in 1981 to 5.3 million in 1990 (S. Green, 2004: 55)) on the one hand, and 
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the political class’s denial that Germany needed a coherent framework of immigration 
policies on the other hand, is tellingly expressed by Bade with the heading: “The German 
Paradox: Immigration Country without Immigration Policies” (Bade, 1997: 28). This 
approach did not change in the course of the 1980s, with the consequence that political 
and social tensions grew while politicians denied the existence of problems that people in 
Germany were confronted with on a daily basis (Bade, 1997: 29). 
 
Xenophobia and Asylum Compromise 
The disintegration and eventual collapse of the Soviet Union and German reunification in 
1990 had serious migration repercussions for Germany, as they removed obstacles for 
migration. Flows of East Germans and ethnic Germans from Poland, the Soviet Union, and 
Romania started to arrive in the Federal Republic of Germany. In addition, many people 
from Eastern Europe applied for asylum (Thränhardt, 1996b: 213). Civil war in Sri Lanka, 
ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia, and the repression of the Kurdish minority 
population in Turkey and its neighbouring countries further augmented the increase in 
asylum applications to Germany. In the absence of legal routes for migration, asylum 
became the most promising avenue to enter the country (Klusmeyer & Papademetriou, 
2009: 137; Menz, 2009: 180). These developments led to further tensions between the 
native and foreign populations in the Federal Republic of Germany, which resulted in 
another wave of xenophobia and even violence against foreigners that lasted for three 
years (Thränhardt, 1996b: 218). The violence included a fire-bombing by a group of neo-
Nazis in the town of Solingen that killed five Turks who were permanent residents of the 
Federal Republic of Germany (Hollifield, 1994). On 6 December 1992, the federal 
government together with the social democratic opposition reached the so-called asylum 
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compromise (Asylkompromiss), the objective of which was to reduce possibilities of abuse 
of the German asylum legislation, and make it more restrictive to reduce the number of 
asylum seekers coming to the Federal Republic of Germany. The asylum compromise 
came into force on 30 March 1993. It helped to resolve what had been called “Germany’s 
biggest political crisis since World War II” (Joppke, 1999: 94); public outbreaks of 
xenophobia decreased after the asylum compromise became law. (Bundesministerium des 
Innern, 2011; Thränhardt, 1996b: 219-220). The Europe Agreement case study falls into 
this period of German immigration history. The Iron Curtain had fallen and the CEECs 
sought to reinvigorate their ties with the West. The Europe Agreement case study 
highlights the migration challenges of this development. The case study also sheds light 
on the dilemma the government of the Federal Republic of Germany found itself in, by 
seeking to receive the CEECs with open arms on the one hand, and facing political limits 
for liberalising immigration policy on the other, as immigration became a salient political 
issue domestically. 
 
Green Card and Zuwanderungsgesetz 
Public criticism, and criticism within the then ruling party (the CDU/CSU), about the dictum 
that the Federal Republic of Germany is not a country of immigration became louder 
during the course of the 1990s. However, the federal government kept its position until the 
late 1990s (Bade, 1997: 28; Joppke, 1999: 62; Thränhardt, 1996b: 198). Even though in 
the 1990s the government concluded a number of agreements with the CEECs10 allowing 
foreign workers to work in the Federal Republic of Germany as subcontractors for certain 
projects, and seasonal foreign worker programmes, there was no route for permanent 
                                                
10 Poland, Hungary, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia–Herzegovina, Macedonia, Romania, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Bulgaria, Latvia, and Turkey. 
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economic migration to the Federal Republic of Germany (Martin, 2004: 239-240; Menz, 
2001: 255; Thränhardt, 1996b: 214). It was the coalition government of the SPD and the 
Greens, which came into power in October 1998, that slowly started to turn its back to the 
political immigration orthodoxy that had dominated the 1980s and much of the 1990s. The 
government introduced a bill that established a legal route of labour migration for highly 
qualified ITC specialists. The government further established a high-profile expert 
commission (unabhängigen Kommission „Zuwanderung“) to make recommendations for a 
comprehensive reform of German immigration law. Giving consideration to the 
recommendations of the Commission, it issued a proposal for a new immigration act to 
regulate immigration in August 2001, which in its first version even contained a point-
based system of selection later erased from the text. The process of implementing the law 
was a lengthy and controversial one, and the final version of the new immigration act 
(Zuwanderungsgesetz) that came into force on 1 January 2005 was more restrictive than 
the initial draft. This reflected the lengthy political battles the process of passing the law 
had involved. These developments indicate that the political leadership felt there were 
labour shortages in certain sectors of the economy that necessitated a legal platform for 
labour migration. The last two case studies (the Economic Migration Directive and the Blue 
Card Directive) of the dissertation are part of this time period. They help to understand 
Germany’s slow move towards opening new channels for economic migration and its even 
slower preparedness to accept EU involvement in this policy area. 
 
Immigration background and governmental preferences 
The Federal Republic of Germany has a particular immigration history. It provides the 
context within which domestic preferences on migration are formed in the Federal 
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Republic of Germany. The four hypotheses of this dissertation include causal variables 
that were established in an iterative process that meant going back and forth between data 
and theory. Of course, immigration policy-making in the Federal Republic of Germany 
does not happen in a vacuum. As discussed above, one of the key aspects of German 
immigration history includes guest worker recruitment, which led to a large immigrant stock 
and had serious social effects that shaped German society until the present day. Givens 
and Luedtke (Givens & Luedtke, 2005) observe that political salience is more significant 
for policy outputs on immigration that the number of immigrants in a country. The general 
migration context and political developments regarding immigration influence the causal 
variables, by for instance increasing the political salience of immigration or inducing the 
government to pass certain domestic laws. Apart from factors that do not directly relate to 
the national context, such as foreign policy value, domestic migration developments are 
operationalised by the causal variables of the dissertation’s hypotheses. In other words, 
the domestic context is captured by the causal variables of this dissertation. 
 
In addition, the Federal Republic of Germany shares the history of guest worker 
recruitment with most other Western European countries, such as Britain, France, 
Scandinavia, the Low Countries, Austria, and Switzerland (Katzenstein, 1987: 210; 
Thränhardt, 1996b: 206). Thus, recruitment of foreign labour in the 1950s and 1960s with 
the intent to send workers back to their country of origin is not a German particularity. 
Neither are waves of xenophobic violence directed towards the foreign population a 
phenomenon particular to the Federal Republic of Germany as they also occurred, for 
instance, in the UK and France (Thränhardt, 1996b: 210). Consequently, even though the 
Federal Republic of Germany has a particular domestic immigration context, governmental 
preferences on economic migration are best explained by the causal variables included in 
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the four hypotheses. The fact that the Federal Republic of Germany shares certain 
aspects of its immigration background with other European countries may be taken as a 
starting point to expand the findings of this study to other countries, as factors such as 
guest worker recruitment, immigrant stock, and xenophobia can be controlled for. 
 
Comparability of measures 
The dissertation explains why a Member State government supports common EU 
measures on liberalising economic migration and why it sometimes decides not to do so. 
Hence, the dissertation is interested in looking at policy measures that propose an EU-
level liberalisation of this policy area. It is important that the policy measure has or had (or 
would have had if adopted) a binding effect that means or would mean a liberalisation of 
economic migration policies at the EU level. In addition, the measure needs to require 
support of Member States before entering into force. Thus, for instance, rulings of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) do not fall into the scope of this study. Assessing the 
impact of ECJ on economic migration policy is beyond the scope of this dissertation. It is of 
less importance what kind of policy measure it is. In other words, the policy measure can 
be an EU directive, regulation, association agreement or another sort of agreement or 
treaty. 
 
The dissertation examines the causal factors that played a role in forming governmental 
preferences. If, for instance, foreign policy factors played an important role in bringing 
about governmental support for a certain policy measure, then this does not pose 
problems of comparability; instead, it is of great significance that foreign policy factors can 
play a key role in the process of supporting EU-level liberalisation of economic migration. It 
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is important also to include policy measures, such as association agreements, which may 
be more susceptible to foreign policy factors. This allows discussing the role of these 
factors in the process of national preference formation. 
 
This study sets out to explain why and under what conditions a Member State supports 
EU-level liberalisation of economic migration in a more comprehensive way, and thus goes 
beyond the literature that focuses on post-Tampere developments. In addition, by using 
the bureaucratic politics framework as a general analytical lens, the explanatory framework 
of the dissertation encompasses, in particular with the rules of the game proposition, 
procedural aspects of the governmental preference formation. Thus, procedural 
differences and what kind of rules of the game are most likely to bring about Member State 
support for liberalising economic migration policies at the EU are taken into account in the 
explanatory framework. Consequently, different kinds of measures, most notably EU 
directives and association agreements, can without problem be used as case studies for 
this dissertation, even if they entail differences in decision-making procedures. 
 
Moreover, if the explanatory framework holds for a large number of different policy 
measures, its explanatory power is more convincing and valuable than of an explanatory 
framework that can only explain a certain kind of policy measure, such as EU directives, 
for instance. The contribution of the latter explanatory framework to explain EU-level 
liberalisation of economic migration would be very narrow. The important point is to explain 
liberalisation of economic migration at the EU-level independent from the form of policy 
measure it takes. This also increases the likelihood that the findings can be generalised 
beyond the case study of this dissertation. 
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Identifying labour shortages 
 
There is no clear way to identify labour shortages. There are no official measures or easy 
indicators (Migration Advisory Committee, 2008: 118). Thus, studies that have embarked 
on measuring labour shortages deploy a range of different indicators (see, for instance, 
Migration Advisory Committee, 2008; Ruhs & Anderson, 2010; Veneri, 1999). Even though 
analysing the factors that lead to the development of labour shortages is beyond the scope 
of this study, it is helpful to briefly consider the factors involved in generating labour 
shortages, in order to contextualise policy making on economic migration. Ruhs and 
Anderson offer a sophisticated account, suggesting that labour shortages are produced by 
an “interdependence between labour demand and supply, and the effects of dynamic 
regulatory, institutional, and policy systems” (Ruhs & Anderson, 2010: 17). Their 
conceptual framework can be broken down to three main points. First, labour demand and 
supply are mutually conditioning. For instance, the workers that employers would like to 
hire depend on the workers they think they will be able to attract. Second, the term skill is 
both conceptually and empirically ambiguous. For instance, skills can mean soft skills or 
skills related to particular professions. This can include, as the authors point out, “a 
willingness to accept certain wages and employment conditions” (Ruhs & Anderson, 2010: 
6). Third, labour shortages can be produced by what the authors call “system effects”. This 
refers to the institutional and regulatory frameworks of the labour market, such as the lack 
of training programmes, increasing the benefits of recruiting immigrants who have already 
been trained abroad (Ruhs & Anderson, 2010: 6; Wickham & Bruff, 2008: 41). Hence, 
labour shortages tend not just to emerge as unavoidable occurrences, but are the product 
of a number of factors. In the words of Geddes and Scott: “It is important to recognize here 
that shortages are socially, economically, culturally, and politically constructed and that 
they need not exist” (Geddes & Scott, 2010: 211). 
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A critical point is that employers are central to both the production of labour shortages and 
their measurement. Regarding measurement, employers are important because they are 
an essential source of information (F. Green, Machin, & Wilkinson, 1998: 165). However, it 
is important to keep in mind that employers may exaggerate or misjudge the labour 
shortages they experience (Migration Advisory Committee, 2008: 110; Veneri, 1999: 18). 
Labour shortages can be reduced by a number of ways – immigration being just one of 
them. Measures to reduce labour shortages other than immigration include increasing 
wages and/or improving working conditions, changing the production process to make it 
less labour-intensive, relocating production to countries where costs are lower, producing 
less labour-intensive commodities and services, increasing overtime, increasing hours 
worked, increasing subcontracting, and retaining existing staff (Geddes & Scott, 2010: 
212; Migration Advisory Committee, 2008: 113; Ruhs & Anderson, 2010: 34). Employers 
often do not engage in these alternatives as they are either not available or much more 
cost intensive than immigration, in case immigrant labour is readily available (Ruhs & 
Anderson, 2010-42; Veneri, 1999: 18). 
 
Consequently, measuring labour shortages should involve a number of different indicators, 
which do not rely entirely on employer information. A very highly developed methodology 
to measure labour shortages is presented by the Migration Advisory Committee. It 
combines what the authors call top-down with bottom-up evidence. Regarding top-down 
evidence, in total, indicators are used to measure labour shortages. They can be 
segmented in four categories: employer-based indicators (for instance, reports of 
shortage), price-based indicators (for instance, earnings and growth), volume-based 
indicators (for instance, employment or unemployment), and indicators of imbalanced 
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based on administrative data (for instance, vacancies or vacancy/unemployment ratios) 
(Migration Advisory Committee, 2008: 109, 116).11 By using the above indicators, rather 
than only a few, the methodology reduces the chance of the evidence suggesting a 
shortage where one does not exist. However, it is still possible that the data gives wrong 
indications about the existence of labour shortages (Migration Advisory Committee, 2008: 
132). The methodology suggests considering, if possible, the top-down together with 
evidence in order to establish whether labour shortages exist in a certain profession. 
Regarding the use of bottom-up evidence, the Migration Advisory Committee states: 
 
Bottom-up evidence enabled us to get more detail and more fully understand the 
context for the data trends we were considering. It enabled us to drill down to 
occupations that were often very specialised. Working with a wide variety of 
stakeholders to gather this evidence also provided the opportunity to refine further 
our methodological approach (Migration Advisory Committee, 2008: 78). 
 
The bottom-up evidence was gathered by extensive engagement with stakeholders. This 
included launching a call for evidence; carrying out visits to every country and region of the 
UK; engaging with the Sector Skills Councils and Sector Advisory Panels; setting up a 
formal Stakeholder Panel; establishing a broader Stakeholder Forum; other meetings with 
employers, employees and representative organisations; and commissioning some 
                                                
11 Employer-based indicators: percentage of skill-shortage vacancies/employment by occupation; 
percentage of skill-shortage vacancies/all vacancies; percentage of skill-shortage vacancies/hard-to-fill 
vacancies. 
Price-based indicators: percentage change in median hourly pay for all employees; percentage change in 
mean hourly pay for all employees; relative premium to an occupation, given NQF3, controlling for region and 
age. 
Volume-based indicators: percentage change in unemployed by sought occupation; percentage change in 
hours worked for full-time employees; percentage change in employment; absolute change in proportion of 
workers in occupation less than one year. 
Indicators of imbalance based on administrative data: absolute change in median vacancy duration and 
stock of vacancies/claimant count by sought occupation. 
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independent research into staff shortages and immigration across key sectors (Migration 
Advisory Committee, 2008: 78). Only if both top-down and bottom-up data suggest there 
are labour shortages in a certain profession, does the methodology acknowledge the 
existence of labour shortages. 
 
Data requirements for such a methodology are enormous and necessitate externally 
commissioned studies, consultation with stakeholders, and a team of researchers. Where 
the dissertation refers to labour shortages, the potential pitfalls are highlighted. 
 
Relevant national legislation 
As discussed in Chapter Two, this dissertation is interested in the misfit between the 
existing national legislation and what is proposed at the EU level. This can be measured in 
a very straightforward way by investigating the relevant legislative acts. For the sub-case 
studies of the dissertation, see Table 4 below. 
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Table 4: Relevant national regulations for each sub-case study 
 Case Study Relevant national regulation 
1 Ankara Agreement Bilateral Recruitment agreement with Turkey 
2 Europe Agreement 1. Bilateral agreements the Federal Republic of Germany 
had in place with Poland, most notably, the agreement 
for workers posted by subcontractor companies 
(Vereinbarung zwischen der Regierung der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Regierung der 
Republik Polen über die Entsendung von 
Arbeitnehmern polnischer Unternehmen zur 
Ausführung von Werkverträgen.) 
2. Gesetz zur Neuregelung des Ausländerrechts 
3 Economic Migration 
Directive 
2001 draft of Zuwanderungsgesetz (Entwurf eines 
Gesetzes zur Steuerung und Begrenzung der 
Zuwanderung und zur Regelung des Aufenthalts und der 
Integration von Unionsbürgern und Ausländern 
(Zuwanderungsgesetz)) 
4 Blue Card Directive Zuwanderungsgesetz 
 
Measurement of political salience 
This study uses a generally agreed upon definition from the literature on political salience, 
i.e. political salience of immigration is the level of popular attention to, or awareness of, 
immigration issues (see, for instance, Givens & Luedtke, 2004: 150; Rosenblum, 2004b: 
40-41). To measure this level of popular attention, most commonly, political salience is 
operationalised as references in newspapers (see, for instance, Baumgartner & Jones, 
1993: 252-268; Givens & Luedtke, 2004: 150; 2005: 17; Lee, Rainey, & Chun, 2009: 468-
469; Ringquist, Worsham, & Eisner, 2003: 150). The most straightforward form is to count 
the number of articles that reference a certain issue over a specified time period in a 
particular publication. Studies covering the US often use the New York Times. This study 
uses Die Zeit, Der Spiegel, and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung. Die Zeit is a 
major German nationwide weekly newspaper. The first edition was printed in February 
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1946. Die Zeit offers an easily accessible archive that allows counting the number of 
articles for all four case studies of this dissertation. 
 
Der Spiegel is Germany’s largest weekly news magazine and was first published in 
January 1947. It also offers an easily accessible archive that includes all issues of Der 
Spiegel. 
 
The Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung is the Sunday newspaper of the Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung which is a centre-right newspaper. The Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Sonntagszeitung is used instead of the daily Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in order to 
make results comparable with the weekly Die Zeit. Archival data for the Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung is only available from 1993. Consequently, it can only be 
used to measure political salience for the latter two case studies of this dissertation. 
 
At the point of writing, I am not aware of other German newspapers that offer an archive 
that is available online and dates back to the 1950s. Even though it is possible to count the 
number of articles of daily newspapers for the latter two case studies, it is not possible to 
include all cases. Consequently, Die Zeit is the most promising source of measuring 
political salience of immigration for the cases used by this dissertation. In combination with 
Der Spiegel and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung it is a sound instrument to 
measure political salience in Germany. Whereas Die Zeit is a centrist to social democratic 
newspaper, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung has a centre-right outlook. 
Having data from two sources from different sides of the political spectrum strengthens 
inferences about the level of political salience at certain points in time. The position of Der 
Spiegel on the political spectrum can be classified as centrist, with slightly liberal positions 
 
 
118 
at times. Figures 1 to 5 show that the data of the three sources correlate. The number of 
relevant articles in Der Spiegel is lower than in Die Zeit and Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Sonntagszeitung. However, this may be because of the structure of the magazine and the 
amount of content in one issue, which is likely to differ to the other two publications that 
are newspapers rather than weekly news magazines. What is important is that the data 
across the four case studies correlates between the three sources, as Figure 5 indicates. 
The political salience was highest for the Economic Migration Directive. Political salience 
was second highest for the Europe Agreement and the Blue Card Directive. The level was 
rather similar for these two case studies. Political Salience was the lowest for the Ankara 
Agreement case study. Even though data of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung 
is only available for the latter two case studies, the data correlates with the other two 
sources. Thus, we can extrapolate that it is very likely that – if available – the data would 
also correlate for the former two case studies. The political salience as measured by 
means of counting newspaper articles is in line with what the analysis of the historic 
contexts suggests (see discussion in relevant chapters). 
 
To measure the political salience of immigration, the German terms Zuwanderung and 
Einwanderung have been used. Both terms are translated with the English term 
immigration (see, for instance, Collins German Concise Dictionary, 1998). Thränhardt 
argues that Zuwanderung is a more neutral term than Einwanderung, but that the 
difference between the two terms cannot be translated into other languages (Thränhardt, 
1996b: 200). Joppke (1999: 96-97) highlights the ideological dimension of the two terms: 
 
[…] the different positions in Germany's immigration debate had narrowed down to 
a cryptic distinction between ‘inmigration’ (Zuwanderung) and ‘immigration’ 
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(Einwanderung). This was still a distinction of principle. Zuwanderung, the term 
preferred by restrictionists, means unwanted immigration that is tolerated for 
constitutional and moral-political reasons. Einwanderung, by contrast, connotes 
actively solicited, wanted immigration. Critics of a self-conscious ‘immigration’ 
policy and law have so far correctly pointed out that such a framework is foreign to 
European nation-states, which – in contrast to the transoceanic new settler nations 
– have never pursued active policies to populate unsettled lands. But once the 
inevitability, even necessity, of inmigration is acknowledged, the difference 
between Zuwanderung and Einwanderung is one of words only, and it is bound to 
disappear. 
 
Consequently, the two terms are well-suited to identify articles that deal with immigration 
issues. Also, the German term Immigration refers to immigration; however this expression 
has only become more common in recent years. Consequently, its use would run the 
danger of biasing the results, as it is less likely to be used, for instance, in 1960 than in 
2008. 
 
The study counts the number of articles in Die Zeit per month in order to measure the 
political salience immigration had during the relevant time periods of preference formation 
of the German government. Articles from ZEIT ONLINE, the internet service of the Die 
Zeit, are not considered. This is because ZEIT ONLINE was only established in the mid-
2000s. Including articles from that source would make the results for the different sub-case 
studies difficult to compare as ZEIT ONLINE is only available for the period the Blue Card 
Directive was negotiated. Also articles from the Austrian edition of Die Zeit are excluded. 
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Only articles that mention either Einwanderung or Zuwanderung in the context of 
contemporary immigration to the Federal Republic of Germany are counted; articles that 
mention the terms Einwanderung or Zuwanderung but refer to immigration in different 
parts of the world, or to immigration to the Federal Republic of Germany in a different time 
period, are excluded. In addition, articles are included that mention Einwanderung and 
Zuwanderung in the European context in a way that includes the Federal Republic of 
Germany or is relevant to the Federal Republic of Germany. Careful attention has been 
paid not to count twice articles that mention both Einwanderung and Zuwanderung. In 
order to compare the results for the different sub-case studies, the average number of 
articles per month mentioning Einwanderung or Zuwanderung during the periods relevant 
for each sub-case study has been calculated (see Figure 5). 
 
To use media attention to measure political salience is not a perfect form of measurement, 
as the salience of an issue in the media and in public opinion can be treated as distinct. 
However, it is generally accepted in the literature, especially as the relationship between 
the salience of an issue in the media and in public opinion is an interdependent one. 
 
This quantitative measurement of political salience is supplemented by a qualitative 
analysis of the debate in the Federal Republic of Germany in the relevant time periods 
using secondary literature and newspaper articles. If available, public opinion surveys 
ranking public attention to different issues can be used. At the point of writing, no relevant 
studies for the Federal Republic of Germany could be identified. However, the method of 
measuring political salience by counting newspaper articles complemented by a qualitative 
analysis of the historical context provides a robust measurement of political salience. 
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Figure 1: Political Salience of Immigration, Ankara Agreement (number of relevant articles 
per month) 
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Source: Online archives, calculation by the author 
 
Figure 2: Political Salience of Immigration, Europe Agreement (number of relevant articles 
per month) 
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Source: Online archives, calculation by the author 
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Figure 3: Political Salience of Immigration, Economic Migration Directive (number of 
relevant articles per month) 
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Source: Online archives, calculation by the author 
 
Figure 4: Political Salience of Immigration, Blue Card Directive (number of relevant articles 
per month) 
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Source: Online archives, calculation by the author 
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Figure 5: Average number of mentions per month during respective periods of 
negotiation12 
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Source: Online archives, calculation by the author 
 
When does political salience arise? 
The literature mentions a number of factors that can contribute to increasing political 
salience of a certain issue. These factors include: “real-world conditions”, in the words of 
Behr and Iyengar (1985: 53-54), such as external shocks (for instance, with regard to 
migration a surge of TCNs trying to enter the country or seeking asylum); discovery of new 
scientific knowledge; the formation of political groups of campaigns attempting to push a 
particular view on a certain issue and framing an issue in a certain way; and increased 
government activity regarding an issue (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993: 122-125). What 
gives rise to increased political salience varies by issue area. For instance, the discovery 
of new scientific knowledge is likely to be more relevant to car safety than to immigration. 
                                                
12 Data from the Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung was available only for the Economic Migration 
Directive and the Blue Card Directive case studies. 
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In addition, the emergence of political salience is not a straightforward process and no 
clear causal process is established by the literature. For instance, if we take press 
coverage as an indicator of political salience, Baumgartner and Jones observe the 
relationship can also happen the other way around, i.e. press coverage results in 
government action (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993: 247). 
 
This study takes political salience as an independent variable in its analysis. Thus, to 
determine what exactly caused the political salience of immigration on certain occasions is 
beyond the scope of this study. However, the qualitative narrative describing the political 
salience of immigration in the respective case studies also gives an indication of what 
factors played a role in bringing immigration to the attention of the public. If the political 
salience of immigration is high, it can change the decision-making process of the 
governmental preference formation, for instance, by changing it from a mode of client 
politics to interest groups politics (see, for instance, Freeman, 2006). However, such a 
possible shift can be constrained by institutional factors, such as the rules of the game 
(see, for instance, Allison & Zelikow, 1999). This is discussed in more detail in the 
empirical chapters. 
 
Operationalisation of foreign policy value 
 
The foreign policy value of a sending country is defined as the importance of a sending 
country to Germany’s overall foreign policy agenda. The importance can be diplomatic, 
strategic, and economic (Rosenblum, 2004b: 42). Factors that indicate a high foreign 
policy value are the following: the potential of the sending country to ameliorate a certain 
security threat (it is important from a geopolitical perspective), the density of trade relations 
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(or the prospect of establishing them), the existence of political links, such as past or 
present military alliances, or former colonial ties (see, for instance, Rosenblum, 2004b: 41-
42). Table 5 indicates the high foreign policy value for the Ankara Agreement and the 
Europe Agreement chapters and the non-applicability and thus relevance of the variable 
for the Economic Migration Directive Chapter and the Blue Card Directive Chapter. 
 
Table 5 Factors indicating a high foreign policy value 
 
 Ankara 
Agreement 
Europe 
Agreement 
Economic 
Migration 
Directive 
Blue 
Card 
Directive 
Potential to ameliorate security 
threat X X N/A N/A 
High density of trade relations 
or potential to establish them X X N/A N/A 
Political links (existence of 
military alliance) X  N/A N/A 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has established and discussed the methodology of the dissertation. Particular 
attention has been paid to the selection of the interviewees, conducting archival research, 
and the analysis of the data. The case selection of the Federal Republic of Germany and 
the sub case studies, i.e. the Ankara Agreement, the Europe Agreement with Poland, the 
Economic Migration Directive and the Blue Card Directive have been considered. It has 
been shown that to answer the research question, the Federal Republic of Germany is the 
best choice, taking into account the criteria that have been proposed by the literature to 
increase external and internal validity of the research. In particular, this is because the 
variation of the dependent variable is the greatest for the Federal Republic of Germany 
compared to other potential case studies, most notably France. The immigration 
background of the Federal Republic of Germany has been given to contextualise the four 
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sub-case studies. In addition, it has been discussed why the three hypotheses put forward 
in Chapter Two are best suited to explain the dependent variable. Even though the Federal 
Republic of Germany has a distinct immigration history, the developments are captured by 
the causal variables on a higher level of abstraction, so that the explanatory framework 
may be applied to other countries. Furthermore, the chapter has addressed concerns of 
comparability of the four sub-case studies. Even though they do not constitute the same 
kind of policy measure, the explanatory framework is broad enough to explain liberalisation 
of economic migration policies in different forms. This is important for a potential 
generalisability of the results. Finally, the chapter has presented the operationalisation of 
political salience. The counting of newspaper articles covering immigration issues with 
regard to the Federal Republic of Germany, complemented by accounts of immigration’s 
political salience as provided by secondary sources, has been singled out as the most 
appropriate way of operationalising political salience. 
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Chapter Four – Germany’s Preferences on the Freedom of 
Movement Provisions of the Ankara Agreement 
 
Introduction 
On 12 September 1963, the European Economic Community concluded an association 
agreement with Turkey (Ankara Agreement). The Agreement entered into force on 1 
December 1964. It was supposed to establish a customs union between the two parties in 
three steps and possibly prepare Turkey for EEC membership. The Agreement contained 
provisions on the establishment of the freedom of movement for workers between Turkey 
and the EEC and thus constituted the first instance of liberalising economic migration 
policies at the EU level. 
 
This is puzzling for a number of reasons. EEC Member States could agree on common 
European action for provisions on freedom of movement between the EEC and Turkey, 
which constituted a liberalisation. However, around 40 years later, efforts to create 
common EU measures on legal economic migration from outside the Union into the Union 
failed because of pronounced opposition and disagreement about the nature of such 
measures.13 In addition, the Federal Republic of Germany had become one of the fiercest 
opponents of common EU measures on economic migration. Moreover, the federal 
government of the Federal Republic of Germany concluded a bilateral labour recruitment 
                                                
13 Council Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third country nationals for the purpose of paid 
employment and self-employed economic activities, COM(2001) 386 final, which was proposed by the 
European Commission in July 2001, had to be formally withdrawn in 2006, as Member States could not reach 
an agreement on the Directive. 
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agreement with Turkey on 30 October 1961 (Vereinbarung zur “Regelung der Vermittlung 
türkischer Arbeitnehmer nach der Bundesrepublik Deutschland“), before the Association 
Agreement with Turkey was brought to a successful conclusion. These developments 
pose an array of important questions. First, why did the federal government of Germany 
see the need for EEC involvement in this domain when everything was already regulated 
on the bilateral level? Second, why did the EEC only put in place provisions on freedom of 
movement with Turkey (and Greece) and not with other countries, such as Spain, 
Portugal, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, which have been used as a source of labour 
migrants by EEC Member States? Third, why do the freedom of movement provisions 
feature at all in an agreement which had the establishment of a custom union as its main 
objective? Finally, did the commitment to implement the freedom of movement provisions 
lack from the very beginning, thus leaving ultimate power to implement the freedom of 
movement provision with the Association Council, where every Member State has the right 
to veto? While all these questions need to be – and will be – answered, the main and 
overarching question that concerns this chapter is: why did the Federal Republic of 
Germany support the freedom of movement provisions of the Ankara Agreement? 
 
The chapter focuses on the period between the points in time when Turkey applied for 
European Economic Community (EEC) associate membership in 1959 and the Ankara 
Agreement entered into force in 1964. The analysis is concerned with the Federal 
Republic of Germany (FRG).14 
 
                                                
14 The focus of this chapter is on the Ankara Agreement itself and not the decisions of the Association Council, 
because the Articles of the Agreement contain the most far-reaching provisions with regard to the freedom of 
movement for Turkish workers. Although its implementation is not tied to a particular deadline, Article 12 
contains a binding obligation for Member States to establish the freedom of movement. 
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The empirical analysis consists of three themes – domestic politics, international politics, 
and labour market concerns. In 1961, the Federal Republic of Germany concluded a 
bilateral labour recruitment agreement with Turkey. Its existence then minimised the misfit 
and the cost of including provisions on freedom of movement and right of establishment in 
the Ankara Agreement, which happened on Turkish demands. But only the constellation of 
the high foreign policy value of Turkey together with the relatively low domestic political 
salience of immigration matters, and the bureaucratic nature of the decision-making 
process led to the German government’s support of the provisions. 
 
The chapter looks at the different actors involved in the formation of governmental 
preferences. The most relevant were ministerial actors. Nevertheless, the chapter also 
considers the Länder and interest groups such as trade unions and employer associations. 
The chapter uses archival primary data from three different archives which has been 
looked through for the first time with a particular focus on the freedom of movement 
provisions.15 Most of the materials are governmental documents that are now accessible. 
While, by and large, they are well archived, sometimes the context in which they are 
written is not clearly established. Secondary literature plus interviews with experts in the 
field are used to triangulate the information obtained in the archives. The chapter is 
structured as follows. It begins with an overview of the Ankara Agreement, its freedom of 
movement provisions and an outline of Germany’s preferences on the Agreement and the 
provisions. The chapter then moves on to the empirical analysis that puts the hypotheses 
to the test. The chapter ends with a concluding section. 
 
                                                
15 The German Federal Archive (Bundesarchiv) in Koblenz, the Historical Archives of the European Union in 
Florence, and the Political Archives of the German Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt) in Berlin. 
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I. Genesis of the Ankara Agreement and its provisions on freedom 
of movement and the right of establishment 
Background 
The first steps towards the association agreement were undertaken by Turkey and not the 
EEC. Accordingly, Turkey applied to become an associate member of the European 
Economic Community (EEC) on 31 July 1959. This was shortly after Greece had put 
forward its application. An association agreement between the Republic of Turkey and the 
EEC (Ankara Agreement) was signed on 12 September 1963 and entered into force on 1 
December 1964 (Bridge, 1976: 161). The association agreement between Greece and the 
EEC was concluded two years earlier, on 9 July 1961, after negotiations that were less 
lengthy than the ones connected to the Ankara Agreement. The former entered into force 
in November 1962 (Önis, 2001: 108; Rey, 1963: 54; Wülker, 1971: 63).  
 
The negotiations on the Ankara Agreement started on 28 September 1959, and took ten at 
times slow and difficult rounds lasting several days each, before they could be concluded 
on 25 June 1963. Three reasons for this can be found. First, the lack of preparation of the 
Turkish side regarding the content of the negotiations (Commission of the European 
Economic Community, 1959a) and domestic political changes resulting from the military 
coup of 27 May 1960 (Ete, 1963: 42; Kramer, 1988: 33-34). Second, disagreement within 
the Commission about the desirability of a far-reaching agreement with Turkey and the 
lesser importance the Commission attributed to the agreement with Turkey (compared to 
the one with Greece whose successful conclusion was seen as very important because it 
was the first association agreement in the history of the EEC) (Ceylanoglu, 2004: 152-
153). Third, disagreement between Member States in the Council of Ministers delayed the 
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negotiations which made it difficult to agree on a common decision (Ceylanoglu, 2004: 
293-294). On the one hand, the Federal Republic of Germany favoured a more 
encompassing Association Agreement, and together with the Benelux countries supported 
a rapid conclusion to the negotiation (Ständige Vertretung der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland bei der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, 1963). On the other hand, 
France and Italy were reluctant to do so and preferred a loose Association Agreement 
(Auswärtiges Amt, 1959b; Birand, 1978: 54; Ceylanoglu, 2004: 193; E. Krieger, 2006: 
127). Italy saw Turkey as a main competitor for its agricultural exports to the other EEC 
countries and wanted to avoid further competition. Although agricultural competition also 
played a role, the reasons for France’s sceptical positions towards the Agreement are 
more complex. France was sceptical about the benefits of an association agreement with 
Turkey and for a long time argued against its conclusion (Auswärtiges Amt, 1959b). 
However, as a letter from the German Embassy in Paris to the Auswärtige Amt shows, the 
French government was aware from the very beginning of the Turkish bid that a rejection 
of the bid was hardly possible for foreign political reasons (Botschaft der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland Paris, 1959). Nonetheless, during the course of the negotiations, France was 
careful to avoid making too many concessions to Turkish demands and favoured an 
agreement that was as minor as possible. This complicated the process of concluding the 
Agreement (Council of the European Economic Community, 1961, 1962).16 
                                                
16 France’s policy towards Turkey was characterised by frustration resulting from the loss of the significant 
geopolitical influence it once held in the region and Turkey’s lack of European credentials Kramer, H. (1988). 
Die Europäische Gemeinschaft und die Türkei: Entwicklung, Probleme und Perspektiven einer schwierigen 
Partnerschaft. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Krieger, E. (2006). Die Europakandidatur der Türkei: 
Der Entscheidungsprozess der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft während den 
Assoziierungsverhandlungen mit der Türkei 1959 - 1963. Zürich: Chronos Verlag.. In addition, Turkey’s support 
for the Algerian rebels fighting for independence from France caused a cooling of the diplomatic relations 
between the two countries and resulted in an increasingly negative French stance towards the Turkish bid. 
Only after Algerian independence was sealed in March 1962, France took again a more positive position 
Ceylanoglu, S. (2004). Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, Griechenland und die Türkei: Die 
Assoziationsabkommen im Vergleich (1959-1963). Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.. In the end, 
France and Italy gave in, mostly because of political security considerations ibid. 
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Content, Aims and Objectives 
The Ankara agreement was concluded to make Turkey an associate member of the EEC, 
to establish a customs union, and to possibly pave the way for Turkish membership of the 
EEC (Deutscher Bundestag, 1964; Joseph, 2006: 3).17 Article 2 of the Ankara Agreement 
states the objectives of the agreement as follows: “[t]he aim of this Agreement is to 
promote the continuous and balanced strengthening of trade and economic relations 
between the Parties […]” (Council of the European Union, 1992). To attain that, the 
Agreement sought to establish a customs union. Due to the big economic development 
gap between the EEC and Turkey, this was envisioned to happen in three stages, as 
otherwise the Turkish economy might have been crushed by full competition with 
Community businesses. First, in the preparatory stage, Turkey was supposed to 
strengthen its economy with financial aid from the EEC. This preparatory stage was meant 
to last for at least five years. Second, in the transitional stage, a customs union between 
the EEC and Turkey was to be progressively established and the economic policies of the 
two parties were to be aligned more closely. This stage was supposed to last no longer 
than 12 years. Third, the final stage was the customs union, meant to entail even closer 
coordination of the economic policies of the Community and Turkey. 
 
An Association Council was established that consisted of members of the governments of 
Community Member States, members of the Council and of the Commission, and 
members of the government of Turkey. The Association Council’s mandate was to ensure 
the implementation of the Agreement’s provisions by binding decisions (Akyürek, 2005: 8; 
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Council of the European Union, 1992: 4).18 In order to guarantee continuity in advancing 
the Agreement in between the Association Council’s meetings, an Association Committee 
was appointed. In addition, a Joint Parliamentary Committee was established to debate 
certain issues based particularly on the annual report of the Association Council 
(Deutscher Bundestag, 1963). The committee was supposed to make recommendations to 
the respective Parliaments and the Association Council (Cameron, 1999: 5-6; Karabetsis, 
1976: 24-25). 
 
Article 28 states that when the implementation of the Agreement has advanced far 
enough, the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the EEC shall be explored.19 Hence, 
the Agreement does not contain any binding provisions for Turkish membership to the 
EEC (cf. Deutscher Bundestag, 1964). The careful wording of potential Turkish 
membership to the EEC indicates that the EEC was aware of at least some of the 
difficulties involved, for instance, the massive developmental gap between Turkey and the 
EEC, as well as the prominent question of whether Turkey is a European country. On the 
one hand, the EEC wanted to root Turkey firmly in the West, but was, on the other hand, 
not so sure if Turkish membership to the EEC might be a step too far. An internal letter of 
the Federal Ministry of Economics (Bundeswirtschaftsministerium) stated that the 
possibility to attain full EEC membership should – contrary to Greece – not apply to 
Turkey. The sentence was later deleted but shows that Turkish EEC membership was 
considered a sensitive issue (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 1959h). In order to 
establish the customs union, the Agreement includes provisions on agriculture, freedom of 
                                                
18 For a detailed discussion of the Association Council’s duties and powers see Akyürek, M. (2005). Das 
Assoziationsabkommen EWG - Türkei: Aufenthalt und Beschäftigung von türkischen Staatsangehörigen in 
Österreich. Wien: Springer-Verlag. P. 8-10. 
19 Given the great controversy more concrete discussions about Turkish EU membership sparked a few years 
later, it can be suspected that talks about Turkish EEC membership at that time might have been opportunistic 
rhetoric, at least to some extent (see, for instance, Krieger 2006). 
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movement for workers, transport policy, trade in capital goods, and coordination regarding 
trade policy with third countries (Kramer 1988: 39; Council of the European Union 1992). 
As the task of this chapter is to explain Germany’s support for the freedom of movement 
provisions, the following section introduces these provisions in more detail. 
 
Free Movement of Workers (Articles 12, 13 and 14) 
Article 12: 
The Contracting Parties agree to be guided by Articles 48, 49 and 50 of the Treaty 
establishing the Community for the purpose of progressively securing freedom of 
movement for workers between them. 
 
Article 13: 
The Contracting Parties agree to be guided by Articles 52 to 56 and Article 58 of the 
Treaty establishing the Community for the purpose of abolishing restrictions on freedom of 
establishment between them. 
 
Article 14: 
The Contracting Parties agree to be guided by Articles 55, 56 and 58 to 65 of the Treaty 
establishing the Community for the purpose of abolishing restrictions on freedom to 
provide services between them. 
 
Article 12, 13 and 14 of the Agreement comprise provisions of economic migration, i.e., the 
freedom of movement of workers and the right of establishment. Ceylanoglu (2004: 18) 
suggests that these provisions were taken from the Treaty of Rome which together with its 
 
 
135 
four freedoms20 served as a model for the association agreement, and that there was no 
disagreement about the freedom of movement provisions in the negotiations.21 The 
chapter shows that this is only partially true, as there was disagreement and the wording 
and content of the freedom of movement provisions in the Ankara Agreement differ from 
both the Treaty of Rome and the Association Agreement with Greece. 
 
Article 12 refers to the establishment of the freedom of movement between the EEC and 
Turkey. This provision is based on Articles 48, 49 and 50 of the EEC Treaty.22 Article 13 
establishes the abolishment of restrictions on the freedom of establishment between the 
EEC and Turkey. It is based on Articles 52 to 56 and Article 58 of the EEC Treaty.23 Article 
14 obligates the contracting parties to do away with any restrictions on freedom to provide 
services between them (Council of the European Union, 1992). The Agreement also 
contains a number of further economic provisions for economic union regarding, for 
instance, transport, competition, taxation, balance of payment, and movement of capital. 
The Articles, including the ones on the freedom of movement, are only brief and rather 
vague in their wording. They are supposed to be supplemented with additional protocols 
by the end of the preparatory stage (Wülker, 1971: 65). Article 36 of the Additional 
Protocol from 1977 provides for the gradual establishment of free movement by 1986, with 
the process managed by the Association Council (Ugur, 1999: 143).24 As Member States 
have veto powers in the Council, freedom of movement was never established. 
 
                                                
20 The four freedoms include the freedom to move (I) people, (II) goods, (III) services and (IV) money freely 
around the EEC (and later the EU). 
21 Supplemented by personal communication with author, 28 April 2008. 
22 Articles 48-50 of the EEC Treaty lay down the provisions on freedom of movement for workers within the 
Community. 
23 Articles 52-56 and 58 of the EEC Treaty refer to the freedom of establishment within the EEC. 
24 Official Journal of the European Communities, No L 361/1, 31.12.77 
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II. Germany’s Preferences 
Rules of the game 
Germany’s preferences were formulated by the government and relevant ministries 
(Ceylanoglu, 2004: 21; Haftendorn, 1983: 51). The GGO II25 mentions the relevant actors 
to be included in the governmental preference formation. Paragraphs 22, 75 and 76 
determine that the ministries in charge of the file are the Federal Ministry of Economics 
and the Foreign Office. Paragraph 24 states that the Länder need to be included if their 
affairs are touched upon, which was not the case for the foreign political matters the 
association agreements belonged to. There is no mention that interest groups need to be 
involved in matters of association agreements. The stipulations of the GGO II are 
corroborated by the literature and the archival material. 
 
While the Ankara Agreement was debated, the European Integration process happened 
almost unnoticed by the general public (Görtenaker, 2002: 145-146). There was very little 
newspaper coverage of the Ankara Agreement, not even to mention the provisions on the 
freedom of movement.26 Hence, public opinion and the media did not play an important 
role in the preference formation on the Ankara Agreement and the freedom of movement 
provisions. Neither is there any indication that the employer associations held active 
positions with regard to the Agreement. The Länder governments as well as the social 
partners did not play a significant and direct role in German preference formation on the 
freedom of movement provisions. 
                                                
25 Gemeinsame Geschäftsordnung der Bundesministerien – Besonderer Teil, as in force in 1959-1963. 
26 As revealed by a visit to the Newspaper Archives of the Bundesarchiv in Berlin but also by research in the 
Bundesarchiv in Koblenz and the Politische Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts in Berlin. There was no reference to 
the public debate. Only occasional newspaper articles about the general Agreement that were very brief could 
be found. 
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However, interest groups or private actors came in through the “back door” as they 
contributed their part in making the German government sign the bilateral recruitment 
agreement with Turkey, which in turn had an important impact on the German 
government’s preferences on the freedom of movement provisions. This will be analysed 
in detail in section III. Competency on formulating the preferences on the Ankara 
Agreement was largely a bureaucratic matter and happened between the relevant German 
Ministries. As the EEC was still in its infancy, competencies on formulating Germany’s 
position on European integration were not yet clear. Both the Foreign Office and the 
Federal Ministry of Economics shared responsibility on European Integration and thus also 
with regard to the Association Agreements. The Foreign Office was masterminding the 
general process, with the Ministry of Economics having the final say on economic matters. 
In practice, general and economic matters were sometimes difficult to disentangle, which 
produced fertile ground for competency struggles between the two ministries 
(Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 1959a). Thus, Germany’s preferences on the Ankara 
Agreement were, by and large, formulated between the Foreign Office and the Federal 
Ministry of Economics. Other Ministries, such as Justice, Employment and Social Affairs, 
and the Interior, only played a marginal role. With regard to macro decisions, the final say 
was with Chancellor Adenauer (cf.: Müller-Rommel, 1994: 162; Rudzio, 2003: 289-290). 
However, no evidence could be found that Chancellor Adenauer took action on the 
freedom of movement provisions of the Ankara Agreement. 
 
 
 
138 
Domestic Politics 
Misfit 
The point of reference to determine the goodness of fit between the Ankara Agreement 
and Germany’s national regulations was the bilateral labour recruitment agreement the 
German government had concluded with its Turkish counterpart on 30 October 1961. It 
entered into force retroactively on 1 September 1961 (Bundesminister für Arbeit und 
Sozialordnung, 1962; Hunn, 2005: 46) (Vereinbarung zur “Regelung der Vermittlung 
türkischer Arbeitnehmer nach der Bundesrepublik Deutschland“). Labour migration of 
foreign nationals to the Federal Republic of Germany commenced in 1955, when the 
booming German economy had depleted domestic resources and was calling for the 
import of further workers from abroad (S. Green, 2007: 31-32). The legal framework was 
generated by bilateral labour recruitment agreements, starting with Italy in 1955, Spain and 
Greece in 1960, and with Turkey in 1961. The wave of conclusion of such agreements 
continued with Morocco in 1963, Portugal in 1964, Tunisia in 1965, and Yugoslavia in 
1968. Before the recruitment agreements, the principal legal basis to recruit foreign labour 
was the 1938 Ausländerpolizeiverordnung that had been revived in the early 1950s. The 
Ausländerpolizeiverordnung was replaced in 1965 by the Foreigner Law (Klusmeyer & 
Papademetriou, 2009: 91). 
 
The implementation of the agreement on the German side was put into the hands of the 
Federal Agency for Employment Service and Unemployment Benefits (Bundesanstalt für 
Arbeitsvermittlung und Arbeitslosenversicherung). It was supposed to act together with its 
Turkish equivalent as an agent to place Turkish workers with German employers. The 
Federal Agency was given authority to determine whether the workers preselected from 
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the Turkish side fulfilled the professional and health requirements to work in the Federal 
Republic of Germany. The agreement further stipulated that each accepted worker was 
issued a standard work contract and a legitimation card (Legitimationskarte). The card 
replaced the work permit, which would usually be required, for a maximum period of one 
year. If the worker desired to stay longer than this period, the agreement foresaw that the 
worker would need to request a work permit at the local employment office and a 
residence permit at the local Aliens Authority. The residence permit could only be issued 
for a maximum period of two years. The agreement was less generous than the ones with 
the other European countries, such as Italy, Spain, and Greece; it contained no provisions 
on transferring earnings, family reunification, the right to receive child allowances, or the 
possibility for German firms to request specific Turkish workers by name, who would then 
enjoy a simplified admission procedure. Moreover, it restricted residency in the Federal 
Republic of Germany to two years (Bundesminister für Arbeit und Sozialordnung, 1962; 
Hunn, 2005: 55-56; Steinert, 1995: 308).27 This confirms that the German government was 
less keen to conclude such an agreement with Turkey compared to countries such as Italy, 
Spain, and Greece. 
 
Labour shortages affected the conclusion of the bilateral agreement with Turkey. However, 
foreign political dynamics also played an important role in convincing the German 
government to conclude the agreement. Turkey made use of the strong desire of Turkish 
workers to work in the Federal Republic of Germany and that many of them approached 
German diplomatic representations in Turkey. In addition, the Turkish government made 
targeted efforts to manoeuvre the German government to support these provisions, by 
making continuous reference to NATO membership and the need to sustain good relations 
                                                
27 A revised version of the agreement came into force on 30 October 1964, which made its provisions very 
similar to the other bilateral labour recruitment agreements. 
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with a NATO partner of strategic importance during the Cold War (Schönwälder, 2001: 
252; Steinert, 1995: 306-307). The bilateral agreement also referred to the need for equal 
treatment to countries with similar geographic distance, namely Greece (Auswärtiges Amt, 
1960; Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Ankara, 1961b; Bundesanstalt für 
Arbeitsvermittlung und Arbeitslosenversicherung, 1960). The Ministry of Labour (for labour 
economic reasons) and the Foreign Office (for foreign political reasons) were the first 
ministries to support the conclusion of the bilateral agreement (Hunn, 2005: 49). The 
Interior Ministry was most reluctant and fought to keep the agreement less generous than 
the ones concluded earlier with Italy, Spain, and Greece. Its position was that there should 
be no permanent employment for Turkish nationals in the Federal Republic of Germany, 
and that there should be health checks and strict control of recruitment (Steinert, 1995: 
308). In the end, it had to give in to the points of view of the other ministries and interest 
groups, most notably employer associations (Hunn, 2005: 52-59). 
 
The bilateral agreement is certainly more concrete than the provisions in the Ankara 
Agreement. This shows that the Ankara Agreement was an EC-wide compromise, albeit 
shaped by the countries with bilateral agreements in place. The Ankara Agreement 
contains a binding commitment to establish freedom of movement and establishment for 
workers from Turkey. In contrast, the bilateral agreement consists of specific measures 
that had an immediate effect on regulating labour migration from Turkey to the Federal 
Republic of Germany (see, for instance, Figures 6 and 7). Hence, the national regulations 
were more open than the EEC-level measures and the fights had taken place in the 
preference formation on the bilateral agreement. Consequently, the German stance on the 
provisions on freedom of movement and establishment was rather relaxed. Given that the 
national measures already allowed significant migration from Turkey to the Federal 
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Republic of Germany, any regulation of the Ankara Agreement that referred to a future 
opening of the EEC labour market to Turkish nationals was easy to back for the German 
government as no intra-governmental actor was in danger of incurring significant costs. 
Neither did the Agreement thwart any national regulations or preclude the inauguration of 
future bilateral agreements. Accordingly, in a departmental meeting, it was concluded that 
specifications on freedom of movement and establishment should already apply in the 
preparatory stage of the Agreement. Given that the bilateral agreement was more detailed 
than the relevant provision of the Ankara Agreement, and allowed Turkish nationals to 
enter the German labour market with immediate effect, there was no misfit that could 
trouble the German decision makers. Consequently, consent to the provisions on freedom 
of movement of the Ankara Agreement was easily given as no political or economic costs 
were looming as a result of a misfit between national and EU-level regulations. 
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Figure 6: Foreign Workers in the Federal Republic of Germany, by country of origin (in 
thousands) 
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Figure 7: Turkish workers sent abroad through the Turkish Employment Service28 
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Sources: Martin (1991: 22), Keyder and Aksu-Koç (1988: 17) 
 
Nature of the Decision-Making Process 
No actor involved in the preference formation process in the Federal Republic of Germany 
was in danger of incurring concentrated costs or benefits from the provisions on freedom 
of movement and the right of establishment. The point of reference that regulated 
economic migration from Turkey since 1961 was the bilateral agreement. Therefore, the 
Ankara Agreement was not expected to make an immediate real-life difference to workers, 
and by and large, it was neutral with regard to costs and benefits. Neither actor had an 
incentive to mobilise particular resources to push for a certain outcome of the provisions. 
Thus, it is unsurprising that the national preference formation process on the Ankara 
                                                
28 For the years 1961 and 1962, Keyder and Akso-Koç (1988) list different figures than the ones from the 
Turkish Employment service used by Martin (1991) for official workers sent abroad (4041 and 8620 
respectively). The estimates of unofficial migration assume that unofficial emigration is 25 percent of official 
migration rounded to the nearest 100. 
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Agreement followed the bureaucratic pattern given by the rules of the game, and there 
was no publicly voiced contestation. 
 
Given that European Integration was a very new development at that time, competencies 
and decision rules were still being developed. Unlike today, where the governmental 
regulations stipulate which actors need to be consulted in the governmental preference 
formation on a certain EU initiative, in the early 1960s the preference formation process 
was more flexible and in the hands of the government. Thus, there is no indication that the 
Länder governments were involved in the preference formation of the German government 
on the freedom of movement provisions at the European level. Even if they had, they 
probably would have been in-line with the federal government as it did not face any 
significant opposition in the Bundesrat between 1959 and 1964.29 The position of the 
German government concerning associating Turkey with the EEC was shared in trade 
union circles (cf. Donner, 1959, 1961, 1963; Schröder-Brzosniowsky, 1959).30 However, 
there are no separate statements on the provision on freedom of movement, right of 
establishment, and the provisions of services. As the preference formation happened in an 
intraministerial way, and no actor incurred concrete benefits or costs from the freedom of 
movement provisions, the debate remained a bureaucratic one and did not get politicised. 
 
Immigration was not politically salient at the time of the Ankara Agreement. Immigration 
was largely seen as a temporal phenomenon that would help the German economy to 
push ahead with full force. The problems of integrating migrants were unknown. In 
                                                
29 The Bundesrat is the upper house of the German parliament and represents the Länder. 
30 In the Journal Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte, which is supposed to be the theoretical centre for debate in 
the German trade unions, it has been repeatedly argued (for instance, by Donner and Schröder-Brosniowsky) 
that concluding an association agreement with Turkey would be beneficial for the EEC on political and 
economic grounds. Nonetheless, the problems an association agreement with Turkey posed were also 
discussed. 
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addition, the Ankara Agreement hardly appeared in general public debate which made any 
politicisation of the decision-making process even more unlikely. Hence, the decision-
making process on the freedom of movement provisions of the Ankara Agreement 
followed the route laid out by the rules of the game – an exception is the role of the Turkish 
government, but this will be discussed in more detail in the section on bureaucratic politics. 
The process was not influenced by any form of domestic political salience. 
 
International factors 
Foreign policy value 
Turkey was of high foreign policy value for the Federal Republic of Germany for a number 
of reasons. Most notably, its role in fighting the threat emanating from the Soviet Union, 
interlinked with strong support for the Association Agreement by the US and Germany’s 
desire to promote European integration as a means to regain a foreign policy profile. 
Finally, there was a historically established special relationship between Germany and 
Turkey. 
 
The German Minister of Economics Ludwig Erhard mentioned the importance of finding a 
quick solution for the Greek and Turkish bids, in order not to upset the governments and 
people of these two countries that constituted a cornerstone of NATO (Council of the 
European Economic Community, 1959a). A German aide-mémoire indicates the 
importance of Turkey’s geographic location and military considerations for the conclusion 
of the Agreement (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 1963b). In a meeting held in the 
Council of the EEC on 3 April 1962, the German delegation reminded the other Member 
States that it was important not to offend Turkey for geopolitical security reasons (Ständige 
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Vertretung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bei der Europäischen 
Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, 1962). 
 
At the end of the 1950s, the Cold War was raging. The Soviet Union, with its expanding 
nuclear programme, was perceived as a very prominent threat in the West. This was 
particularly the case for the Federal Republic of Germany, which was the epicentre of the 
Cold War. As a defeated power of World War II that was not in possession of nuclear 
arms, it was not in a position to defy the Soviet Union with its own military capacities. The 
threat of war was most immediate during the Berlin Crisis, when the Soviet Union annulled 
the four-power status of Berlin, climaxing with the building of the Berlin wall in 1961 
(Hacke, 2003: 86-87). It was crucial for the Federal Republic of Germany to have very 
close ties with the Western powers and to intertwine as deeply and quickly as possible 
with the member countries of organisations, such as the EEC and NATO. Being integrated 
into the EEC gave the Federal Republic of Germany a voice at the European level and 
was one of the main priorities of Chancellor Adenauer (Lappenküper, : 89; Moravcsik, 
1998: 27). Integrating with its Western European neighbours was then seen as the prime 
route to re-establish some of Germany’s geopolitical power. It also made the Federal 
Republic of Germany, at least de jure, an equal partner in the European project. 
 
The Federal Republic of Germany was dependent on US goodwill and support in order to 
have a comfortable position in terms of geopolitical security and avoid the outbreak of a 
war on its territory. Germany was no nuclear power and needed support of the Western 
powers, in particular the US, to deter the Soviet Union whose influence began immediately 
after the Federal Republic of Germany’s eastern borders (Adenauer, 1959: 247-250; 
Rudzio, 2003: 17; Ständige Vertretung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bei der 
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Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, 1962). This “fundamental dependence” (Johnson, 
1973: ix) made the Federal Republic of Germany subordinate to the US, and meant that 
German politicians had to take into account US interests when making foreign policy 
(Besson, 1970: 185). Negotiations of the Ankara Agreement show that US pressure was 
an important factor in the EEC’s efforts to integrate Turkey into Europe. This is particularly 
the case for the Federal Republic of Germany (Commission of the European Economic 
Community, 1963; E. Krieger, 2006: 189; Özren, 1999: 243). The US also exercised 
diplomatic pressure in support of the Athens Agreement, including a visit to the Auswärtige 
Amt in 1960 (Ceylanoglu, 2004: 217-218). US influence also impacted the Federal 
Republic of Germany in another way, namely direct US diplomatic pressure with regard to 
the EEC association agreement with Greece. The head of the unit dealing with European 
Affairs in the Federal Ministry of Economics, Mr. Jentsch, was called by the US embassy 
inquiring about the validity of rumours that the Minister of Economics, Ludwig Erhard, did 
not support the EEC Association Agreement with Greece (Bundesministerium für 
Wirtschaft, 1959b). With regard to the Ankara Agreement, such direct pressure cannot be 
found (Ceylanoglu, 2004: 217-218). Nonetheless, the US was favourable towards Turkey 
becoming an associate member of the EEC. 
 
The containment policy of the US inaugurated by the Truman Doctrine in 1947 made it an 
important US foreign policy goal to support states endangered by Communism and Soviet 
rule, such as Turkey, and to anchor them in the West (E. Krieger, 2006: 171-172; Rudzio, 
2003: 14-15). Turkey was particularly important as on 30 October 1959, it had agreed to 
station US missiles on its ground that could reach the Soviet Union. Only two further 
countries (the UK and Italy) had agreed to station such missiles on their territory (Jamin, 
1998: 70-71). Consequently, the US supported the Ankara Agreement, largely on political 
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grounds (Ceylanoglu, 2004: 213-218). The US was even prepared to put up with exposing 
its products, most notably tobacco, to increased competition with Turkish (and Greek) 
products within the EEC’s markets in order to tie Turkey closer to the West (Council of the 
European Economic Community, 1963). Regarding economic relations, increasing 
financial aid from the EEC to Turkey meant a relief for US finances (Gürbey, 1990: 175; E. 
Krieger, 2006: 37; Özren, 1999: 293). In particular, with regard to the Federal Republic of 
Germany and its increasing economic prosperity and capacity, the US expected a return 
service for the Marshall Plan (E. Krieger, 2006: 178). In addition, the US held particularly 
close ties with the Federal Republic of Germany so as to prevent it from becoming a 
negative force in Europe again, and lay the foundation of legitimacy for US hegemony in 
Europe (W. Krieger, 2004: 182). The US supported closer and institutionalised ties 
between the EEC and Turkey also on budgetary grounds. Nonetheless, it must be noted 
that financial aid to Turkey was politically motivated and sought to increase the West’s 
influence in the region. The US expected the German government to take “the leading 
role” in providing financial assistance to Turkey. The German government did not have 
much latitude in that respect and met the demands. Thus, the Federal Republic of 
Germany supported Turkey’s fast integration in the West by means of the Ankara 
Agreement. It sought to avoid any weakening of Turkey which was seen as an important 
pillar for the West and NATO partner vis-à-vis the Soviet threat (Erhard, 1959; E. Krieger, 
2006: 178). 
 
The foreign policy value of Turkey to the Federal Republic of Germany was further 
increased by the fact that the relationship between the two countries had been a special 
and cordial one. This made the German administration rather receptive to Turkish 
demands. Germany was an important trade partner and ally for Turkey and, in addition, 
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the two countries were united by the long-established “German-Turkish friendship” and the 
alliance in the First World War. Unlike a few years later, in the 1950s and early 1960s, this 
“friendship” was still an appropriate characterisation of German-Turkish relations (Gürbey, 
1990: 9-10). The German Foreign Office praised this alliance and friendship strongly in 
1963 and attributed great significance to it – at least officially. Hunn describes the 
reciprocity of these appreciations with reference to archival material (Hunn, 2005: 34-35).31 
An internal document of the Foreign Office indicates that the traditional bond with Turkey 
and its history as a reliable ally were still important considerations for the Federal Republic 
of Germany when the Ankara Agreement was discussed (Auswärtiges Amt, 1959a). In 
July 1962, the Turkish government thanked the German government in an aide-mémoire 
for its continued support of the Turkish bid (Turkish Embassy to the Federal Republic of 
Germany, 1962). This special relationship further increased Turkey’s foreign policy value 
and gave Turkey the opportunity to voice its interest to the German government with a 
good chance of being taken seriously. 
 
Domestic Salience of the Freedom of Movement Provisions 
As discussed above, decision-making on freedom of movement provisions did not feature 
in contemporary mainstream political debate and happened to a large degree within the 
government bureaucracy. Thus, the level of politicisation of the subject was low, which 
increased the importance of the foreign policy value of Turkey in the preference formation. 
This is corroborated by Figure 1 and Figure 5 (to be found in Chapter Three) that show 
that the political salience of immigration was low compared to the other sub-case studies. 
                                                
31 Bundesarchiv Koblenz, Politische Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Berlin. 
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Turkish Diplomatic Efforts 
Concerns about political security provide a convincing explanation for why the Federal 
Republic of Germany supported the Ankara Agreement as a whole. However, they do not 
give an indication of why the freedom of movement provisions feature in the Agreement. 
The inclusion of Turkey’s diplomatic efforts in the conclusion of the Agreement allows 
important insights. 
 
The provisions of the freedom of movement for workers were important for Turkey. In the 
late 1950s, Turkey was in an economic and political crisis with inflation increasing by 60 
percent between 1954 and 1958 (Gitmez, 1989: 4). The Turkish government anticipated 
that the freedom of movement provisions promised several immediate benefits to Turkey 
that would change the status quo for the better (Escobar, Hailbronner, Martin, & Meza, 
2006: 716).32 First, Turkey’s economy was suffering sustained underemployment (Hunn, 
2005: 33). This was because its high birth rate, mechanisation of agriculture, and rapid 
industrialisation had left many workers without a job. The possibility of exporting workers to 
the EEC promised relief for the domestic labour market. A further benefit was that Turkish 
workers could obtain professional qualifications in the EEC that would benefit Turkey’s 
economic development after the return of the workers. Remittances from workers abroad 
could improve Turkey’s balance of payments (Wülker, 1971: 69). Figure 11 indicates the 
increasing number of Turkish labour emigrants from 1961 to 1973. Interestingly, the 
Turkish delegation initially was more interested in receiving qualified workers from the EEC 
to provide technical assistance, rather than sending Turkish workers to the EEC 
(Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 1959g; Commission of the European Economic 
                                                
32 At the time when the freedom of movement provisions were negotiated, it was not clear that their date of 
implementation would be kept extremely vague. 
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Community, 1959b; Council of the European Economic Community, 1959b). In addition, 
the long-lasting rivalry with Greece, which applied for EEC associate membership a few 
months before Turkey, was important for Turkey’s motivations. This point will be discussed 
in more detail below. 
 
Figure 8: Turkish workers sent abroad through the Turkish Employment Service33 
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Sources: Martin (1991: 22), Keyder and Aksu-Koç (1988: 17) 
 
It is argued here that the Federal Republic of Germany supported the provisions on 
freedom of movement so as not to endanger the conclusion of the Ankara Agreement. In 
order to advance its goals, Turkey used two framing devices, first the Soviet threat, and 
second being disadvantaged vis-à-vis Greece. For instance, in April 1962, the Turkish 
Prime Minister, İsmet İnönü, stressed the fragility of the country despite it being an 
                                                
33 For the years 1961 and 1962, Keyder and Akso-Koç (1988) list different figures than the ones from the 
Turkish Employment service used by Martin (1991) for official workers sent abroad (4041 and 8620 
respectively). The estimates of unofficial migration assume that unofficial emigration is 25 percent of official 
migration rounded to the nearest 100. 
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important pillar of NATO and expressed his concern about the prolongation of the 
conclusion of the Agreement by the Community (Ständige Vertretung der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland bei der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, 1962). On a more general 
note, in August 1961, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Selim Rauf Sarper, conveyed an aide-
mémoire to the German Embassy in Ankara expressing explicit Turkish expectations for 
German support of the Turkish bid for associate membership (Botschaft der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland Ankara, 1961a). 
 
The most important point is that Turkish motivations to join the EEC have to be seen in 
light of the developments that took place in the wake of Greece’s bid for EEC membership. 
Turkey did not want to fall behind its main rival Greece, which had applied for EEC 
association membership in June 1959, two months before Turkey (Auswärtiges Amt, 1961; 
Commission of the European Economic Community, 1960). Thus, the Turkish government 
used the necessity of equal treatment with Greece as a second framing device to make its 
case vis-à-vis the EEC. A letter about the German position sent around within the German 
Ministry of Economics states that the Commission also saw the Turkish desire for equal 
treatment with Greece as the main reason for its attempts to conclude the Association 
Agreement with the EEC. The letter further argues that the sensitivity of the Greeks and 
the Turks as well as their mutual jealousy blocked the way to an Association Agreement 
with Turkey that differed fundamentally from the one with Greece. The letter further put 
forward that although an Agreement with Turkey that was completely identical to the one 
with Greece was not desirable due to Turkey’s lack of economic development, there was 
not much latitude to take this into account (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 1961). In 
addition, a note of the federal government’s position with regard to the Association 
Agreement with Turkey shows that it was considered as politically impossible to refuse 
 
 
153 
Turkey from becoming an associate member of the EEC, as Greece now was (Council of 
the European Economic Community, 1961). This argument is further corroborated by 
the fact that the Turkish delegation was at times badly prepared for the negotiations and 
predominantly tried to achieve the same provisions that had been agreed in the Athens 
Agreement (Commission of the European Economic Community, 1959a, 1960). Turkey 
actively exerted pressure on the Federal Republic of Germany and the other EEC Member 
States, for instance, vocally by the Turkish Foreign Minister, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, including 
reference to the importance of equal treatment with Greece (Bundesministerium für 
Wirtschaft, 1960). 
 
This Turkish behaviour, induced by its relative position to Greece, is also the key to the 
freedom of movement provisions in the Ankara Agreement. Before the Athens Agreement 
was concluded, Turkey did not have any particular demands with regard to freedom of 
movement, apart from technical assistance from the EEC (Council of the European 
Economic Community, 1959c). At a later stage of the negotiations and after the Athens 
Agreement was successfully signed, the Turkish delegation’s proposal for the content of 
the freedom of movement provisions consisted of a copy of the text of the Athens 
Agreement’s relevant provisions (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 1963a). It is important 
to note that Turkey made explicit demands with regard to the freedom of movement 
provisions, i.e., they needed to be similar to the ones in the Athens Agreement. However, 
after Turkey articulated these demands, the Community did object to having the same 
provision in the Ankara Agreement, and pushed for formulations that were less 
encompassing (Auswärtiges Amt, 1963). Title III of the Ankara Agreement does not 
include articles on the exchange of young workers and the provision of technical 
assistance by the Community, like the ones in the Athens Agreement. In addition, the 
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wording of the freedom of movement provisions in the Athens Agreement is stronger than 
in the Ankara Agreement. Thus, Title III of the Ankara Agreement was neither completely 
uncontested, nor is it just a copy of Title III of the Athens Agreement. 
 
Ministerial cost and benefits distribution with regard to foreign policy considerations 
As foreign policy is the domain of the Foreign Office, it understood the concrete costs and 
benefits of nourishing significant diplomatic relations with a country such as Turkey. By 
maintaining good relations with a politically important foreign country, it stabilised the 
West’s ring of support against the Soviet Union. This constituted concrete benefits for the 
Foreign Office. A deterioration of the relationship with Turkey would mean less geopolitical 
stability and, hence, concrete costs. Thus, the Foreign Office was strongly in favour of 
concluding the Agreement and was generous with regard to giving in to Turkish demands 
to include provisions on freedom of movement and the right of establishment. The Ministry 
of Economics was initially in favour of a looser agreement in the form of a free trade area, 
which may not have included significant provisions on freedom of movement. However, 
during a visit of the Minister of Economics, Ludwig Erhard, to Turkey in August 1959, it 
was stated that the German government would lobby to support Turkey becoming an 
associate member of the EEC (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 1959c). Documents of 
the Ministry of Economics and the Ministry of the Interior show that while the Minister did 
not want to endanger the conclusion of the Agreement, the position of the Ministry was 
nonetheless that a free trade area would be more beneficial for the Federal Republic of 
Germany. The Ministry of Economics preferred a looser form that could be applied to 
several countries, while the Foreign Office in contrast was in favour of concluding 
individual agreements (Bundesministerium des Innern, 1959; Bundesministerium für 
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Wirtschaft, 1959e). While the Ministry of Economics was aware of foreign political 
considerations that were part of the decision-making process on the Ankara Agreement, 
these considerations manifested themselves less concretely than they did for the Foreign 
Office. Therefore, the benefits of finalising an association agreement, rather than a free 
trade area, did not surpass the costs that would occur if finalising a free trade area was 
foregone. 
 
Also, the Ministry of Finance was more worried about financial concerns than foreign 
policy considerations and thus preferred different association agreements with Greece and 
Turkey. The financial costs were still in the forefront, and foreign policy benefits reached 
the Ministry to a smaller extent (Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 1961). Due to its focus 
on internal security, the Ministry of the Interior also did not experience immediate benefits 
from the foreign policy considerations. To conclude this theme, we can state that foreign 
policy was an important factor that contributed to the freedom of movement provision to 
feature in the Agreement (and that the Agreement was concluded in the first place). The 
high foreign policy value of Turkey, the low political salience of immigration matters, a 
general societal acceptance of labour recruitment, and the decisive lobbying efforts of the 
Turkish government played a crucial part in making the German federal government 
support the freedom of movement provisions. 
 
Labour market concerns 
Figure 9 indicates the healthy shape of the German economy in the late 1950s and early 
1960s. Between 1950 and 1960, the German economy experienced a productivity rise of 
6.7 percent annually. After 1958, unemployment decreased rapidly, and within three years 
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it arrived at a level that was considered equal to full employment (Korte, 1985: 30-31). 
Figure 10 shows the number of employees in the Federal Republic of Germany that were 
foreign nationals. There was a sharp increase in foreign nationals working in the Federal 
Republic of Germany from 1959. In fact, the number of foreigners working in the Federal 
Republic of Germany doubled between 1959 and 1960 (Korte, 1985: 30). The labour 
shortages that were filled with foreign workers were in the agricultural sector (in the mid-
1950s), but in the 1960s this shifted to the fields of manufacturing, construction, mining, 
and services. Most shortages occurred in semiskilled and unskilled positions (Klusmeyer & 
Papademetriou, 2009: 92). In addition, the strong economic expansion, the age structure 
of the German population, the build-up of the Bundeswehr, the prolonged schooling time, 
and the cut-off of the migration flow from Eastern Germany due to the erecting of the 
Berlin wall in 1961, increased the demand for foreign workers in the Federal Republic of 
Germany (Schönwälder, 2001: 159). The decrease of the German labour force is 
illustrated by Figure 12. The figure also demonstrates that the overall labour force slightly 
increased up until 1965 due to labour immigration. This is made even clearer when also 
taking into account Figure 13, which displays increased labour migration to the Federal 
Republic of Germany. Figure 13 also shows that the number of vacancies is more or less 
constant between 1960 and 1965 – despite growth in the overall work force. This suggests 
that new jobs kept being created. Figure 11 splits up the number of foreign workers 
according to nationality. It indicates a significant increase in Turkish workers once the 
bilateral recruitment agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and Turkey 
was put in place in 1961 (and when its revised version entered into force in 1964). 
 
The positive economic climate enabled Germany to give substantial financial assistance to 
Turkey within the framework of the Association Agreement. The Federal Republic of 
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Germany could afford to make sure that the negotiations would not collapse or be 
postponed even longer due to the EEC’s unwillingness to provide support to the Turkish 
economy, and without which no realistic plans for a customs union – not to mention EEC 
membership for Turkey – could be made. For instance, Germany took the biggest share of 
the burden to provide financial assistance to Turkey. Of the $175 million US of pre-
association aid, the Federal Republic of Germany provided $58.5 million US (around one 
third) (Özren, 1999: 244). 
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Figure 9: Real GDP Growth Rate in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1959-1965 
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Sources: Herbert 1986, 2001 
 
Figure 10: Foreign Workers in the Federal Republic of Germany (in thousands) 
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Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 
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Figure 11: Foreign Workers in the Federal Republic of Germany, by country of origin (in 
thousands) 
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Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 
 
Figure 12: Labour Force in the Federal Republic of Germany (in thousands) 
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Source: Herbert (2001: 207) 
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Figure 13: Foreign labour force and job vacancies in the Federal Republic of Germany (in 
thousands) 
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Source: Herbert (2001: 207) 
 
Germany was suffering labour shortages by the time the Ankara Agreement was 
negotiated, and there was no sign that the situation would change in the near future 
(Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 1959d; Deutsche Zeitung und Wirtschaft Zeitung, 1959; 
Düsseldorfer Nachrichten, 1961; Kölner Stadt Anzeiger, 1963). Since the Federal Republic 
of Germany actually needed foreign labour, immigration was a topic that was not 
controversial in domestic politics, and decisions could be made within the government 
ministries, largely shielded from the general public. In addition, it was believed that labour 
shortages were hampering economic growth and thus standards of living. At that time, no 
major interest group (e.g. employer associations and unions) or party was opposed to 
labour migration to the Federal Republic of Germany (Chin, 2007: 37-38). The number of 
foreigners in the Federal Republic of Germany was low compared to today’s figures, and 
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potentially negative effects of large-scale migration, such as problems of integration, were 
not yet known. Furthermore, despite the high immigrant inflow during the 1950s and 60s, 
there was no significant opposition in the German public (Brochmann, 1996; Hollifield, 
1992). The first scattered critical voices began to emerge in the mid-1960s in the form of 
newspaper articles and references in parliamentary debates (Schönwälder, 2001: 179-
182). 
 
Although the existence of labour shortages in Germany during the Ankara Agreement 
negotiations is now taken as a given, there are no available studies that measured the 
labour shortages at that time in a way that would today be considered up to date. The 
existing data is chiefly based on employer information. However, it is reasonable to 
assume that labour shortages existed during that period, even if they might have been 
overstated by employers keen to recruit cheap immigrant labour. This is corroborated by 
the fact that recruitment of foreign labour to the Federal Republic of Germany decreased 
temporarily during the recession between 1966 and 1967, and came to an standstill – with 
the exception of family reunification, asylum, and migration of the highly skilled – after the 
first oil shock hit the German economy in 1973 (Geddes, 2000: 2; 2003:81-82). 
 
Finally, in line with Hypothesis Two, it can be noted that the passing of national legislation 
opening access for labour migrants from Turkey reduced the misfit between the national 
legislation and the proposals of the Ankara Agreement. Labour market concerns did not 
directly impact the German government’s preferences with regard to the inclusion of the 
freedom of movement provisions in the Ankara Agreement. While they are likely to have 
had an impact on the conclusion of the bilateral labour recruitment agreement with Turkey, 
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other factors, most notably foreign policy concerns, also played a role in the conclusion of 
the agreements (as discussed in the misfit section of this chapter). 
 
Bureaucratic politics 
Responsibility for forming Germany’s position on the Association Agreement with Turkey 
was shared between the Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry of Economics. The 
Foreign Office was responsible for questions regarding association agreements. The 
economic appraisal of the agreement rested with the Federal Ministry of Economics. This 
constellation placed the two ministries in the most important positions for negotiating the 
Ankara Agreement. But it also gave rise to a turf war in the establishment of ministerial 
competencies in a new policy-making domain where boundaries of responsibility and 
influence were still rather fluid (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 1959a). An internal note, 
circulated within the Ministry of Economics, complained that the Foreign Office tried to 
become chiefly responsible for dealing with association matters (Bundesministerium für 
Wirtschaft, 1959f). Over the long-run, the Foreign Office managed to become more 
significant in national decision-making processes for European Integration matters, but 
that was certainly aided by the increasingly political nature of the European Integration 
project. Other ministries that were involved in preference formation were the Ministries of 
the Interior, Justice, Family, Agriculture, and Employment, though they played a less 
prominent role (Müller-Rommel, 1994: 1994). With regard to macro decisions, final 
judgements were made by Chancellor Adenauer (Rudzio, 2003: 289-290). 
 
Allison’s first proposition holds with regard to the Foreign Office. Its principal objective is 
the fostering of relations with other states as well as international and supranational 
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organisations. Lending evidence to Allison’s proposition, the Foreign Office was the first 
ministry to support the Agreement and the freedom of movement provisions. Other 
Ministries voiced concerns. For instance, the Ministry of Finance was worried about money 
flowing from the Federal Republic of Germany to Turkey, which was in a poor state of 
development in the 1960s. In addition, Turkey was not forced to adhere to developmental 
measures outlined by the European Community in the first phase of the Agreement. Being 
the guardian of the German federal budget, this position is not surprising. The Foreign 
Office did not regard these concerns as worthy of blocking the agreement, and remained 
committed to its stance that the Agreement was urgently necessary for geopolitical 
reasons (Özren, 1999: 242-243). 
 
The Minister of Economic Affairs, Ludwig Erhard, initially rejected a customs union with 
Turkey in favour of a large free-trade area, which would not have included provisions on 
the movement of persons. Concerned with the economic well-being of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, the Ministry was distressed about the potential repercussions that a 
uniform external duty might have had on the export-orientated German economy, should a 
customs union with the EEC and Turkey have been implemented (Ceylanoglu, 2004: 195-
196; Özren, 1999: 242). But also, similarly to the Ministry of Finance, it was worried about 
the potential economic costs that the conclusion of an association agreement with Turkey 
might entail. Providing economic assistance to a country of Turkey’s size was seen as 
surpassing the capacities of the Federal Republic of Germany (Bundesministerium für 
Wirtschaft, 1959e). In addition, the Ministry of Agriculture voiced some reservations 
regarding the inclusion of tariff-quotas, with the option of extension, for Turkish tobacco to 
enter the Community. The Ministry was concerned that this might disadvantage domestic 
tobacco producers (Bundeskanzleramt, 1961). 
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In the end, the view of the Foreign Office prevailed. This was certainly not due to any 
superior structural power of the Ministry. Rather, the foreign political argument was the 
most powerful one and found resonance in the highest echelon of the German government 
(Auswärtiges Amt, 1959a; Özren, 1999). It allowed Turkey to include provisions on 
freedom of movement and establishment in the Agreement, which resembled the 
provisions outlined in the Athens Agreement. This implies that the Turkish government 
belonged to the relevant actors that were involved in the decision-making process. Allison 
and Zelikow (1999: 258) acknowledge that foreign officials can be part of the process; 
however, the framework does not further elaborate on how exactly foreign governments 
can take part. Given how the framework is established, we would expect the rules of the 
game to include them somehow, for instance, through consultation with allies before taking 
action against a hostile regime. The rules of the game for this investigation relate to 
bureaucratic decision-making processes for the German government. In addition to written 
regulations, the rules of the game can also include conventions and even culture (Allison & 
Zelikow, 1999: 302). The Turkish government is not included as a player through either of 
these. However, it managed to elbow its way into the decision-making process of the 
German government. Consequently the definition of the rules of the game should allow a 
point of entry for other actors, such as for instance foreign governments, by external 
pressure. 
 
With the strategic foreign policy value of Turkey, reinforced by the Soviet threat and US 
interests, coupled with the low domestic political salience of immigration, the conditions for 
foreign policy interests shaping the federal government’s preferences were ideal. In 
combination with the bureaucratic nature of the debate and the fact that the provisions on 
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freedom of movement and establishment did not thwart any national regulations and would 
thus not involve adaptation costs, there was clear support from the German government 
for a policy measure that liberalised some aspects of immigration policy at the European 
level. 
 
III. Conclusion 
Three themes have been used to explain why the German government supported the 
provisions on freedom of movement and right of establishment in the Ankara Agreement: 
domestic politics, international politics, and labour market concerns. The themes relate to 
different causal factors that influenced the relevant actors. As a broader theoretical lens, 
the chapter uses a bureaucratic politics stance that analyses actors’ positions and their 
influence according to their position in the organisation, their power structures, and the 
institutional design that organises the relations between the actors. The three themes are 
discussed in light of how they impact on the cost and benefits distributions as perceived by 
the relevant actors. 
 
Reported labour market factors did not play a direct role in shaping the considerations 
regarding the provisions. However, they were important, as the Federal Republic of 
Germany concluded a bilateral labour recruitment agreement with Turkey. The bilateral 
recruitment agreement had feedback effects, as discussed with regard to domestic political 
factors: it reduced the costs of yielding to Turkish bids to include provisions with relevance 
for migration in the Ankara Agreement. This is because, according to the misfit hypothesis, 
the Ankara Agreement did not entail any significant costs for actors as the national 
regulations, i.e., the bilateral labour recruitment agreement between the Federal Republic 
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of Germany and Turkey would continue to apply. Hence, the Association Agreement did 
not infringe upon Germany’s national regulations. The second theme – foreign policy 
considerations – elucidates why Turkey was in the position to, and in fact did, propose the 
insertion of provisions on freedom of movement in the Agreement. It did so principally 
because it did not want to conclude an agreement that would be significantly less profound 
than the agreement concluded between the EEC and Greece. Doing otherwise would have 
produced national embarrassment for Turkey vis-à-vis its long-term rival, Greece. That the 
German government was receptive to Turkey’s bids can be explained by several foreign 
policy concepts. Given the geopolitical insecurity of the early Cold War years, Turkey was 
a key ally for the West that the US did not want to be susceptible to Soviet courtings. 
Hence, its foreign policy value for the Federal Republic of Germany was high. This 
together with the low domestic salience and the uncontroversial as well as prevalent 
dictum of the need to continue fueling the post-war economic boom with foreign labour, 
maximised the influence Turkey could have on the German government. The government 
in Ankara gladly used this opportunity. 
 
The case nicely demonstrates the interplay of the different hypotheses underpinning full 
German support for a liberalisation measure at the EU level. Each hypothesis played a 
role in the process of preference formation. The most important hypotheses are 
Hypotheses One and Three. The high foreign policy value of Turkey, together with the low 
political salience of migration matters in Germany and the targeted lobbying efforts of the 
Turkish government, facilitated the inclusion of the freedom of movement provisions in the 
final agreement. The German government did agree to these provisions because there 
was no misfit, as the bilateral labour recruitment agreement would continue to regulate 
immigration from Turkey to the Federal Republic of Germany. 
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The chapter fills a gap in the literature on the Ankara Agreement and on EU immigration 
policy. The existing literature on the Ankara Agreement (see, for instance, Ceylanoglu, 
2004; Gürbey, 1990; E. Krieger, 2006; Özren, 1999) fails to provide a satisfactory 
explanation of why the freedom of movement provisions are included in the Agreement, 
and focuses too much on political security factors. As a result, it misses the complex 
interplay of political and economic factors that led to Germany’s support of the freedom of 
movement provisions. The chapter has shown that the freedom of movement provisions 
were not just taken from the Treaty of Rome, as put forward by the literature, but are 
modified versions of the provisions in the Athens Agreement. With regards to the literature 
on EU immigration policy, it has been shown that Member States have supported 
liberalisation of immigration measures at the EU level – given that the factors on which the 
three hypotheses are built are in place. This point challenges the assumption that has 
been implicitly present in the work on EU immigration policy, i.e., that cooperation at the 
EU level is only possible if it contributes to making immigration controls into the Union 
stricter; the immigration of highly skilled workers is the exception. The findings of this 
chapter outline the foreign policy factors that were crucial for this process. They show the 
importance that foreign policy factors can have for the EU-level liberalisation of 
immigration policies, as well as the significance of the Foreign Office. The Foreign Office is 
generally concerned with relations with other countries and less so with domestic political 
matters that are the chief concerns of the Interior, Employment, Economics and Finance 
Ministries, such as domestic security, and potential fiscal, political, or social costs of 
immigration. The role of the Foreign Office in the decision-making process was 
instrumental in Germany delegating competencies that entail a liberalisation of immigration 
policies to the EU level. 
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Theoretically, the chapter has assembled different theoretical concepts that are usually not 
associated with EU policies on immigration. In particular, the bureaucratic politics 
framework, together with actors’ perceived costs and benefits, provide a sound base to 
approach the black box of governmental sovereignty concerns with regards to delegating 
immigration competencies to the European level. Furthermore, the bureaucratic politics 
framework constitutes an analytical lens that might also be applied to other countries and 
policy initiatives to better understand the causal processes that form certain government 
preferences on immigration matters. With particular regard to the bureaucratic politics 
framework, Allison and Zelkow’s rules of the game definition should be modified to enable 
a point of entry for a foreign government to influence governments’ preference formation 
without being formally invited to take part in the process. This case study shows that the 
Turkish government made an important contribution to the decision-making process by 
lobbying the German government out of its own initiative. 
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Chapter Five – The Unknown Effects of the Europe 
Agreements: EU Economic Migration Liberalisation 
Through the Back Door? 
 
Introduction 
When does an EU Member State decide to delegate competencies on regulating 
immigration to the EU level? The most common response is the Fortress Europe 
argument: Member States choose to cooperate at the EU level if it contributes to sealing 
off the EU’s labour market from third-country workers; highly qualified workers being the 
exception (see, for instance, Bigo, 1998; Geddes, 2000: 56). However, this is not 
necessarily the case. This chapter questions that assumption, beginning with the 
proposition that cooperation at the EU level with regard to liberalising economic migration 
for third country nationals of all skill levels is possible – and in fact already happened. 
Whether (and what type of) cooperation occurs at the EU level depends on the set of 
conditions in place at a particular point in time, and the definition we adopt for “cooperation 
at the EU level”. 
 
Following the founding of the European Community (EC) in 1957, Member States agreed 
on including provisions on the freedom of movement in the Association Agreements with 
Greece and Turkey in 1961 and 1963, respectively. However, what followed these 
agreements was, by and large, a history of not agreeing on common EU regulation, such 
as the proposed Economic Migration Directive of 2001. When common EU policies were 
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agreed upon, they tended to have the aim of restricting the flow of immigrants into the 
Community, such as Directives and Regulations on combating illegal migration, border 
control, and returning illegal migrants. A case that lies in between liberalisation and non-
liberalisation are the Association Agreements the Community concluded with Hungary, 
Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania in the early and mid-1990s; the so-called Europe Agreements (EAs). In those 
Agreements, Member States agreed on provisions on the movement of workers, the right 
of establishment, and the freedom to provide services. The Agreements have direct effect 
and constitute a de jure modification of German national immigration regulations. 
 
The existing literature on the EAs treats the provisions on freedom of movement and the 
right of establishment in an unsatisfactory way, focussing chiefly on the provisions on trade 
and market liberalisation (see, for instance, Kramer, 1991; Langhammer, 1992; Lippert, 
1999; Mayhew, 1998; Müller-Graff, 1997; Palánkai, 2000; Papadimitriou, 2002; 
Phinnemore, 1999; Rupp, 1999; Sedelmeier, 2005a, 2005b; Sedelmeier & Wallace, 1996; 
von Hagen, 1996) or their role as a gateway to actual EU membership (Tebbe, 1997). 
When authors discuss the freedom of movement provisions, they generally tend to argue 
that the EAs do not give labour market access to workers from the associate countries, but 
only give recommendations on how to improve the current situation; create new facilities; 
or facilitate some restrictions (Müller-Graff, 1997: 30; Sedelmeier, 2005a: 63-64). It is 
generally assumed that the free movement of labour is only a possibility in principle, as 
Member States were unwilling to give any real concessions to the Central and Eastern 
European Countries (CEECs). This was mainly because of the gloomy economic situation 
in the Community and a feared mass migration of workers from the East. 
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These claims are based on a simplified reading of Title IV of the EAs and a focus that 
relies heavily on Chapter I, i.e., the freedom of movement provisions. This case study 
bases its analysis on the Europe Agreement with Poland. The provisions relevant for the 
movement of workers are almost identical across the agreements. With regard to the 
freedom of movement provisions, Poland was the most active negotiator of all CEECs 
(Auswärtiges Amt, 1991a; Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 1991a, 1991j). For this 
reason, the negotiation process between the EEC and Poland also affected the content of 
the freedom of movement provisions of the other agreements. Consequently, to explicate 
why the provisions relevant for migration are included the way that they are, it is most 
valuable to study the EA with Poland. The existing literature is correct that the EC was 
extremely wary of opening its labour market for workers from Poland through the freedom 
of movement provisions. However, with the exceptions of a few analyses (Barros, 2001; 
Fuchs, 1995; Jestaedt, 1996; Meinel, 2003; Vogt, 2001), the literature ignores the fact that 
through the regulations of Chapter II, i.e., the right of establishment, which include natural 
persons, liberalising measures slipped in through the backdoor. Even these authors focus 
on the legal implications of the Agreement and do not give a detailed or theoretically 
embedded account of the political processes that led to the provisions. Article 44(3) grants 
Polish nationals a treatment no less favourable than national citizens: 
 
Each Member State shall grant, from entry into force of this Agreement, a 
treatment no less favourable than that accorded to its own companies and 
nationals for the establishment of Polish companies and nationals as defined in 
Article 48 and shall grant in the operation of Polish companies and nationals 
established in its territory a treatment no less favourable than that accorded to its 
own companies and nationals. 
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This article would forbid the German authorities to refuse a self-employed worker on the 
grounds of an existing overcapacity on the German labour market. This was common 
practice in the Federal Republic of Germany under the “recruitment stop” policy 
(Anwerbestopp) that had been in place since November 1973. Also the so-called “needs 
test” for the labour market (Bedürfnisprüfung) was to be omitted (Vogt, 2001: 297). Article 
44(3) can also be read to prohibit demanding a Polish self-employed national to be able to 
sustain him or herself, as that is not a requirement for self-employed German nationals 
(Jestaedt, 1996). In addition, Article 52(1) EA grants a Polish company the employment of 
key personnel. The Article states: 
 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Chapter I of this Title, the beneficiaries of the 
rights of establishment granted by Poland and the Community respectively shall be 
entitled to employ, or have employed by one of their subsidiaries, in accordance 
with the legislation in force in the host country of establishment, in the territory of 
Poland and the Community respectively, employees who are nationals of 
Community Member States and Poland respectively, provided that such employees 
are key personnel as defined in paragraph 2 and that they are employed 
exclusively by such beneficiaries or their subsidiaries. The residence and work 
permits of such employees shall only cover the period of such employment. 
Thus, the EA also provides the right of a certain group of highly skilled employed workers 
to enter the labour market of the EC. While not all analysts agree (Strunz, 2004), more 
detailed treatments of the matter generally come to this conclusion (Barros, 2001: 122; 
Vogt, 2001: 298). Both Article 44(3) and 52(1) have direct effect (Vogt, 2001: 282-283 and 
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294-295)34 and thus can be seen as constituting a de jure change of immigration 
regulations in the Federal Republic of Germany, and as opening the Single Market to self-
employed workers from Poland, to some degree (Vogt, 2001: 298). However, de facto, the 
German authorities did not apply these regulations. This is exemplified, for instance, by the 
case of the Polish student Gabriela Janusz, who was pursuing studies at the Technical 
University of Berlin, and wanted to sell attire at an art market in Berlin. This would have 
made her a self-employed worker. Ms. Janusz was not granted this permission by the 
responsible authorities (Landeseinwohneramt) as, according to the German authorities, 
foreign nationals were not allowed to be self-employed while pursuing education. Ms. 
Janusz appealed twice to the Administrative Court of Berlin (Verwaltungsgericht) with 
reference to the EA, but was unsuccessful (European Union Delegation of the European 
Commission in Poland, 1995; Vogt, 2001: 268-269). In addition, with regard to the right of 
key personnel of Polish companies to enter the Community, some authors argue that the 
Agreement stipulates that these persons should not be included in the quota of the 
bilateral posted workers agreement between Poland and the Federal Republic of 
Germany. However, the prevalent praxis of the German authorities was to count these 
toward the quota determined by the bilateral agreement (Fuchs, 1995: 61). These 
practices, as well as the forceful rejection to grant Polish workers access to the 
Community’s labour market, seem to stand in contradiction with the political pathos of 
German decision-makers promulgating their full support to anchor the CEECs in Europe 
(Agence Europe, 1994; Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 1991h). 
As in the preceding chapter, the bureaucratic politics framework is used as a general 
approach for this chapter, which allows predictions about how governmental preferences 
are formed. This chapter is based on newspaper analysis; an analysis of articles of the 
                                                
34 See also discussion in Section II. 
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press agency Agence Europe, archival research in the Federal Archives of the Federal 
Republic of Germany (Bundesarchiv); and a number of interviews with experts in the field. 
The chapter is structured as follows. It will first introduce the conceptual framework. The 
second section discusses the genesis of the EA with Poland, followed by the empirical 
analysis. The chapter closes with concluding remarks. 
 
I. Genesis of the Europe Agreement and Title IV 
Up until the associate countries from Central and Eastern Europe joined the EU in 2004 
and 2007, the EAs were the main legal instruments for regulating the relations between 
those countries and the Community. All legal disputes between the parties were settled by 
referring to the agreements (Mayhew, 1998: 41). The EAs were signed with Hungary, 
Poland, and Czechoslovakia35 in December 1991; with Romania in February 1993; with 
Bulgaria in March 1993; with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in June 1995; and with 
Slovenia in June 1996 (Guild, 2001: 176; Sedelmeier, 2005b: 403).36 With regard to 
freedom of movement, the agreements are similar in their content. The main differences 
are that in the agreements with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the provisions on 
establishment only apply to individuals from 31 December 1999 onwards, but in the 
agreement with Slovenia, they apply after the end of a transitional period of a maximum of 
                                                
35 The Europe Agreement with Czechoslovakia was replaced with agreements with the two successor-states in 
October 1993. 
36 Because of the ratification process involved the EAs came into force some time after they were signed: 
EA with Poland: 1 February 1994; Official Journal of the EU 1993 L 348 
EA with Hungary: 1 February 1994; Official Journal of the EU 1993 L347 
EA with Czech Republic: 1 February 1995; Official Journal of the EU 1994 L360 
EA with Romania: 1 February 1995; Official Journal of the EU 1994 L 357 
EA with Bulgaria: 1 February 1995; Official Journal of the EU 1994 L 358 
EA with Slovakia: 1 February 1995; Official Journal of the EU 1994 L 359 
EA with Estonia: 1 February 1998; Official Journal of the EU 1998 L68 
EA with Latvia: 1 February 1998; Official Journal of the EU 1998 L26 
EA with Lithuania: 1 February 1998; Official Journal of the EU 1998 L51 
EA with Slovenia: 1 February 1999. Official Journal of the EU 1999 L 51 
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six years duration (Guild, 2001: 176; see also, Weiss, 2001: 243-4). In the earlier 
agreements these confinements do not apply. The main purpose of the agreements was to 
institutionalise the commitment of a political dialogue and to develop a free trade area 
(Kramer, 1991: 127; Müller-Graff, 1997: 16; Phinnemore, 1999: 44). Furthermore, the 
objectives of the agreements are to progress towards realising the economic freedoms of 
the Community, creating policies to integrate the associate countries into the Community, 
promoting the transition to a market economy, and setting up institutions for the 
implementation of the association agreement (see, for instance, EA with Hungary). 
 
Direct Effect 
The Title IV provisions of the EAs have direct effect. While this was not clear when the 
agreements entered into force (Gargulla, 1995: 189), it was confirmed by a number of 
judgments of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and is now generally accepted in the 
relevant literature (see, for instance, discussion by Guild, 2001: 195-201; Meinel, 2003: 
154-160; Strunz, 2004: 131). The relevant cases are as follows: Case C-63/99, Gloszczuk; 
Case C-235/99 (27/09/2001), Kondova; Case C-257/99 (judgement 27/09/01), Barkoci and 
Malik (judgements 27/09/2001); and Case C-268/99, Jany (judgement 20/11/2001). They 
all refer to the right of establishment and enshrine the right that self-employed workers can 
enter the Community. However, as paragraph 31 of the Jany case (C-268/99) shows, this 
does not preclude a system of prior control according to the rules of the respective 
Member State.37 This is pointed out by a number of scholars (Guild, 2001: 208; van Ooik, 
2002). However, van Ooik (2002) mistakes the regulations of British national law with 
minimum conditions of entry made by the EAs (cf. Baudenbacher, 2004: 225). The EAs do 
                                                
37 See, for instance Article 44(3) of the EA with Poland or Articles 45(3) and 59(1) of the EA with the Czech 
Republic. 
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not put forward minimum conditions, but only refer to the right of Member States to apply 
their national rules of entry. The ECJ considers those stipulations as reasonable to apply 
with regard to the qualifying clause,38 but they are not included in the text of the EAs. 
 
Even though the Agreements have direct effect and constitute a de jure modification of 
German national immigration regulations, de facto, the German authorities were extremely 
reluctant to recognise this. This exemplifies the dilemma the German federal government 
found itself in, which resulted in contradictory declarations and actions. On the one hand, 
Germany was keen on rooting its Eastern neighbours in Europe and helping to create a 
politically stable and secure zone. This was important for foreign and security policy 
reasons. On the other hand, domestically, the government was reluctant to make any 
concessions in the EAs allowing workers from the CEECs to enter the labour markets of 
EC Member States. 
 
Title IV of the Agreement with Poland, “Movement of Workers, Establishment, Supply of 
Services” is divided into four chapters: I. Movement of workers, II. Establishment, III. 
Supply of services between the Community and Poland, and IV. General provisions. 
Chapter I (Article 37-43) does not establish the free movement of workers, but awards 
workers who are legally established in the Community equal treatment with workers from 
the EC. The provisions on establishment (Article 44-54) are more meaningful with regard 
to immigration. They allow self-employed workers from the associate countries to establish 
themselves in the Community. In addition, they permit self-employed workers from the 
associate countries to bring in key personnel from their home countries.39 The provisions 
                                                
38 See, for instance, Article 58(1) of the EA with Poland and Article 59(1) of the EA with the Czech Republic. 
39 The first six EAs only allow this for subsidiaries, whereas the EAs with the Baltic states and Slovenia include 
branches. 
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on the supply of services (Article 55-57) do not concede anything concrete, except the 
commitment of the parties to carry out the necessary measures to gradually allow the 
supply of service. Compared with the EC Treaty, these provisions have the most minor 
reach of the entire EA. The last article of Title IV (Article 58), General Provisions, creates 
some tension with the other articles of the Title, especially with regard to the right of 
establishment, as it permits national regulations to apply if they do not “nullify or impair the 
benefits accruing to any parties under the terms of a specific provision of this Agreement”. 
This made the interpretation of the Agreement rather difficult and eventually necessitated 
the involvement of the ECJ to establish whether Title IV of the EAs has direct effect. 
 
Negotiations 
After the Commission presented the negotiation mandate at the beginning of November 
1990 (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 1990a), the Council of Ministers agreed upon the 
negotiation mandate for the Commission on 18 December 1990 (Council of the European 
Community, 1990). The negotiations were opened in December 1990 and continued in the 
second week of February 1991 after a short break (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 
1991d). They concluded after ten rounds, on 22 November 1991 (Papadimitriou, 2002: 
37), and were signed in Brussels on 6 December 1991 (Auswärtiges Amt, 1991c). The 
negotiations with the other Visegrád states took place simultaneously. A key issue was EC 
membership of Poland. Initially, Member States were reluctant to include any reference to 
EC membership in the Agreement. However, pressure from Poland (and the other 
Visegrád countries), backed by the governments of the UK and the Federal Republic of 
Germany, finally led to the inclusion of the possibility of joining the EC (Phinnemore, 1999: 
68-69; Sedelmeier & Wallace, 1996: 370). 
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A large part of the negotiations were concerned with trade (Mayhew, 1998: 22). In 
particular, France obviated rapid progress on several occasions due to its unwillingness to 
accept concessions on liberalising trade of agricultural products. The Commission had to 
go back to the Council in April 1991 to modify the negotiation mandate in a few areas in 
which it had been proven to be unrealistically restrictive (Mayhew, 1998: 22). Furthermore, 
at the beginning of September 1991, negotiations almost broke down because of the 
inflexible position of the French government on granting further trade concessions 
(Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 1991f; Handelsblatt, 1991). As a result, from 30 
September to 1 October 1991, the Council again modified the negotiation mandate in the 
areas of trade with agricultural products, trade with textiles, financial cooperation, and 
freedom of movement of workers, coal, and transit. This led to conclusion of the 
Agreement at the end of November 1991 (Council of the European Community, 1991). 
 
The regulations on freedom of movement were until the last stage of the negotiations a 
highly contested point, as the EC was not willing to move and Poland was not prepared to 
desist from its claims. The key issues were the refusal of the EC to give any ground on 
granting improved freedom of movement for Polish workers vis-à-vis vehement Polish 
insistence on such an improvement. Moreover, Polish demands for the regularisation of 
Polish nationals residing illegally in the Community caused controversy. Regarding the 
regulations on the provision of services, it took some time to agree on a common position. 
The EC wanted them to conform to the criteria stipulated by the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), but was also cautious not to open a loophole for Polish workers. 
The provisions on the right of establishment caused the least controversy. 
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II. Germany’s Preferences 
Regarding the agreement as a whole, the Federal Republic of Germany was a strong 
supporter of concluding it – possibly the strongest amongst the Member States (Dinan, 
2004: 273; Hirn, 1991; Papadimitriou, 2002: 90). By and large, the German government 
was keen not to endanger the conclusion of the agreements and was willing to 
compromise on sectoral issues, as long as they were not too substantial (Sedelmeier, 
2005a: 63-64). It even argued that it was the EU’s responsibility to take advantage of the 
opportunity offered by the political changes in Central and Eastern Europe (Agence 
Europe, 1994; Sedelmeier, 2005b: 56). 
 
With regard to Title IV, the Federal Republic of Germany had a tougher position which was 
in contrast with the political rhetoric of anchoring Poland and the other CEECs in Europe. 
The German government was unwilling to grant any opening of the labour market to Polish 
workers. It stayed firm, even when Poland tried hard to influence the Community to include 
more generous provision on freedom of movement in the Agreement. The German 
demeanour was shared by the UK, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. Other accounts 
even claim that all Member States had problems with the freedom of movement of persons 
(Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 1990a) (Interview Eastern Europe Expert, Academia). 
However, the German government was the most fiercely opposed to the requests for 
freedom of movement made by Poland and Hungary (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 
1991c, 1991d). Generally, the issue of freedom of movement was one of the most 
sensitive issues in the negotiations and the association debate (Gurgalla, 1995: 182; 
Kramer, 1991: 130; Kuschel, 1992: 99; Mayhew, 1998: 332; Papadimitriou, 2002: 61). 
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Eleven ministries were involved in forming the position of the German federal government. 
The Federal Ministry of Economics (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft) and the Foreign 
Office (Auswärtiges Amt), according to paragraphs 23, 79, and 80 of the GGO II40, were in 
charge of the file and responsible for including other relevant ministries according to their 
respective portfolios. The Ministry of Economics and the Foreign Office involved the 
following ministries: the Federal Ministry of the Interior (Bundesministerium des Innern); 
the Federal Ministry of Justice (Bundesministerium der Justiz); the Federal Ministry of 
Finance (Bundesministerium der Finanzen); the Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and 
Consumer Protection (Bundesministerium für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und 
Verbraucherschutz); the Federal Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs 
(Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales); the Federal Ministry for the Environment, 
Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und 
Reaktorsicherheit); the Federal Ministry of Mail and Telecommunications 
(Bundesministerium für Post und Telekommunikation); the Federal Ministry of Research 
and Technology (Bundesministerium für Forschung und Technologie); and the Federal 
Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (Bundesministerium für 
wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung) (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 
1990b, 1990d). Other ministries that played a prominent role were the Federal Ministry of 
the Interior and the Federal Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs. According to 
paragraph 80 of the GGO II, the Länder were informed about the progress of the 
negotiations but did not play an active role in the preference formation. The involvement of 
interest groups, such as the social partners, was not stipulated by the GGO II. 
 
                                                
40 Gemeinsame Geschäftsordnung der Bundesministerien – Besonderer Teil, as in force in 1990/1991. 
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Domestic Politics 
Misfit 
The fit with national legislation and arrangements has two dimensions for the EA with 
Poland. First, the Federal Republic of Germany had existing bilateral agreements in place 
with Poland, most notably, the agreement for workers posted by subcontractor companies 
(Werksvertragsvereinbarungen) that granted yearly quotas to Polish workers to enter the 
German labour market and thus bypassed the recruitment stop for foreign workers (Vogt, 
2001: 42). It was signed on 31 January 1990 and entered into force on 11 April 1990. The 
Agreement fixed the quota to 21,670 workers. In addition, there was a quota of 5,000 for 
service contracts that involved small and medium-sized companies in the Federal Republic 
of Germany, a quota of 500 for employees working as conservators, and a quota of 8,000 
for workers in the construction industry (between the years 1991 and 1993).41 The quotas 
could be adapted to improving or worsening situations of the labour market. Generally, the 
agreement allowed the issuing of a work permit for a maximum of two years. If the work 
took longer to be completed, a prolongation of six months was possible. If the work was 
from the outset deemed to exceed the two years duration, the work permit could be issued 
for a maximum duration of three years. Workers in leadership or managerial positions 
could receive a work permit for up to four years.42 
 
The second dimension consists of the existing national regulations on granting access to 
the German labour market for workers from third countries. The German federal 
                                                
41 Paragraph 2, Vereinbarung zwischen der Regierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Regierung 
der Republik Polen über die Entsendung von Arbeitnehmern polnischer Unternehmen zur Ausführung von 
Werkverträgen. 
42 Paragraph 5, Vereinbarung zwischen der Regierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Regierung 
der Republik Polen über die Entsendung von Arbeitnehmern polnischer Unternehmen zur Ausführung von 
Werkverträgen. 
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government made frequent reference to the bilateral agreement with Poland and to the 
need that these regulations should co-exist alongside the Association Agreement 
(Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 1991c). They were regarded as important for foreign 
policy, labour market, migration, development and economic reasons (Faist, Sieveking, 
Reim, & Sandbrink, 1999: 140-143). 
 
In February 1991, representatives of the Federal Ministry of Employment and Social 
Affairs went to a meeting with Director General Degimbe of DG V of the European 
Commission, to make sure that the bilateral agreements with Poland and the other CEECs 
could co-exist with the provisions of the EAs. The Commission showed support for the 
German concerns (Auswärtiges Amt, 1991e). As a particular statement reveals, the 
Federal Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs expressed support for making reference 
in the EAs to the existing bilateral agreements. Perceived attempts by the Commission to 
gain more influence over the regulations of the bilateral agreements found immediate 
resistance on the German side (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung, 1991). 
The Ministry of Employment was in charge of concluding the bilateral agreement and thus 
felt responsible to make sure the agreement was not thwarted by the EA. 
 
Without the co-existence of the bilateral agreements and the quotas they stipulate, 
agreement to the Title IV provisions by the German federal government would not have 
been possible. Changing the provisions of the bilateral agreement would have been costly 
for the Federal Republic of Germany because of loss of control over the quotas set by the 
agreement, and consequently over who enters the German labour market. 
 
 
 
183 
At the time the EA with Poland was negotiated, immigration to Germany was regulated by 
what was called the Act for the New Regulation of the Alien Law (Gesetz zur Neuregelung 
des Ausländerrechts). It came into force on 1 January 1991 and was voluminous, detailed, 
complicated, and difficult to understand for foreigners (Rittstieg, 1996: XI). Its predecessor 
was a comparatively slim law from 1 October 1965 (Ausländergesetz) which, by and large, 
put the decision regarding issuing, prolonging or terminating residency permits into the 
hands of bureaucrats and was thus a somewhat arbitrary arrangement. 
 
German immigration law stipulated that Polish nationals did not need a residency permit 
for stays of up to three months, as Poland featured on the list of countries that were 
exempted from a residency permit for short stays.43 After entry, in exceptional 
circumstances, Polish nationals could obtain a residency authorisation for a further stay of 
a maximum duration of three months without taking up employment (Sieveking, 1995: 
240). 
 
The federal government was unwilling to make any changes to these regulations because 
of the EA with Poland. Doing so would have been extremely costly, because granting 
access to the German labour market was undesired. Giving support to an EA that would 
leave national regulations untouched was safe for Germany. In addition, the enshrinement 
of the reference to the validity of bilateral agreements in the EA made sure there was no 
significant misfit. The provision on the right of establishment was different, as it constituted 
changes in German national regulations. However, as will be shown below, this was not 
clear to German policy-makers at that time. 
 
                                                
43 Paragraph 1, Verordnung zur Durchführung des Ausländergesetzes (DVAuslG) 
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Nature of the Decision-Making Process 
Decision-making on the EA happened in a bureaucratic way. While there were 
disagreements between the intra-governmental actors, they were not large enough to 
change the rules of the game. Thus, there was no fierce political contestation that would 
have been publicly noticed. Also, neither of the extra-governmental actors in Germany 
were experiencing concentrated costs or benefits that would lead them to take an active 
position in the decision-making process. 
 
Figure 2 and Figure 5 (to be found in Chapter Three) indicate that immigration was a 
salient issue while the process of preference formation on the Europe Agreement took 
place. Immigration was debated domestically in the wake of reforming German asylum 
law, and changes in the Foreigners Act (1990) regarding family reunion. The number of 
asylum applications had risen since the beginning of the 1990s, most notably due to the 
war in the former Yugoslavia. The feeling in Germany was that the German asylum law 
was too generous, the country could not cope with the increased influx of asylum seekers, 
and asylum law needed to be made more restrictive. This eventually led to the so-called 
Asylum Compromise that was agreed upon on 6 December 1992 (Takle, 2007: 101-103). 
 
Immigration was framed as a possible threat to internal security if immigrants could not be 
absorbed by the labour market (Die Tageszeitung, 1991d). Mass immigration from Eastern 
and Central Europe through the channel of asking for asylum was especially feared (see, 
for instance, Die Tageszeitung, 1991a, 1991b; Takle, 2007: 103). In addition, the debate 
was further fuelled by increased racially motivated violence against asylum seekers. In 
fact, the German population saw foreigners and asylum as the most important issues 
facing the country. Xenophobia, citizenship, and asylum were hotly debated themes in 
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mainstream politics in Germany (Koopmans, 1999: 629). Political salience of immigration 
was high when the preference formation on the EA with Poland took place, and decision-
makers were favouring restrictive immigration policies, most notably regarding asylum 
(Takle, 2007: 103). The public debate included economic migration and the need to 
prevent migration flows from the CEECs (see, for instance, Die Zeit, 1990a; Handelsblatt, 
1990a). 
 
As the political salience of immigration was high, the political costs to support provisions 
on freedom of movement and the right of establishment would have been high for most 
actors involved. In the public debate, the Agreement was not linked to opening an avenue 
for immigration from Eastern and Central Europe. Given the political salience of 
immigration, German decision-makers were cautious that the Agreement would not allow 
immigration from the East, and that it was not framed like that in public debate. Press 
coverage of the Agreement tended to focus on the economic aspects of the Agreement 
and the prospect of EC membership. Migration was not mentioned (see, for instance, Die 
Tageszeitung, 1990, 1991c; Die Zeit, 1992). Consequently, the debate about the 
Agreement followed a bureaucratic logic even though political salience of immigration, 
especially from Eastern and Central Europe, was high. This was conducive to German 
support of the Title IV provisions. 
 
International Politics 
Foreign Policy Value 
The German government certainly had important foreign policy interests regarding Poland 
and the region of Central and Eastern Europe in general. This gave Poland considerable 
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foreign policy value from the view of the German government. After being a divided 
country for around 40 years, it was felt strongly amongst German decision-makers that the 
CEECs should be brought closer to the EU. Continuous acknowledgment of the 
Community’s traditional pan-European orientation meant decision-makers were obliged to 
adhere to their commitment to reaching out to the CEECs, once this had become 
geopolitically feasible (Die Zeit, 1991a; Schimmelfennig, 2001: 76-77). This should have 
ended Europe’s division that followed the Second World War; it was deemed important to 
have economically and politically stable countries to the East of Germany (Die Zeit, 1990b, 
1990c; Handelsblatt, 1990b, 1992). The economic gains that the Central and Eastern 
European economies promised once they regained their strengths also played a critical 
role (Dinan, 2004: 273; Kramer, 1991: 126; Sedelmeier, 2005b: 53, 56; Sedelmeier & 
Wallace, 1996: 359). Moreover, increased economic prosperity in the CEECs was 
expected to reduce the threat of mass immigration to the EC, about which decision-makers 
were worried (Langhammer, 1992: 8). Consequently, the official rhetoric of German 
decision-makers was one of anchoring Poland and the other CEECs firmly in Europe 
(Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 1991h; Die Zeit, 1991c). The principal means for this 
were seen as helping Poland with its political and economic reforms, by, for instance, 
drawing up a timeline for a step by step strengthening of Poland’s links with the West 
(Membership of the Council of Europe and the Association Agreement with the EC), and 
measures such as debt annulments. For instance, the then CEO of Volkswagen, Kai 
Rieckmann, claimed that after having fought communism for forty years, now, when it had 
finally been defeated, the West must not rest (Die Zeit, 1990c, 1991a, 1991b). In a speech 
in St. Gallen on 27 March 1991, German Chancellor Kohl called for a rapid conclusion of 
the EAs and the openness of the EC for full membership of the CEECs, given they fulfilled 
the necessary economic and political conditions (Auswärtiges Amt, 1991g). 
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Political salience 
As established in the preceding section, domestic salience of immigration matters was 
high. This increased the costs of using immigration policies to attain certain foreign policy 
goals, i.e., the economic and political stabilisation of Poland. For political decision-makers, 
openly supporting more liberal immigration policies for a country from Eastern and Central 
Europe would have entailed substantial political costs. 
 
Polish diplomatic efforts 
In addition to its foreign political significance, the Polish government was very eager to 
have rights on the movement of workers to the EC included in the Association Agreement, 
and was committed to make its voice heard in the negotiations (Interview Federal Ministry 
of Finance) (Gurgalla, 1995: 182). A reason for this was its difficult economic situation, and 
the high unemployment it was suffering. The Polish government attempted to ease this 
delicate situation by sending workers to the Community (European Commission, 1990) 
(Interview Office for European Integration). Thus, the desire also had economic 
motivations and was not predominantly political, as for instance the case with 
Czechoslovakia (Auswärtiges Amt, 1991f). In the negotiations, the Polish delegation was 
the most outspoken of the Visegrád countries and repeatedly demanded improvements in 
freedom of movement. This would have gone beyond the annual quota set by the bilateral 
agreement between Poland and Germany, which in 1991 was around 35,000 Polish 
workers (see, for instance, Auswärtiges Amt, 1991a, 1991b). In addition, the Polish 
government actively asked for a legalisation of 500,000 Polish nationals who resided 
illegally in the Community, and for Polish workers taking part in Member States’ social 
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insurance systems (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 1991k). According to Polish figures, 
there were around 100,000 Polish nationals living illegally in Germany (Bundesministerium 
für Wirtschaft, 1991b). Poland continued to repeat its claims, even when it was clear that 
the Community was not prepared to agree to the improvement of freedom of movement 
and the legalisation of illegal immigrants. The Polish delegation stressed that the 
inflexibility of the EC would need to be dealt with at the political level. It also threatened 
that it was willing to inform the Council of Ministers of the drastic divergence of positions, 
which could have led to the abandonment of the negotiations (Bundesministerium für 
Wirtschaft, 1991a). Poland also took part in an attempt at the highest political level of the 
Visegrád countries to push forward the stagnating negotiations; the then Polish president, 
Lech Wałęsa, together with the President of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, 
Václav Havel, and the Prime Minister of Hungary, József Antall, wrote a letter on 23 
August 1991 to the Dutch Prime Minister, Ruud Lubbers, who was then president of the 
Council of the European Union. The letter referred to the attempted coup d’état in the 
Soviet Union in August 1991 by Communist hardliners, which increased the political 
instability of Soviet Union and thus of the region as a whole. It argued that the importance 
of a successful conclusion of the EAs for the political stability of the region would be 
enormous, and that it should not be obstructed by narrow political interests (Auswärtiges 
Amt, 1991d). The Polish Government even tried bilateral talks with the German Federal 
Ministry of Economics and representatives of the Länder to further its ends (Interview 
Office of European Integration). In October 1991, shortly before the conclusion of the 
Agreement, Poland still demanded comprehensive freedom of movement rights 
(Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 1991j). 
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Ministerial costs and benefits distribution 
The German Foreign Office repeatedly alluded to the high importance Poland gave to the 
inclusion of concessions on the free movement of persons, the pressure that Poland was 
expected to exert in this area in the negotiations of the Agreement, and its attempts to 
push ahead the negotiations (see, for instance, Auswärtiges Amt, 1990a, 1990b). The 
Foreign Office is likely to have had a cautious eye on the precarious political relations with 
that country, which were bearing a heavy historical burden. However, the German stance 
as a whole remained firm, which to a large extent can be attributed to the unmoveable 
position of the Federal Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs, but also of the Federal 
Ministry of the Interior. This can be linked to the high domestic political salience and the 
consensus of German decision-makers that immigration from Eastern and Central Europe 
needed to be restricted (see, for instance Takle, 2007). Thus, Polish pressure, even in light 
of the foreign political importance of the country, had very little effect on Germany’s 
position and the position of the EC as a whole (Interview Office for European Integration). 
Rather than giving any concessions on the freedom of movement, the German federal 
government was willing to accommodate Polish wishes in other areas of the Agreement, 
for instance, trade (Auswärtiges Amt, 1991b). 
 
However, with regard to the regulations on the right of establishment, things took a 
different course. Neither Germany nor another Member State saw any large migratory 
potential of these provisions. Hence, they were uncontroversial but, in fact, were the 
provisions that actually deviated from the national regulations. A small note of caution by 
the Federal Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs with regard to these provisions can 
be found (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 1991e). However, there is nothing that 
suggests that the German government was concerned that the provisions on the right of 
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establishment might lead to increased migration from Poland to Germany. In speaking 
notes for the Council of Economic Ministers in Brussels on 3 and 4 July 1991, outlining the 
state of the negotiations and the outstanding controversial points, there was no mention of 
the provisions on the right of establishment. In contrast, provisions on the freedom of 
movement were brought up (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 1991b). 
 
In July 1991, when the negotiations were stuck, the Commission came up with a new 
proposal on including new regulations on the right of establishment. The proposal was 
agreed upon with Poland and Member States were not consulted (Bundesministerium für 
Wirtschaft, 1991l). It seems that some of the wishes Poland had with regard to freedom of 
movement made their way into the provision on the right of establishment. Whether or not 
this was intended by Poland – or the Commission – cannot be established with 100 
percent certainty. However, it is fair to assume that Poland tried to get concessions for the 
movement of persons in one way or another (Interview Office of European Integration). 
Nonetheless, the German federal government was not worried about the establishment 
provisions, but only about the regulations on the provisions of cross border services 
(Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 1991l). Even though Poland had a high foreign policy 
value for Germany and pushed for more far-reaching provisions on the subject of 
migration, the German federal government was not prepared to compromise on the 
freedom of movement provisions, but tried to accommodate Polish wishes in other parts of 
the Agreement. The high political salience of migration increased the political costs of such 
concessions and is the reason why the pressure of the Polish government was less 
successful than, for instance, that from the Turkish government with regard to the Ankara 
Agreement. 
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Labour market concerns 
The period in which the EA was negotiated and concluded coincided with low economic 
growth, high unemployment, and ailing state budgets in the EC. In 1991, GDP growth in 
the EC was 1.6 percent and falling. By 1993, the EU economy had slid into recession 
(Papadimitriou, 2002: 62). Germany had a negative growth of 0.8 percent in 1993 (see 
Figure 14). Figure 15 shows that from 1992 onwards, the situation of the German labour 
market was tense, as the number of unemployed in proportion to the working population 
rose by 3 percent in total between 1992 and 1997. However, despite the gloomy economic 
situation, from 1989 on Germany concluded a number of bilateral labour recruitment 
agreements with the CEECs for temporary workers (Gastarbeitnehmer), seasonal workers 
(Saisonarbeitnehmer), and workers posted by subcontractor companies 
(Werkvertragsarbeitnehmer) (Menz, 2001: 254). This could be an indicator for the 
existence of labour shortages in certain sectors of the German labour market. However, 
foreign policy, economic, and developmental considerations also played a role (Faist, et 
al., 1999: 140-143; Reim & Sandbrink, 1996: 28-29). But still, in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, the construction industry reported labour shortages for skilled workers (Faist, et al., 
1999: 141; Menz, 2001: 255). In the fourth quarter of 1989, the Institute for Employment 
Research (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung) found that a 12 percent segment 
of all companies experienced impediments to their production due to labour shortages. 
Sectors particularly affected were construction and consumption related services. Small 
companies suffered relatively strongly because of labour shortages (Reyher, Spitznagel, & 
Kretschmer, 1990: 353). Also, German reunification in July 1990 reinforced the existing 
regional and sectoral labour shortages (Faist, et al., 1999: 141; Sandbrink, 1996: 95). 
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Figure 14: Real GDP Growth Rate, Germany 
Real GDP Growth Rate: Germany
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Figure 15: Unemployment rate Germany, in percentage 
Unemployed in percentage of working population in 
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The labour shortages the German labour market seem to have been facing at that time did 
not influence the position of the federal government in a significant way. Although sectoral 
labour shortages were reported, they did not feature in the political debate, and 
consequently the debate about the EA was not framed in a way that could allow it to serve 
as a short- or medium-term solution to fill these shortages. Hence, Title IV of the EA was 
not linked to the need to fill labour shortages through targeted migration, and labour 
shortages did not have a direct effect on the freedom of movement provisions. In fact, the 
most important rationale was the concern not to overburden the labour market with 
additional labour in light of high domestic unemployment (Domaradzka, 2006: 83; 
Gurgalla, 1995: 182; Husmann, 1998; Kohlmann, 1997: 95; Reim, 2000: 80; Vogt, 2001: 
173). Within the German government, the general view was that concessions on freedom 
of movement needed to be avoided by all means. The economic term of reference was 
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therefore the tense situation of the labour market that overlaid the reported labour 
shortages (Auswärtiges Amt, 1991b), combined with a fear of a significant increase of 
migration from Poland in case immigration regulations would be loosened in the EA (Ad-
Hoc-Gruppe "Einwanderung", 1990). 
 
The German federal government, in particular the Federal Ministry of Employment and 
Social Affairs, was bent on not including any regulations in the Agreement that might give 
Polish workers the right to enter the EC labour market. Consequently, it preferred not to 
include any reference to the possibility of free movement in the EA (Bundesministerium für 
Wirtschaft, 1990c). The Ministry was of the opinion that in case freedom of movement was 
to be extended to Poland and the other Visegrád countries, the largest burden would be 
borne by Germany. Thus, it should be discussed with other Member States whether they 
would be willing to admit nationals from the Central and Eastern European Associate 
countries. In addition, the Federal Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs was keen to 
stress that freedom of movement fell under the responsibility of the Member States, 
necessitating a mixed association agreement and consequently the involvement of the 
Member States in the negotiations (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung, 
1990). The Ministry was opposed to acceptance of the freedom of movement as a 
principle in the Agreement, and did not want to define which conditions of admission into 
the European labour market would be accepted – as proposed repeatedly by the Federal 
Ministry of Economics (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 1991d). The Ministry was finally 
prepared to agree to improve the situation of Polish nationals and their family members 
who were already legal residents in the Community. For any further improvement, the 
situation of the labour market needed to be probed (Auswärtiges Amt, 1991g). The 
Ministry also objected to a locking up of certain quotas for posted workers in the EA as 
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they – unlike with regard to the bilateral agreement – might not be changed 
(Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 1991g). In addition, it warned that it might be difficult to 
enforce restrictive freedom of movement provisions in the negotiations while at the same 
time including more open regulations on the right of establishment (which were supposed 
to be regulated in a different paragraph of the Agreement) (Bundesministerium für 
Wirtschaft, 1990b). It is interesting here that not even the Federal Ministry of Employment 
and Social Affairs was at that point aware of the potential implications of provisions on the 
right of establishment. 
 
The Federal Ministry of Economics acknowledged the responsibility of the Federal Ministry 
of Employment and Social Affairs for anything immediately related to foreign workers 
entering the German labour market, but voiced concerns – together with the Foreign Office 
– to keep in mind the Association Agreement the EEC had concluded with Turkey in the 
early 1960s. In this Agreement, concessions on freedom of movement had led Turkish 
nationals to call upon German courts and the ECJ which led, together with decisions of the 
Association Council, to the establishment of a number of rights for Turkish nationals. For 
instance, article 8(1) of Decision No.1/80 of the Association Council grants preferable 
treatment of Turkish nationals compared to other third country nationals, in case a vacancy 
cannot be filled with a Community national. Such developments were supposed to be 
avoided for the EA (Bundesministerium des Innern, 1990b; Bundesministerium für 
Wirtschaft, 1990e). The Ministry was slightly less concerned about including references to 
freedom of movement in the Agreement, and together with the Foreign Office requested 
the Federal Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs to check its position, which had 
been to make no reference to freedom of movement in the Agreement (Bundesministerium 
für Wirtschaft, 1990b). 
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The Federal Ministry of the Interior was very cautious about including provisions that might 
allow, in one way or another, Polish workers to enter the labour market of the EC. Its 
position was similar to that of the Federal Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs. The 
Ministry also made reference to the experience with the Association Agreement with 
Turkey, and called for not including any regulations that might lead to Member State 
obligations with regard to migration or granting individual entitlements of rights of the 
freedom of movement. To that end, it maintained that the term “freedom of movement” 
should not be included in the Agreement but should only relate to relations between the 
EC and the Member States (Bundesministerium des Innern, 1990a). The Federal Ministry 
of Justice expressed its support for this proposition (Bundesministerium der Justiz, 1990). 
It further argued that the term “freedom of movement” should not be used in a general 
way, but the Agreement should only contain a reference to the future establishment of 
some sort of freedom of movement (Bundesministerium des Innern, 1990b). Hence, the 
German federal government was extremely cautious to grant any concessions that might 
lead to relaxed rights of admission for Polish workers to the labour market of the EC. The 
need to fill labour shortages did not feature in the debate, only the tense situation of the 
German labour market. Consequently, in the case of the Europe Agreement, a direct link 
between labour shortages and German support for migration-relevant provisions can be 
established. As the Europe Agreement was not framed as a possibility for reducing labour 
shortages, employer associations that might have taken action to support the Agreement 
to this end did not take any action. 
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Bureaucratic Politics 
The where you stand depends on where you sit proposition can explain the position of the 
actors involved. In addition to the Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry of Economics, 
the Federal Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs was very active, as the admission of 
workers to the labour market fell in its area of responsibility. The fourth ministry that had 
strong opinions was the Federal Ministry of the Interior, as immigration and controlling who 
enters the country were part of its portfolio. Most immediately concerned was the Federal 
Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs, as the guardian of the German labour market. 
In light of high unemployment, the Ministry’s main objective was not to admit any further 
workers to the Germany labour market beyond the quota allowed by the bilateral 
agreement on posted workers. Although labour shortages were reported when the 
Agreement was negotiated, any references to the filling of labour shortages cannot be 
found, and the debate about the EA was certainly not framed in a way that the Agreement 
could be used to fill these shortages. Thus, the costs of including regulations that would 
allow Polish workers to access the German labour market were seen as constituting 
concentrated costs, while their benefits were diffuse in terms of helping to conclude the 
entire Agreement that was politically crucial and economically potentially beneficial. 
 
A very similar distribution of costs and benefits applied to the Federal Ministry of the 
Interior. It was opposed to giving away competencies to the EU level with regard to being 
able to decide who can enter Germany’s territory. It made particular reference to the 
provisions of the Association Agreement with Turkey, which had resulted in decisions of 
the Association Council such as decision no.1/80 which stipulated that if a vacancy could 
not be filled by an EC citizen, Turkish nationals should be given priority compared to other 
third country nationals. 
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The Federal Ministry of Economics and the Foreign Office were slightly less hostile to 
including some sort of freedom of movement regulations in the Agreement, though 
certainly not very generous ones. As the Ministries in charge of the entire Agreement, they 
were more immediately exposed to the political claims of the German leadership that the 
Agreements should be concluded as soon as possible to anchor Poland and the other 
CEECs in Europe, for reasons of political stability in the region but probably also with an 
eye on German reunification. This applies in particular to the Foreign Office. Conversely, 
the Federal Ministry of Economics is likely to have given most of its attention to regulations 
on trade liberalisation and economic assistance. In both cases, therefore, costs of 
provisions on freedom of movements – unless they were extremely far-reaching – were 
diffuse while the overall benefits of the Agreement were fairly concentrated. 
 
As for the political dynamics of preference formation, no major differences are apparent 
within the federal government with regard to freedom of movement provisions and the right 
of establishment. Neither the Economics Ministry nor the Foreign Office were in favour of 
provisions that would enable immediate migration from Poland to Germany. Both 
ministries referred to the burden the promise of freedom of movement in the Ankara 
Agreement posed on Turkey’s associate membership to the EEC (Bundesministerium für 
Wirtschaft, 1991i). The Employment and Interior Ministries were more strongly opposed to 
any provisions that might mean migration from Poland to Germany. 
 
The situation was made more precarious by the Polish government including itself in the 
preference formation, as it pushed for the inclusion of provisions on freedom of movement 
and the right of establishment. Thus, parallels to the efforts of the Turkish government with 
 
 
199 
regard to the Ankara Agreement emerge. Given the political salience of migration was high 
on this occasion, Poland’s lobbying efforts were less successful than Turkey’s with regard 
to the freedom of movement provisions. However, concerning the provisions on the right of 
establishment, the lobbying efforts were fruitful and helped the German government to 
agree to these provisions. German decision-makers were not aware of the consequences 
the provisions might have with regard to immigration, and saw them also in the light of 
offering benefits for German companies attempting to do business in Poland, for instance, 
by facilitating the opening of subsidiaries there. In the end, it was those provisions that had 
an actual impact on the possibilities of Polish workers to enter the German labour market. 
Consequently, the Polish government also features amongst the relevant actors that took 
part in the decision-making process on the EA. 
 
Regarding the Länder governments, they were informed about the state of the negotiations 
via the Bundesrat and even managed to send a representative to discussions in the 
relevant working group of the Council of the EU (Bundesrat, 1991). However, there is 
nothing that suggests the Bundesrat’s position was different from the federal 
government’s. This also applies to the German parliament, the Bundestag. As the Länder 
did not take any action, we can assume that the costs and benefits were moderate and 
diffuse, not necessitating any action. It is likely that the Länder would be concerned with 
Polish workers entering the German labour market, but as the general government stance 
was very tough in that respect, there was no necessity for Länder representatives to take 
action. 
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III. Conclusion 
The analysis of this case study does away with the common misconception of the existing 
literature on the EAs that the migration relevant provisions of the Agreement with Poland 
did not have a direct and tangible effect on national migration regulations. In particular, the 
provisions on the right of establishment and the clause that prohibits the national 
regulations to nullify or impair provisions of the Agreement constitute a de jure modification 
of German national regulations. These are the refusal of entry due to overcapacity of the 
German labour market, the omission of the needs test of the labour market, and the need 
for demands of self-employed Polish workers to be able to sustain themselves. 
 
The position of the German federal government on Title IV of the EA with Poland, i.e., the 
part of the agreements that bears relevance to the discussion about the regulation of 
economic migration at the EU level, can be explained by three themes – domestic politics, 
international politics, and labour market concerns – that are linked by a bureaucratic 
politics framework. The first theme, domestic politics, includes two hypotheses. Hypothesis 
One concerns the fit between existing national regulations. It showed that the federal 
government was not prepared to give any concessions on the movement of workers that 
would go beyond or thwart the national regulations, most notably, a bilateral agreement 
with Poland on the sending of posted workers to Germany. Hence, Germany was not 
wiling to accept any misfit between national and EC regulations and was 100 percent 
determined to upload its preferences to the EC level. This happened in the form of 
including a reference to the co-existence of bilateral agreements with the EA. The 
discussions with regard to Hypothesis Two showed that the debate about the freedom of 
movement provisions took place in the style of bureaucratic politics even though political 
salience of immigration was high. This could happen because decision-makers made it 
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quite clear from the beginning that the Agreement could not allow increased immigration 
from Poland to Germany and it was not framed publicly in that way either. Rather, the 
Agreement tended to be portrayed as facilitating economic cooperation and potentially 
leading to EU membership at a later point in time. 
 
The second theme of international politics relates to foreign political factors. Accordingly, 
Hypothesis Three discussed Poland’s foreign policy value to Germany in terms of creating 
political and economic stability in the region. The foreign policy value of Poland was high; 
however, so was the political salience of immigration in Germany. The latter was fuelled by 
a heated debate about the need to curb asylum flows by making national asylum 
legislation more restrictive; this was because of increased asylum applications due to, for 
instance, the war in former Yugoslavia. The Polish government lobbied for the inclusion of 
provisions in the Agreement that would allow further immigration from Poland to Germany. 
The German government remained tough because of the high political costs involved. 
Instead of including more generous provisions on freedom of movement, it tried to give 
concessions in other areas of the Agreement, most notably, trade, in order not to endanger 
its conclusion. Nonetheless, the Polish government’s efforts made a difference as they 
contributed to the inclusion of provisions on the right of establishment. They indeed 
constituted de jure changes to the German national immigration regulations. German 
decision-makers were not aware that these would have this effect. 
 
The third theme considers labour market concerns. Labour shortages did not have a direct 
impact on Germany’s position on the Europe Agreement. The provisions were not framed 
in a way that coupled them with the ability to reduce domestic labour shortages. 
Nonetheless, they were instrumental in making the German government conclude a 
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bilateral labour agreement with Poland for posted workers. The existence of that 
agreement, and reference to the co-existence of such bilateral agreements in the EA, 
reduced the misfit and helped to secure German consent to the freedom of movement 
provisions of the EA. 
 
Discussing the bureaucratic politics of preference formation has revealed that the Ministry 
of Employment and Social Affairs as well as the Foreign Office were slightly advantaged 
by the rules of the game, as they were jointly in charge of the file. This meant they had to 
establish the German government’s position by coordinating the diverging views of the 
relevant ministries. Thus, they had some degree of flexibility to lead the discussions in a 
certain direction or to stress a few particular points. Both ministries were aware of the 
political importance of the Agreement (and what concerned the Economics Ministry – its 
economic potential). Consequently, they attributed high priority to its successful 
conclusion. The Employment Ministry and the Interior Ministry, supported by the Ministry of 
Justice, strongly cautioned about including provisions that could mean increased 
immigration from Poland to Germany. Consequently, the federal government was not 
prepared to include such provisions and tried to appease the Polish government by giving 
concessions in other areas of the agreement, most notably trade. German preference 
formation followed a pattern that is better characterised as coordination rather than hard-
nosed bargaining. That is because there was broad agreement about the general position 
on the freedom of movement provisions. 
 
In addition to these executive actors, the Polish government pushed itself into the game. 
This resembled developments regarding the Ankara Agreement. However, given the high 
political salience of immigration and the experiences of the German government with the 
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relevant provisions of the Ankara Agreement, the Polish government was less successful 
in gathering German support for extensive freedom of movement provisions. However, it 
contributed to the inclusion of provisions on the right of establishment that opened a 
loophole for Polish workers to migrate to Germany as self-employed workers or key 
personnel. The German government was not aware of this effect. It was more concerned 
about the provisions on the freedom to provide services, which it saw in light of facilitating 
access for German companies to the Polish market. 
 
Each of the three hypotheses contributes to explaining the preferences of the German 
federal government, and to answering under what conditions a Member State agrees to 
liberalise economic migration policies at the EU level. However, it is still possible to 
discuss differences in the importance of the hypotheses. In determining the exact position 
of the federal government, domestic politics are the most important theme. Notably the 
misfit hypothesis (Hypothesis One) is the most crucial one, as the existing regulations, i.e., 
the bilateral agreement with Poland on posted workers, marked the red line indicating the 
maximum of what Germany was willing to concede to the EU-level in the EA. Hypothesis 
Two contributes to the explanation by highlighting the significance of the political salience 
concept. It made it difficult for the German government to openly support any provisions 
that would lead to increased migration from Poland to Germany. Nonetheless, the German 
government succeeded in not framing the EA as a policy measure that might have this 
outcome. Consequently, the position on the freedom of movement provisions could be 
formed without causing too much political stir, which could have endangered the 
conclusion of the overall Agreement. 
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International political considerations (Hypothesis Three) indicate two main things. First, 
Polish insistence on some sort of improvement of the movement of persons resulted in the 
regulations on the right of establishment that contained some flexibility for workers to enter 
the EC labour market. This confirms the findings of the case study of the Ankara 
Agreement that foreign governments can wrestle themselves into the governmental 
decision-making process, even though they are not formally included by the rules of the 
game. This substantiates the call to modify the politics framework to incorporate the ability 
of foreign governments to push themselves into the game to make a substantive 
contribution to the governmental decision-making process. Second, it indicates again the 
importance of the concept of political salience in explaining German reluctance to agree to 
noteworthy migration provisions. Even continued pushes by the Polish government could 
not induce the German government to agree to outright provisions on immigration. It took a 
misinterpretation of the provisions on the right of establishment to make a tangible 
difference. Hence, the increased political salience decreased the impact of the Polish 
government compared to that of the Turkish government with regard to the Ankara 
Agreement. 
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Chapter Six – Germany’s Resistance to the Economic 
Migration Directive 
 
Introduction 
Since the early 1970s, when the most prominent European immigrant-receiving countries 
stopped their guest worker recruitment, the official debate about immigration – if there was 
one – tended to be dominated by a logic of restrictionism. Calls for harmonising Member 
States’  immigration policies and even delegating competencies of regulating migration to 
the EU level were fuelled by the signing of the Single European Act in February 1986. This 
established the goal of a European Common Market by 1992, the communitarisation of 
immigration, and the incorporation into EU law of the Schengen Agreement that abolished 
internal border controls through the conclusion of the Amsterdam Treaty in October 1997. 
In the Conclusions of the 1999 European Council in Tampere, the EU Member States 
embarked on outlining a programme of action that would create legally binding instruments 
on asylum and immigration policy, justice cooperation, and the fight against crime. Point 
22 of the programme states (European Council, 1999): “The European Council stresses 
the need for more efficient management of migration flows at all their stages.” It also linked 
the carving of the Schengen Agreement into EU law with the need to further cooperate in 
that area, and in particular in order to guarantee an effective control of the Union’s external 
border. 
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While these developments can be seen as progress towards a common immigration 
policy, the formulations are general and do not give any detailed indication about the 
content of an EU policy on legal migration. A crude distinction can be made between a 
restrictive logic of immigration, which dominated European thinking about immigration 
since the end of the keen recruitment of guest workers era, and a policy that 
acknowledges the need for immigration and allows for channels to admit migrants for 
purposes of employment. As the Commission was asked to elaborate policy proposals, it 
was up to the Commission to interpret the Tampere programme. With regard to legal 
migration, the Commission proposed a Directive on family reunification and long-term 
residents as well as the admission and residence of third-country nationals for employment 
purposes. In particular, the latter was a clear commitment to a controlled opening to 
economic migrants from outside the Union. The proposal states (European Commission, 
2001: 22): “In an increasingly global labour market and faced with shortages of skilled 
labour in certain sectors of the labour market the Community should reinforce its 
competitiveness to recruit and attract third-country workers, when needed.” Thus, the 
Commission attempted to frame the migration debate as a response to the need to fill 
labour shortages and to take advantage of the EU’s resources to attract the brightest 
migrants worldwide. In its 2005 Policy Plan on Legal Migration,44 the Commission 
acknowledged the issue of brain drain and the need for ethical recruitment. However, in 
the Economic Migration Directive, references to brain drain issues were missing. 
 
The proposal did not find much acceptance amongst Member States and the Commission 
was finally forced to shelve and withdraw the proposal. This chapter analyses why 
Member States were unwilling to support the Directive. A standard explanation for why the 
                                                
44 COM(2005) 669 final. 
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proposal was not adopted by Member States is that the European value added by a 
common EU policy is not enough to justify EU-level cooperation (see, for instance, Ryan, 
2007). However this approach is too simplistic. The chapter argues that the misfit between 
the proposal and the German national regulations of migration was too high. As the 
domestic political salience of migration was very pronounced, the political costs of 
agreeing to the Economic Migration Directive were extremely high. Even though labour 
migration had started to be framed as able to contribute to reducing the existing labour 
shortages, the link between EU-level liberalisation of economic migration and the reduction 
of labour shortages had not been made. Foreign policy factors did not play a role in the 
preference formation on the proposal. The case studies of the Ankara and the Europe 
Agreement substantiated the potential of foreign policy factors to increase the likelihood of 
a Member State government supporting EU-level liberalisation of economic migration 
policies, under certain conditions. As a consequence, these factors were not part of the 
equation and reduced the decision to the other factors. The chapter is organised as 
follows. It discusses the genesis of the Directive, followed by the empirical analysis of the 
process of preference formation of the German government, and a concluding section 
reflecting on the relevance of the hypotheses. 
 
I. Genesis and Background of the Directive 
Genesis 
The Treaty of Amsterdam, which entered into force 1 February 1999, communitarised the 
immigration policy area by moving it into the first pillar of the EU. This resulted in the 
conclusion of the Tampere European Council of 15-16 October 1999. The conclusion drew 
up a programme of action in an attempt to establish a comprehensive legal policy 
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framework in Justice and Home Affairs. The programme set targets and deadlines in areas 
such as immigration and asylum policy, justice cooperation, and the fight against crime. 
The Tampere programme additionally invited the Commission to propose the respective 
legislation. As regards legal migration, the Commission proposed Directives on the right to 
family reunification;45 on long-term resident status;46 students;47 researchers;48 and on 
economic migration.49 The Economic Migration Directive was proposed on 11 July 2001 
and was based on a feasibility study commissioned by the DG Justice, Liberty and 
Security of the European Commission. The study compared and analysed the legal and 
administrative frameworks of the then 15 EU Member States with regard to the admission 
of third country nationals for the purposes of paid employment or self-employment. The 
study established a number of commonalities across Member States, such as the 
distinction between paid employment and self-employed economic activities; a generally 
restrictive orientation that nonetheless leaves opportunities to react to shortages on the 
domestic labour market; residence and work permits as two separate titles granted by 
different authorities; and the sanctioning of illegal residence and illegal employment. 
However, not surprisingly, the differences outstripped the commonalities. These included 
the application of a quota system; the regulation of immigration by one or several laws; 
eligibility criteria as well as length of residence; the use of a work permit in addition to a 
residence permit; the regulation of family reunion, voting rights for third country nationals; 
and the authorities in charge of the admission of immigrants (ECOTEC, 2000: 33). 
                                                
45 Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, Official Journal L 
251, 03/10/2003 p. 12 – 18; 
46 Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third country nationals who 
are long-term residents, Official Journal L 016, 23/01/2004, p. 44 – 53. 
47 Council Directive 2004/114/EC of 13 December 2004 on the conditions of admission of third country 
nationals for the purposes of studies, pupil exchange, unremunerated training or voluntary service, Official 
Journal, L 375, 23/12/2004, p. 12–18. 
48 Council Directive 2005/71/EC of 12 October 2005 on a specific procedure for admitting third country 
nationals for the purposes of scientific research, Official Journal L 289, 03/11/2005, p. 15–22 
49 COM(2001) 386 final. 
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Content 
The Directive followed a horizontal approach, covering conditions for entry and residence 
for any third country national. Thus, it would have applied to both skilled and unskilled 
migrants working in various professions and sectors. The Directive was divided into six 
chapters. Its main points were the following: First, it laid down common definitions of the 
relevant terminology (such as third country national, self-employed person, the different 
residence permits, seasonal worker, transfrontier worker, intra-corporate transferees, and 
trainees) and its scope. It left room for Member States to put in place more favourable 
provisions than the Directive’s. It merged the residence and work permits into one single 
permit (residence permit – worker). Second, it laid down the application process, the 
requirements for admission (Articles 5 and 6), and the rights granted once admitted. These 
included a job offer in a Member State that could not be filled by an EU national or legal 
resident, and that had been advertised for a period of at least four weeks. It gave the 
Member States the right to couple admission to a minimum annual income to be 
determined by the Member State. The residence permit – worker was supposed to be valid 
for up to three years and renewable for periods of up to three years. Initially, the permit 
was restricted to specific professional activities. After three years these restrictions should 
have been lifted, giving the holder the right to work in other Member States and to take on 
other jobs. The permit also allowed re-entry after temporary absence, and equal treatment 
with EU citizens; for example, with regard to working conditions, vocational training, 
recognition of qualifications, social security, and union membership. Third, the proposal 
specified rules for special categories of workers, such as seasonal workers, intra-corporate 
transferees, trainees and au pairs. Fourth, the Directive covered conditions for admission 
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of self-employed workers who were covered by the residence permit – worker. It was 
supposed to be issued for a period of up to three years and to be renewable for up to three 
years. During the first three years, it was supposed to be restricted to a specific economic 
activity or field of activity, or to a specific region. After three years those restrictions were 
lifted. Fifth, it contained several horizontal provisions, such as allowing Member States to 
set quotas or to restrict the issuing of permits to a certain period. Sixth, the Directive 
included articles on procedure and transparency thought to ensure that all details of the 
application procedure were publicised. Finally, it made a few general statements about the 
Directive’s taking of effect. 
 
The proposal constituted an attempt by the Commission to change the paradigm of 
restrictionism to one of controlled openness, as it had already announced in its 
communication on a community immigration policy of November 2000.50 However, it still 
tried to leave the determination of actual numbers to the Member States in an effort to 
make the proposal more easily digestible for Member States. 
 
Main Issues 
The content of the proposed Directive caused concern for a number of Member States. 
The main issues were the following. First, the legal basis of the Directive, Article 63(3) of 
the EC Treaty, was questioned. Article 63(3) stipulates that the Council shall adopt: 
 
“measures on immigration policy with the following areas: (a) conditions of entry 
and residence, and standards on procedures for the issue by Member States of 
                                                
50 COM(2000) 757 final. 
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long-term visas and residence permits, including those for the purpose of family 
reunion;” 
 
In particular, Germany and Austria were doubtful about the competence of the Community 
to adopt rules concerning access to Member States’ labour markets. It was considered 
that under the current Treaty, and, in particular, on the basis of Article 63, the Commission 
did not have the competence to propose legislation in this policy domain (Bundesrat, 
2002a; Council of the European Union, 2003) (Interview 3 Commission, Interview 2 
Council, Interview Diplomat). Second, merging residence and work permits into one single 
permit was seen as a problem by some Member States. This was a problem especially for 
Member States with a federal structure, as in addition to federal authorities, regional ones 
were also involved in admitting third country nationals to the labour market (Council of the 
European Union, 2002: 3-4). Third, some Member States found the system established by 
the Directive rather bureaucratic and not responsive to the needs of their labour market, in 
particular regarding the possibility of recruiting third country national workers quickly 
(Interview 2 Permanent Representation, Interview UK Permanent Representation). Having 
one procedure that would apply to all kinds of migrants who, for instance, require different 
qualifications, was not seen as efficient (Council of the European Union, 2002, 2003) 
(Interview 3 Commission, Interview 2 Council, Interview Diplomat). Moreover, restricting 
workers to specific professional fields in the first three years was not seen as flexible 
enough (Peers & Rogers, 2006: 673). In addition to these problems, Member States found 
a multitude of other issues in almost all provisions of the proposal. These included: 
suspicion about the link between decisions on migration for employment and self-
employment and the issue of visas to the persons concerned; the possibility to file an 
application while in-country; the need for further conditions that needed to be met in order 
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for a permit to be granted (accommodation, requirement of integration, or commitment of 
employer to pay tax expenses); and unemployment not constituting a sufficient reason for 
revoking a residence permit – worker (Article 10(3)) (Peers & Rogers, 2006: 672). 
 
Negotiations 
The Directive was proposed in July 2001. The German government was one of the most 
outspoken opponents of the Directive (together with the Austrian government). However, 
Member States were not enthusiastic about the Directive in general. Already the first 
reading of the proposal indicated that it would be very difficult for Member States to agree 
on the Directive. The Working Party on Migration and Expulsion of the Council of the 
European Union discussed the proposal briefly at four meetings in 2002 (21 March, 16 
April, 10 June, and 8 July), after which discussions came to a halt (Council of the 
European Union, 2003: 1). The Commission pursued a strategy to overcome 
disagreement over details by putting forward a general “escape” clause. Nevertheless, the 
general reluctance of Member States to change national legislation and procedures was 
too pronounced. Neither the Seville European Council in June 2002, nor the Conclusions 
of the Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003 set a deadline to agree on the 
proposal. The Directive was debated again in July 2003 and in October 2003 by the 
Working Party on Migration and Expulsion. That concluded the first reading of the 
proposal. November 2003 marked the last time the proposed Directive made it to the 
Council, when the Justice and Home Affairs Council mentioned the “state of play” 
concerning the proposal. The Council only stated the serious differences and reservations 
of Member States concerning the proposal. The Commission formally withdrew the 
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proposal in March 2006 (Council of the European Union, 2007; European Commission, 
2006: 12; Peers & Rogers, 2006: 671-675; Sénat, 2004). 
 
II. Germany’s Preferences 
The formation of governmental preferences in Germany is a process that involves a 
number of different actors. Given the federal and decentralised structure of government in 
Germany, this does not come as a surprise. Which actors are involved is structured by the 
institutional set-up. How actors’ positions, influence, and moves are aggregated to form a 
certain governmental position and action is conceptualised by Allison (Allison & Zelikow, 
1999: 300-304) as the game. 
 
In Germany, the macro-structure for governmental preference formation is given by the 
Gemeinsame Geschäftsordnung der Bundesministerien that regulates interministerial 
affairs. Accordingly, the central actors are the federal government, the social partners, and 
the Länder. However, if there is a vivid public debate about a certain legislative endeavour, 
the list of actors might increase, as political actors from inside and outside the government 
voice their opinions, which are filtered by the media. The relevant actors for the Economic 
Migration Directive are as follows. For the German government, the Ministry of the Interior 
was in charge of the file. In addition, several other ministries were involved: the Federal 
Ministry of Employment; the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs; the Foreign Office; the 
Federal Ministry of Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth, the Federal Ministry 
of Education and Research; the Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban 
Development; and the Office of the Federal Representative for Migration, Refugees and 
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Integration. The Federal Ministry of the Interior and the Federal Ministry of Employment 
had the strongest influence on the decision-making process. 
 
The social partners were represented by their respective peak organisations – the 
employer associations by the Federation of German Employer Associations 
(Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände or BDA) and the trade unions by 
the Confederation of German Trade Unions (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund or DGB), the 
peak organisation of the German trade unions (Interview BDI). The Länder also took part 
in the process, via the Bundesrat. In addition, the position of the parliament (Bundestag) 
needed to be taken into consideration. The Directive was proposed when immigration was 
a hot topic domestically as it coincided with lively discussions about immigration policy and 
the effects of immigration on Germany. This raised the stakes for actors involved in the 
debate. 
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Domestic Politics 
“Agreeing openly to adopt the Economic Migration Directive would have meant political 
suicide.” (Interview 2 Permanent Representation). 
 
Misfit 
The point of reference for the national legislation is not clear-cut, as Germany was in the 
process of changing its domestic immigration legislation. This endeavour caused 
controversy. Soon after the Schröder Government came into power in 1998, it embarked 
on reforming German immigration law. At that time, immigration to Germany was regulated 
by what was called the Act for the new Regulation of the Alien Law (Gesetz zur 
Neuregelung des Ausländerrechts). It had come into force on 1 January 1991 and was 
voluminous, detailed, and complicated. Consequently, it was difficult to understand for 
foreigners (Rittstieg, 1996: XI). Its predecessor was a comparatively slim law from 1 
October 1965 (Ausländergesetz) which, by and large, put the decision over issuing, 
prolonging, or terminating residency permits into the hands of bureaucrats and was thus a 
rather arbitrary arrangement. The process of reform was initiated by a speech given by 
Chancellor Schröder at the CeBIT, a tradeshow for the digital industry, in Hanover on 23 
February 2000. He announced the introduction of a so-called Green Card to lure IT 
specialists to Germany, consequently launching a debate about a fundamental renewal of 
German immigration policy (Schröder, 2000). It was the first time the Schröder government 
publicly mentioned the Green Card initiative that sought to give a work permit to third 
country nationals to work in the IT industry. It was the first step away from a solely 
restrictive labour immigration policy towards one of providing selected entry points for 
skilled workers that complemented the national labour force. The only exception are a 
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number of bilateral recruitment agreements with CEECs on temporary, seasonal, and 
posted workers the German government had concluded since 1989 that did not gain much 
public attention (Menz, 2001: 254).  
 
The Green Card initiative entered into force on 1 August 2000.51 The residence permit was 
limited to five years and restricted to IT professionals with either a relevant university 
degree or a minimum annual salary of €50,000. In addition, the total number was restricted 
to 10,000 initially, but was later increased to 20,000 – as planned from the outset. By 
German standards, the initiative was generous, but it still included restrictive elements, as, 
for instance, the residence permit was non-renewable and the Green Card thus provided 
no long-term perspective to prospective migrants. 
 
The Green Card initiative provides some insights into the German regulation of economic 
immigration. Apart from this, it is difficult to establish what the point of reference for 
German immigration legislation was, as Germany was in the middle of an immigration law 
reform. On 3 August 2001, a first draft of a new immigration act was proposed by the 
Minister of the Interior, Otto Schily. It was adopted in a modified version by the Cabinet on 
8 November of the same year (Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Steuerung und Begrenzung 
der Zuwanderung und zur Regelung des Aufenthalts und der Integration von 
Unionsbürgern und Ausländern (Zuwanderungsgesetz)) (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung 
für Ausländerfragen, 2002: 19).52 However, it was not until 1 January 2005 that the act 
entered into force as a highly watered-down version of the initial proposal. This was 
because the views on what constituted immigration policy were greatly divergent between 
                                                
51 Verordnung über Aufenthaltserlaubnisse für hoch qualifizierte ausländische Fachkräfte der Informations- und 
Kommunikationstechnologie (IT-ArGV). 
52 Drucksache 14/7387. 
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the government and the opposition parties that had held a blocking majority in the 
Bundesrat since 1999. Many analysts criticised the legislation for falling short of being a 
comprehensive answer to Germany’s immigration related issues (Münz, 2004). 
 
The legislation proposed by the government in November 2001 does reflect its stance on 
how German immigration legislation should look. Hence, it can be taken as a point of 
reference to gauge the fit with the proposed EU Directive. The proposal envisaged only 
two kinds of residence permits, one limited to a maximum of three years – although 
renewable – (Aufenthaltserlaubnis) and the other one permanent 
(Niederlassungserlaubnis). It also provided two main channels for third-country workers to 
enter the German labour market for employment purposes. The first route was thought to 
provide highly skilled workers with a permanent residence permit by means of a point-
based selection process that was independent from an existing job offer. Highly qualified 
workers were defined as scientists with specialist knowledge, teachers and scientific 
workers in special functions, as well as specialist workers and executive staff in general 
with an annual salary of at least approximately €85,000. The criteria according to which 
applicants were assessed would be determined by the federal government. The Federal 
Office for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge) and the 
Federal Agency of Labour were supposed to determine a maximum number of available 
permits. By providing highly qualified workers with the opportunity to attain a permanent 
residency permit, the draft proposal attempted to avoid repeating the mistake of the Green 
Card initiative, which did not include a long-term perspective for migrants and was thus 
less attractive for the highly qualified. 
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The second route foresaw the attainment of a temporary residence permit for specific 
employment and was supposed to be a flexible instrument for reducing immediate labour 
shortages. A precondition was approval by the Federal Agency of Labour (Bundesanstalt 
für Arbeit), given only if the vacancy could not be filled with a German national or another 
person with equal rights and privileges to German nationals (e.g. EU citizens). In addition, 
an assessment needed to confirm that filling the position with a third country national was 
reasonable from a labour market and integration point of view. The legislation also 
contained provisions for self-employed persons. If the proposed self-employed activity was 
approved by the relevant authorities, the self-employed worker would be eligible for a 
temporary Aufenthaltserlaubnis. The draft provided the possibility to obtain the permanent 
Niederlassungserlaubnis after three years, subject to the business being successful. 
 
By providing clearly denoted routes of entry to the German labour market, the draft 
constituted a break with the hitherto applicable recruitment stop policy. It reflected the view 
of the government; the CDU/CSU was more conservative and opposed the proposal. It 
argued that the legislative proposal would encourage immigration and did not foresee 
enough measures to strictly limit immigration (Klusmeyer & Papademetriou, 2009: 252). 
So when the German Parliament voted on the proposal on 1 March 2002, the CDU/CSU 
fraction (with the exception of three delegates) voted against it, and the Free Democrats 
(FDP) abstained. The governing parties held the majority in the House so the act could be 
passed. However, the adoption of the proposal in the Bundesrat proved more difficult, as 
the opposition parties held the majority there. This led to the inauguration of an arbitration 
commission, as the Bundesrat rejected the proposal on 20 July 2003. This was the second 
vote of the House; the first one had been declared void by the German Constitutional 
Court because of violations of the official voting process. No agreement could be reached 
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in the arbitration commission, and the proposal ended up being discussed on the highest 
level before a compromise could finally be reached and was adopted on 9 July by the 
Bundesrat. The final version was more restrictive than the first proposal and, for instance, 
no longer contained the points-based system for issuing certain highly skilled workers with 
a permanent residence permit. 
 
As the national law was in the process of being reformed, the government found it difficult 
to agree to EU legislation in this domain (Interview 2 Permanent Representation, Interview 
2 Council, Interview 2 MinInterior). It was difficult for the government to reform domestic 
immigration legislation, which was further complicated by the existence of a number of 
veto players, such as those in the Bundesrat. Thus, agreeing to an Act that would need to 
be changed again shortly after its adoption (because of EU legislation) would have 
resulted in high political costs for the government. However, the national legislation being 
in flux, it also could have offered the possibility of incorporating the tenets of the EU 
proposal into the national legislation. This would have circumvented the need to change it 
soon after its adoption. That the latter scenario did not happen implies that the federal 
government did not desire to do this, and held different preferences on how immigration 
should be regulated, or was sceptical of EU involvement per se. 
 
There was a misfit between the proposal of the Zuwanderungsgesetz and the Economic 
Migration Directive. In addition to a number of technical details, two points stood out. First, 
the Zuwanderungsgesetz contained a system of admission based on points. This supply-
side measure stands in contrast to the Economic Migration Directive that presupposed a 
job offer for a specific job in order to be eligible for admission to the EU labour market. The 
Zuwanderungsgesetz also included temporary residence permits that could be obtained by 
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taking on a job that could not be filled without a third country national. However, strong 
proponents of a points system were unlikely to support a Directive that would not allow for 
this kind of policy measure, as the points system among experts was seen as the most 
effective way to use immigration to counter structural shortfalls in the labour market (see, 
for instance, Council of the European Union, 2003: 2; Unabhängige Kommission 
„Zuwanderung“, 2001: 83-118). Second, the Zuwanderungsgesetz attributed great 
significance to the Federal Agency of Labour, especially for the demand-side route of 
admission, by requiring its approval of the admission of third-country workers for specific 
jobs according to clearly denoted criteria. This sat uneasily with the conditions for 
admission set by the Economic Migration Directive, which were broader. As the final 
version of the Zuwanderungsgesetz was more restrictive than the initial government 
proposal, the misfit compared to the Economic Migration Directive was larger. 
 
The misfit affected the relevant actors in different ways. Most ministries would have 
suffered costs due to giving away authority on who enters the country. For the 
Employment Ministry this was relevant from a labour market perspective, and for the 
Interior Ministry from a perspective of potential security issues. In addition, as the 
Economic Migration Directive would have reduced the influence of the Federal Agency of 
Labour in the admission process, the Employment Ministry would have suffered a loss of 
authority, as the agency is under its control. Regarding the employers, they considered the 
Directive as not taking sufficiently into account the specifics of the national labour markets, 
and thus had problems with setting criteria for admission that were applicable EU-wide 
(Communication BDA). The EU Directive also deviated from the position of the German 
trade unions, as they supported a supply-side system rather than a demand-driven one as 
put forward by the Directive. In addition, the trade unions considered the Directive to target 
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too many categories of migrants, i.e., not only highly skilled, and made too little efforts to 
avoid wage dumping (Interview 1 DGB) (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, 2001). In light of 
Hypothesis One, the findings suggest that the pronounced misfit between the Economic 
Migration Directive and the national regulations was a major problem for most of the actors 
involved in the decision-making process. The misfit manifested itself in two ways. First, the 
Economic Migration Directive and the national legislation differed considerably in their 
approach to admitting migrants. Second, the government was not willing to accept that EU 
legislation overruled its national legislation. Regarding the second point in particular, 
political salience played an important role. This will be further analysed in the following 
section. 
 
Nature of the Decision-Making Process 
As shown by Figure 3 and Figure 5 (to be found in Chapter Three), the domestic political 
salience of immigration polices, i.e., the level of popular attention (cf. Rosenblum, 2004b: 
40-41), was very high when the Economic Migration Directive was proposed. This was 
because ever since Gerhard Schröder kick-started the domestic debate about immigration, 
the discussions had gained further momentum. Thus, it was not possible to have entirely 
bureaucratic decision-making on the Economic Migration Directive that would be unnoticed 
by popular attention. In addition, the cost and benefit distribution of the relevant actors was 
also influenced by high political salience. 
 
The domestic immigration debate was driven by a number of strands: the Green Card 
Initiative (see, for instance, Agence France Presse, 2001); the convening and the report of 
the Independent Commission on Immigration published on 4 July 2001 (Unabhängige 
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Kommission Zuwanderung)53 headed by Rita Süssmuth, a former president of the German 
Parliament (see, for instance, Die Tageszeitung, 2001c; Impulse, 2001); the new 
immigration act (Zuwanderungsgesetz) (Die Welt, 2001c); integration and guiding culture 
(Leitkultur) as well as the question of whether female Turkish teachers should be allowed 
to wear headscarves in school (see, for instance, Die Tageszeitung, 2001b); the use of 
anti-immigration rhetoric in the federal election campaign of CDU/CSU contender Edmund 
Stoiber (see, for instance, Focus Magazin, 2002; Geddes, 2003: 89; S. Green, 2004: 4; 
Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2001); the link between immigration and terrorism in the aftermath 
of 9/11 (see, for instance, Der Spiegel, 2001); the question of whether citizens of the 
Central and Eastern European countries due to join the EU in 2004 should be allowed 
access to the German labour market (see, for instance, Berliner Morgenpost, 2001; Die 
Tageszeitung, 2001a); and discussions about related EU Directives, such as the ones on 
family reunification and long-term residents (Associated Press Worldstream, 2001a). 
 
Given the prominence of the immigration debate, it was impossible to have a 
governmental debate concerned only with the technical issues of the Directive without 
being framed in a different way, or without being mixed with other agendas related to the 
above driving themes of the general immigration debate. The centre right CDU and CSU, 
especially, made an effort to frame EU involvement as an increased liberalisation and link 
it to Germany’s limited absorption capacity (see, for instance, Die Welt, 2001d). There was 
hardly any differentiation between the different migration-related EU directives. For 
instance, the directives on family reunification, long-term residents, and economic 
migration were mixed together, without referring to their particular provisions. They were 
framed in an over-simplified way that stipulated that they would result in strongly increased 
                                                
53 The Commission comprised 21 representatives of different parties, employer associations, trade union, 
churches as well as academia and was supposed to find a compromise acceptable by all parts of society. 
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migration to Germany in case of their adoption (see, for instance, Associated Press 
Worldstream, 2001b; Die Tageszeitung, 2001c; Focus Magazin, 2001). Moreover, the 
Social Democratic Interior Minister, Otto Schily, held a conservative stance and considered 
the EU Directives as too liberal. Only the Green party did not subscribe to this policy frame 
and argued that the EU Directives were close to its position (Der Spiegel, 2003). 
 
The highly politicised debate had a strong impact on the distribution of costs and benefits 
regarding the Economic Migration Directive. Any statement with regard to the Directive 
could be linked to one of the existing policy frames, most notably, the one that adoption of 
the Directive, together with the other relevant directives, would lead to waves of 
immigration to Germany, in turn exceeding Germany’s absorption capacity in terms of 
existing job vacancies and social integration. Given this constellation, no governmental 
actor could openly support the Directive without having to swim against the restrictive tide 
and consequently having to incur political costs. This affected all ministries in a similar 
way, but perhaps the Foreign Office slightly less, as support of the Directive might have 
had a positive effect on how the German government was perceived in Brussels. At that 
time, Germany was regarded as being highly sceptical of any of the initiatives on legal 
migration that were on the negotiation table, and thus had the reputation for being one of 
the main nations that attempted to circumvent a common EU policy on economic 
migration. 
 
Support for the Directive was not sustainable and costs would have included losing 
electoral support by swimming against the flow of the public debate at that time. This could 
have easily manifested itself in Länder elections. According to Freeman’s framework, only 
a skilled policy entrepreneur could have overcome this resistance by investing resources 
 
 
224 
into supporting the Directive for political gain and consequently creating benefits for the 
initiative (Freeman, 2006: 233; Kingdon, 1995: 122). Given the unwelcoming climate for 
EU-level measures that would render immigration policies more open, such a move was 
beneficial for no political actor. Thus, no supporting group for the Directive formed, and the 
actual governmental preference formation on the Directive happened largely without public 
involvement. It is important to note that the salient debate was caused by above 
mentioned factors such as reform of domestic immigration legislation and EU enlargement, 
not by the Economic Migration Directive. Nevertheless, the debate increased the 
concentration of costs accruing to an actor that would have supported the proposal. 
 
International Politics 
The proposed Directive included workers from all third countries. Hence, there was no 
particular sending country or a clearly defined group of sending countries to which the 
policy measure related. Even supposing an urgent foreign policy security threat to 
Germany’s security, there was no country that could be targeted to reduce this security 
threat. Rather, any perceived threat to Germany’s security would derive from international 
terrorism, and consequently relate directly to immigration policy and who might be able to 
enter the country. The policy frame linking immigration to the threat of international 
terrorism was particularly pronounced during the immediate aftermath of 9/11. For 
instance, Friedrich Merz, the leader of the CDU/CSU fraction in the Bundestag at that time, 
argued that the terrorist attacks showed that Germany needs a comprehensive concept to 
control and restrict immigration that also takes into account the necessities to provide 
internal security (Associated Press Worldstream, 2001c). The threat of terrorism was a 
constant theme in the immigration debate (see, for instance, Associated Press 
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Worldstream, 2002; Die Welt, 2001b) (Interview 2 Council). Hence, the external threat 
stemming from international terrorism instigated another dynamic, as suggested by 
Hypothesis Three. It gave rise to a policy frame that sought to restrict immigration for the 
good of internal security. 
 
In addition, the variables of foreign policy value and lobbying by a third country do not 
apply for the case of the Economic Migration Directive as there was no third country that 
could be singled out. The third part of the hypothesis still holds. Political salience was high; 
hence hardly any foreign policy considerations played a role, the security threat of 
terrorism aside. The high domestic political salience and the absence of any of the other 
factors due to the inexistence of a clearly denoted sending country, led to foreign policy 
considerations not being a significant factor in the formation of the German government’s 
position.  
 
Labour Market Needs 
The independent Commission for Immigration stated there were labour shortages in 
Germany that could not be filled with the domestic work force. It based its conclusions on 
reports by four different research institutes.54 The use of four different reports substantiates 
these claims of the existence of labour shortages. Difficulties for filling certain vacancies 
varied across economic sectors and regions (Unabhängige Kommission „Zuwanderung“, 
2001: 37). This was also taken up in the November 2001 version of the 
Zuwanderungsgesetz which reported that in certain sectors, in particular biotechnology 
and information and communication technology (ICT), there was a demand for qualified 
                                                
54 Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft (IW-Consult GmbH), Ifo – Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Institut Zukunft 
der Arbeit gGmbH (IZA), and Hamburgisches Welt-Wirtschafts-Archiv (HWWA). 
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workers and managers that could not be met by the domestic work force (SPD & Bündnis 
90/Die Grünen, 2001: 55). 
 
An international employer survey carried out by the Institute for the Study of Labour (IZA) 
found that firms in Germany (and in France, the UK, and the Netherlands) recruited foreign 
workers because they required skills that only foreign workers were able to supply (IZA, 
2001: II-IV). In addition, there was a scarcity of workers with very specialised professional 
and task-specific knowledge and skills, such as information scientists, mechanical 
engineers, and controllers (see, also, Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung, 
2001; Deutscher Bundestag, 2001). More specifically, other reports indicated that the most 
straightforward partial labour shortages that could be identified in Germany were 
shortages of ICT professionals. In the first six months of 2000, 90,000 vacancies for ICT 
professionals could not be filled (see, for instance, Zentrum für Europäische 
Wirtschaftsforschung, 2001: 7-9). In addition, the German IT association Bitkom projected 
that the need for IT experts would increase to more than 720,000 until 2003. In the metal 
and electro industry, there were more than 240,000 vacancies in April 2001. An increase in 
vacancies was also predicted for these professions (Die Welt, 2001a). According to the 
discussion of labour shortages in Chapter Two, these employer-based indicators have to 
be treated with caution and might be an overly optimistic estimation of labour shortages at 
that time, as they are employer-based. 
 
Due to a slowdown of the business cycle, the ICT shortages were a bit less pronounced in 
2001, but they were still significant. The fact that labour shortages were reported even in 
an economic downturn is an indicator that the shortage of ICT professionals was 
structural, rather than a business cycle problem. A further indicator for labour shortages is 
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the time period that it takes to fill an existing vacancy (Kettner, 2007). In 2001, there were 
49,200 vacancies; it took an average of 94 days to fill them. This was a significant increase 
from the year before, when it took 79 days on average (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, 2002: 
134). The national average of all professions was 55 days in 2001 (Bundesanstalt für 
Arbeit, 2002: 140). This suggests difficulties filling vacancies for ICT jobs with appropriate 
candidates. 
 
The shortages that were publicly announced related to qualified migrants. Although there 
was a small segment of jobs that natives were reluctant to do, such as temporary 
harvesting jobs or low-prestige cleaning jobs, this did not feature in the debate. The 
number of these jobs was small and the high unemployment rate of 10.3 percent suggests 
that there was indeed a domestic pool of workers available that could fill these jobs 
(Klusmeyer & Papademetriou, 2009: 256). In addition, given the highly politicised debate, 
low-skilled migration was framed as an absolute “no-go” for German immigration policy. 
 
Even though the above data suggests that Germany was experiencing labour shortages 
while the Economic Migration Directive was debated, it is possible they are slightly 
overstated, as a significant part of the data relies on employers or employer-friendly 
organisations. In addition, there is no direct causal link that can be traced between the 
existence of labour shortages and support for EU-level measures on liberalising economic 
migration. Even if it is highly likely that some labour shortages existed in Germany at the 
time the Economic Migration Directive was negotiated, they did not matter in the 
respective preference formation of the German government. 
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Bureaucratic Politics 
How the final preferences of the government came about can be analysed with the help of 
Allison’s bureaucratic politics framework. The first proposition is that where an actor sits 
within the organisation determines the actor’s position. Regarding power in the 
organisation, the Ministry of the Interior is predicted to have a structurally elevated position 
as it was in charge of the file. Thus, its task was to coordinate the government’s position 
by taking into account all other relevant ministries and their respective points of view. As 
the Ministry of the Interior was in charge of producing the first version of the 
Zuwanderungsgesetz, this can be taken as reflecting its view on immigration matters. 
Consequently, an EU regulation that interfered with the propositions of the proposed law 
would have been costly. 
 
The Employment Ministry was active. Its main concern was to keep a points system as 
proposed by the Zuwanderungsgesetz. The provisions of the Directive were not seen as 
providing the best solution for regulating access to the German labour market, and thus 
the Ministry opposed a number of the Directive’s propositions. Replacing the proposal for 
the Zuwanderungsgesetz with the Economic Migration Directive was perceived as costly. 
For instance, the Ministry did not like Articles 3(1), 5(3), and 6(1), which were seen as 
incompatible with national regulations (Interview 2 BMAS, Personal Communication 
BMAS). 
 
The Foreign Office cautioned about the potential negative effects on relations with other 
Member States if the federal government would be too ferociously against the proposed 
Directive. However, it accepted the argument that access to the German labour market 
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was better regulated domestically. The Foreign Office was not very active in the 
preference formation process on the Economic Migration Directive (Interview 2 BMAS). 
 
The social partners had to be included in the governmental decision-making process, 
according to paragraph 41 of the regulations for interministerial relations 
(Bundesgeschäftsordnung der Bundesministerien or GGO). They were invited to meetings 
in the respective ministries and were encouraged to issue statements and often even 
specific information to the relevant ministries (Interview BMAS, Interview DGB) (Edinger, 
1993: 181). Generally, by taking into account the views of the associations, the 
government makes sure that the associations are, by and large, happy with the respective 
initiative (Rudzio, 2003: 95). There are also a number of informal channels, such as 
personal familiarity, membership of civil servants in associations and trade unions, and 
interchange of personnel between the associations and the government bureaucracy 
(Rudzio, 2003: 95-96). However, these channels are difficult to measure empirically. 
Through them, the associations have a significant bearing on the process. However, their 
power to influence is not as great as the relevant ministries’. For instance, the associations 
are not present in the departmental meetings where the government’s position is 
elaborated. Both employer associations and trade unions enjoy the same formal privileges 
regarding considerations in the governmental decision-making process. While the 
employer associations may have more financial means, the DGB is also financially solid 
and able to resort to considerable financial resources (Edinger, 1993: 187; Rudzio, 2003: 
101). However, it is unlikely that differences in resources between employer associations 
and trade unions had a significant bearing on their influence with regard to the Economic 
Migration Directive. Neither of the two kinds of organisations attributed particular attention 
to the Directive. The DGB, for instance, focussed its resources on lobbying with regard to 
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the national debate, including the independent expert commission on migration (Interview 
1 DGB). The employer associations were in favour of keeping economic migration under 
national control, and thus in line with the government on whether the EU level should be 
involved or not (Communication BDA, Interview DIHK). Even though the employer 
associations can carry more weight in terms of lobbying than the trade unions (Interview 
IG Metall), this did not matter with regard to the Economic Migration Directive, as neither 
the employers nor the trade unions engaged in extensive lobbying efforts. 
 
The BDA expressed the need to recruit further immigrants to Germany 
(Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände, Bundesverband der Deutschen 
Industrie, Deutscher Industrie- und Handelskammertag, & Zentralverband des Deutschen 
Handwerks, 2001). However, the competence to admit migrants and to set admission 
criteria should remain at the national level (Communication BDA). The BDA had some 
concerns with regard to specific provisions. For instance, tying the work permit to work in a 
specific sector or region was seen as inflexible, and as decreasing the value of third-
country workers to reduce labour shortages. Also, to limit the work permit to three years 
was seen as inappropriate, especially as highly qualified workers should be bound to the 
host country by the provision of attractive working conditions. The BDA further argued that 
provisions on the rights for social security did not belong in such a directive, and also 
rejected that employers should supply security benefits for seasonal workers (a point of 
collision with the trade unions). In line with the “where you stand depends on where you 
sit” proposition, the position of German employers can be summarised as “to be able to 
quickly and flexibly recruit desired migrants without much governmental involvement and 
without the obligations to provide social benefits to the migrants.” The most positive 
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contribution of the Economic Migration Directive proposal was seen as its giving further 
impetus to the liberalisation of national immigration policies (Interview DIHK). 
 
The position of the trade unions differed clearly from the employer associations’. The DGB 
preferred a supply-driven measure, such as a points system, rather than a demand-driven 
system as proposed by the Directive. It was very careful not to support a measure that 
would undermine migrants’ rights. Thus, the DGB espoused an equal treatment of 
migrants compared to German citizens in terms of social rights. In that respect, it clearly 
differed from the employers’ position (Interview DGB, Interview IG Metall). 
 
With regard to equal treatment of migrants in the subject area of social security, including 
healthcare (Article 11 (f) (iv)), the German delegation entered a reservation. This indicates 
that the final government position was reluctant to provide too many rights to migrants, and 
consequently corresponded to the points made by the employer associations (Council of 
the European Union, 2003: 27-28). This suggests that the BDA lobbied effectively on that 
point. 
 
The Gesetz über die Zusammenarbeit von Bund und Ländern in Angelegenheiten der 
Europäischen Union that regulates the affairs of the Bundesrat stipulates in Paragraph 5 
that the federal government needed to take the Bundesrat’s position into account in its 
preference formation regarding the Economic Migration Directive. However, the Bundesrat 
did not have a veto in the decision-making process and was thus less powerful than the 
intra-governmental actors. 
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On 1 March 2002, the Bundesrat adopted a position on the Economic Migration Directive 
in which it asked the federal government of Germany to oppose the Directive.55 The 
position was elaborated by the relevant advisory committees and rejected the Directive for 
a number of points.56 The four main ones were the following. First, the Länder did not see 
an overall Community competence in admitting economic migrants, and thus questioned 
the legal basis of the proposal. Second, the Länder wanted to keep the right to admit 
economic immigrants to the German labour market under national competence. The 
Länder saw no single European labour market, but significant difference between the 
labour market situations in Member States. They argued that an EU-wide harmonisation of 
admitting economic migrants was not justified. Third, it was expressed that immigration to 
the Union needed to be controlled and restricted, and integration problems of Member 
States with a high proportion of foreigners needed to be taken into account. Fourth, it was 
argued that it needed to be guaranteed that immigration did not undermine the national 
welfare state. The Bundesrat voiced concerns that the Directive was not seen to guarantee 
that (Bundesrat, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c). As the government did not have a majority in the 
Bundesrat, the position of the house was also influenced to a significant extent by the 
opposition parties, most notably the CDU/CSU. In particular, this is reflected by the points 
made by the Bundesrat with regard to the need to take into account integration problems 
and the potential undermining of the welfare state. These points depart from constituting 
an instrument to fill labour shortages, such as that proposed by the first version of the 
Zuwanderungsgesetz. Despite these minor differences, the conclusions of the Bundesrat 
concurred with the government’s, i.e. rejection of the proposal. Hence, the Ministry in 
charge, which was the Interior Ministry, did take into account the position of the Bundesrat, 
                                                
55 Beschluss des Bundesrates: Vorschlag für eine Richtlinie des Rates über die Bedingungen für die Einreise 
und den Aufenthalt von Drittstaatsangehörigen zu Ausübung einer unselbständigen oder selbständigen 
Erwerbstätigkeit KOM(2001) 386 endg.; Ratsdok. 11803/01. 
56 These were the committees for Employment and Social Policy, Interior Affairs, and Economic Affairs under 
the leadership of the committee for European Affairs. 
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as demanded by the regulations for interministerial affairs. The Bundestag’s point of view 
needed to be considered. Nothing suggests that it differed fundamentally from those of the 
government and the Bundesrat. 
 
The final position of the federal government includes input from all the above actors. The 
executive actors had an advantaged position, so the strongest influence was exerted by 
the Interior and Employment Ministries. However, the employer associations also 
managed to shift the focus away from bestowing rights to immigrants. The latter was 
closer to the position of the trade unions. Finding a common position was facilitated by the 
fact that all major actors preferred the national regulation of migration, and were not willing 
to accept the overruling of national regulations by the Economic Migration Directive. 
Consequently, the chance for the proposal to find the German government’s support was 
evanescently small from the very beginning. 
 
III. Conclusion 
The sceptical view of the German government with regard to the Economic Migration 
Directive is explained by the misfit between the proposal and national regulations and the 
high political salience of migration matters in Germany. The absence of a high foreign 
policy value of a relevant sending country, and of a sending country government’s lobbying 
efforts, meant that the additional push for Germany’s support of economic migration 
liberalisation at the EU level was missing. The inability to fill all vacancies that existed on 
the German labour market with domestic workers induced several political voices to 
propagate immigration as a means to reduce those shortages. After setting up an expert 
commission to come up with proposals on how immigration should be regulated in 
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Germany and the inauguration of a programme devised to attract qualified third-country 
ICT specialists, the German Interior Ministry proposed a new draft legislative act to 
regulate immigration to Germany. 
 
For a number of reasons, the misfit between the law and the EU proposal was significant; 
most notably, domestically a points system was proposed while the EU Directive pushed 
for a demand-side approach necessitating a job offer, and restricting the work permit to a 
clearly denoted geographic area. In addition, the domestic political salience of immigration 
was high, as there was a vivid and politicised domestic debate going on. It was fuelled, for 
instance, by the report of the expert commission on migration, issues of the link between 
immigration and the threat of terrorism, and the discussions about the reform of German 
national regulations on immigration. Foreign political factors did not play a role in the 
governmental preference formation. Hypothesis Two suggests that if the foreign policy 
value is high, political salience is low, and the sending country (or countries) exert 
pressure on the host government, there will be a relatively open immigration policy with 
regard to that country (or countries). Neither of these conditions was in place. As the 
Directive applied to all third country nationals, there was no particular country that could 
have had a high foreign policy value and that could have engaged in lobbying efforts. In 
addition, the political salience of immigration was very high, making foreign political 
influence on migration policies less likely. The constellation of these factors made it 
unlikely that the German government would adopt a position similar to the proposed 
Directive. Without a constellation advantageous for foreign policy influence in favour of 
liberalising immigration policies on the EU, the likelihood of a Member State government 
supporting such measures decreases to a great extent. The chapters on the Ankara 
Agreement and the Europe Agreement show that if the constellation of these factors is 
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more advantageous, cooperation on delegating competencies on liberalising immigration 
policy to the EU level can happen. 
 
This chapter demonstrates another dynamic foreign policy certain factors can bring 
underway: the pressure of a sending country (or a group of sending countries) can help to 
bring national preferences in line with EU-level measures. Open immigration policies per 
se are not enough to dispose a Member State to support EU-level liberalisation of 
immigration policies. 
 
The view of the German government was strongly determined by the Ministry of the 
Interior, which had a strong interest in pushing forward its view as it was the ministry that 
proposed the first draft of the Zuwanderungsgesetz. The Zuwanderungsgesetz constituted 
a first attempt to make German immigration legislation fit for the 21st century. Any measure 
that would mean a moving away from the tenets of the draft law would have been costly. In 
addition, the Ministry was in charge of the coordination of the German government’s 
position on the Directive. This gave the Interior Ministry a slight advantage that it could use 
to its ends when gathering the different points of other Ministries. This position in the 
organisation of the federal government gave the Ministry increased structural power to 
foster its objective compared with other Ministries involved in decision-making (cf.: Allison, 
1969; Allison & Halperin, 1972; Allison & Zelikow, 1999; Brummer, 2009). 
 
The three themes of the chapter and the respective hypotheses provide a sound 
framework to explain why the German government did not support the Economic Migration 
Directive. By considering the relevant actors, the chapter unpacks the processes that led 
to the specific position of the German federal government on the Economic Migration 
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Directive. Ironically, the points system that made a big difference in the German 
government’s reservation regarding the Directive was later a victim of the heated and 
controversial discussion to adapt the Zuwanderungsgesetz. Because of conservative 
pressures, the points-based system did not feature in the final version of the law. The 
points-based system that would have allowed a targeted migration to Germany was 
opposed to the CDU/CSU’s dictum of the necessity of a consequent enshrinement of 
restrictions for immigration with regard to the new immigration law (Notwendigkeit der 
konsequenten Festschreibung der Zuwanderungsbegrenzung) (CDU/CSU-FRAKTION, 
2003: 1). 
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Chapter Seven – Germany’s support for the EU Blue Card 
Directive: Policy Fit and Technocratic Politics 
 
Introduction 
This chapter explains why the German government agreed to delegate competencies on 
regulating economic migration to the European Union. This happened because of support 
for a Directive regarding the conditions of entry and residence of third country nationals for 
the purposes of highly qualified employment. The Directive was proposed by the European 
Commission in October 2007 and adopted by the Council of the European Union in May 
2009. This is important for a particular reason. In 2001, the Commission had already made 
an attempt to liberalise economic migration policies at the EU level by creating a European 
framework to manage migration. However, at that time, there was no political will to agree 
on even a watered-down version of the Directive, as happened with the Directive on family 
reunification, for instance, (Council Directive 2003/86/EC) and to a lesser extent, with the 
Directive on the status of long-term residents (Council Directive 2003/109/EC). The 
question then becomes: what was different regarding the developments of the Blue Card 
Directive that made Member States support this Directive? Establishing the differences in 
the configuration of causal factors allows fleshing out a number of hypotheses that explain 
when a Member State agrees to delegate competencies regulating migration to the EU. 
These hypotheses will help to elucidate where the preferences on EU immigration policies 
come from and how they are aggregated. 
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The most relevant hypothesis for this chapter is the hypothesis which relates to the misfit 
between the national regulations and the measure proposed at the EU level. The German 
government was happy to support the Blue Card Directive because it acknowledged the 
continuing validity of the relevant national legislation. The Blue Card Directive made the 
German government adopt national legislation for the regulation of highly skilled migration. 
The existence of this national legislation, and the fact that the Blue Card allowed for the 
co-existence of national and EU-level legislation, nullified the misfit. Foreign Policy 
considerations did not play a causal role in this case study. The chapter is structured as 
follows. Initially, the developments that led to the Blue Card proposal, its content, and the 
course of the negotiations are imparted. This is followed by the empirical analysis and a 
concluding section. 
 
I. Genesis and Purpose of the Blue Card Directive 
The Commission failed in its attempt to create a binding common EU policy on legal 
economic migration, which it hoped to do with the 2001 proposed Directive regarding the 
conditions of entry and residence of third country nationals for the purpose of paid 
employment and self-employed economic activities.57 Afterwards, the Commission started 
a period of intense public consultation to gauge what kind of policy measures were likely to 
be adopted. As legal migration legislation still had to be adopted under unanimity voting in 
the Council of the EU, each Member State retained the right to veto proposed legislation. 
 
                                                
57 COM(2001) 386 final. 
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In January 2005, the Commission released the Green Paper,58 which marked the start of 
public consultations. The paper contained questions regarding the possible nature of an 
EU economic migration policy, and invited responses by Member States, EU bodies, social 
partners, NGOs, academia, and anyone who wanted to contribute to the discussion. The 
results were more than 130 contributions59 that were incorporated into both the Policy Plan 
on Legal Migration, which was launched in December 2005,60 and the Commission’s 
impact assessment of the Blue Card Directive.61 The German contribution stressed the 
need for migration provisions at the EU level to be flexible. Also, with regard to the 
movement of third-country workers to other Member States, the German government 
expressed some reluctance, arguing that the second Member State needed to carry out 
effective checks before admission could be granted. 
 
The Policy Plan on Legal Migration laid down a road map for the Hague Programme, 
which included policy measures to be adopted until 2009. From the public consultation, it 
was clear that there was not enough support amongst Member States for the horizontal 
approach that the Commission had hitherto pursued; and that Member States requested 
sufficient flexibility to accommodate labour market differences across the EU. 
Consequently, the Commission opted for a sectoral approach and split up the policy area 
of legal migration into different legislative pieces, as the consultation process revealed that 
Member State support for highly-skilled migration was higher than for low-skilled migrants 
(Guild, 2007: 1). Following the Policy Plan on Legal Migration, on 23 October 2007 the 
Commission proposed the Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third 
                                                
58 COM(2004) 811 final. 
59The contributions can be found here: 
http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/consulting_public/consulting_0016_en.htm 
60 COM(2005) 669 final. 
61 SEC(2007) 1403. 
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country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment (Blue Card Directive),62 
and the Directive for a single application procedure for a residence and work permit and a 
common set of rights for Non-EU Member Country workers.63 The policy plan also 
stipulates legislative proposals on the conditions of entry and residence of seasonal 
workers and of remunerated trainees, and the procedures regulating entry and residence 
of Intra-Corporate Transferees. However, neither has been proposed by the European 
Commission at the time of writing. 
 
Negotiations 
After negotiations lasting around one and a half years, the Directive was adopted on 25 
May 2009 by the European Council without any further discussion. However, the political 
decision to adopt the Directive was taken by the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 25 
September 2008 (Kuczynski & Solka, 2009: 220). This was preceded by intensive 
negotiations that were pushed forward ambitiously by the French Presidency. Each of the 
presidencies overseeing the negotiations of the Directive (Portugal, Slovenia, France, and 
the Czech Republic) attributed high significance to the legislative proposal. Nonetheless, 
the negotiations started rather sluggishly and only picked up drastically under the French 
Presidency, which made the adoption of the Directive a priority (Agence Europe, 2008a) 
(Interview 1 Permanent Representation EU, Interview Council, Interview EP). This was 
aided by the fact that Member States assumed in the first half of 2008 – before the Irish 
referendum – that the Lisbon Treaty would enter into force. As the Treaty would have put 
legal migration under qualified majority voting in the Council, it would have been easier for 
the Commission to push through a Directive that was more far-reaching. Hence, Member 
                                                
62 COM(2007) 637 final. 
63 COM (2007) 638 final. 
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States were eager to assert their influence under unanimity voting to modify the proposal 
according to their national preferences. By the time the Irish rejected the Treaty of Lisbon 
by referendum, the negotiations had already reached great momentum, which was further 
increased by the French Presidency. Hence, the realisation that the Treaty of Lisbon would 
enter into force with delay did not negatively affect the process of reaching agreement on 
the Blue Card proposal (Kuczynski & Solka, 2009: 221). 
 
France took the Directive to the political level, by discussing it in the Justice and Home 
Affairs Council on 24 July 2008. Member States, by and large, agreed with the Directive 
and its chief objective to increase the competitiveness of the Union to attract the best and 
brightest. However, a few details in the content of the Directive went too far in the view of 
several Member States, causing opposition (Kuczynski & Solka, 2009: 220-221). France 
and Spain saw the Directive in the most positive light (Agence France Presse - German, 
2007b). The proposal sought to harmonise admission procedures and requirements for 
highly-skilled third-country workers and to enable them to work in other EU Member States 
after two years. 
 
Content of the Directive 
The Directive consists of six chapters (I. General provisions, II. Criteria for Admission, III. 
Blue Card Procedure and Transparency, IV. Rights, V. Residence in other Member States, 
and VI. Final Provisions). The first chapter lays out the applicability of the Directive for 
entry and residence of highly qualified third country nationals and their family members. 
Highly qualified worker is defined vaguely as being a paid employee and possessing 
adequate competencies, supported by relevant qualifications. The definition is further 
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specified in Chapter II. The scope includes the applicability of the Directive to third country 
nationals but lists a number of exceptions, such as subjects of international protections or 
family members of Union citizens. The Directive does not prejudice Member States to 
issue residence permits for employment other than the Blue Card. The Directive allows 
Member States to adopt more favourable provisions than the provisions it stipulates, 
including bilateral or multilateral agreements. 
 
The second chapter specifies the criteria for admission. A third country national has to be 
in possession of a binding job offer for highly qualified employment for at least one year. In 
addition to the definition provided by Chapter I, the salary of the job to be taken on by the 
candidate shall not be inferior to a relevant threshold of at least 1.5 times the average 
gross annual salary in the Member State concerned. For professions with particular need 
for third-country workers, the salary threshold may be at least 1.2 times the average gross 
annual salary in the Member States affected. The Directive would not infringe upon a 
Member State’s right to establish the volume of admission of third country nationals that 
are admitted to its territory for the purpose of highly skilled work. 
 
The third chapter covers the Blue Card, procedure and transparency. The Blue Card is 
issued for a period of one to four years, unless the work contract covers a period less than 
that. In that case, the Blue Card shall be valid for the duration of the work contract plus 
three months. The Blue Card holder is entitled to enter, re-enter and stay in the territory of 
the Member State issuing the Blue Card. A Member State can apply its national 
procedures for filling a vacancy when issuing or renewing (during the first two years of 
legal employment) the Blue Card based on an examination of its labour market. The 
application for a Blue Card can be filed from abroad or inside the territory of the respective 
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Member State if the applicant holds a valid residence permit or long-stay visa. The 
application for a Blue Card shall be turned around within 90 days. 
 
The fourth chapter confers certain rights to the Blue Card holder. For the first two years, 
the Blue Card holder is restricted to employment activities that meet the conditions for 
granting a Blue Card. Thereafter, the Member State may grant the Blue Card holder equal 
treatment with nationals with regard to access to highly qualified employment. 
Unemployment is not a reason for withdrawal of the Blue Card, unless it exceeds three 
successive months, or it occurs more than once during the validity period of the Blue Card. 
The Blue Card grants equal treatment with nationals of the Member State. However, a few 
exceptions apply, for instance, concerning the eligibility for grants and loans to finance 
education and access to university or post-secondary education. The Directive grants the 
right of family reunion and refers to the Family Reunification Directive (Council Directive 
2003/86/EC). Regarding the attainment of long-term residence status, the Blue Card 
holder is allowed to accumulate periods of residence in different Member States. A Blue 
Card holder is eligible for long-term residence status if two conditions are met. The first is 
five years of legal residence within the Community as a Blue Card holder. The second is 
legal and continuous residence for a period of two years in the respective Member State 
prior to filing the application for long-term residence status. 
 
The fifth chapter lays down the provisions for residence in other Member States. After 18 
months of legal residence as a Blue Card holder in the first Member State, the person and 
his or her family members may move to another Member State to pursue highly qualified 
employment. However, the person needs to apply for another Blue Card in that Member 
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State. If the application is unsuccessful, the first Member State has to readmit the worker 
and his/her family members. 
 
The sixth chapter lists a few final provisions. For example, the Member States shall 
provide the Commission with statistics of Blue Card issuances and renewals. Member 
States shall implement the Directive by 19 June 2011. 
 
As Member States are free to refuse to issue a Blue Card, it is ultimately up to Member 
States to determine which workers enter their country. The Blue Card is far from achieving 
its initial objective – creating a permit offering highly skilled migrants a route of immigration 
to the EU significantly superior to the opportunities offered by individual Member States. 
Rather, the Blue Card constitutes an extra system of admission, in addition to the national 
systems of Member States. The Blue Card differs considerably from the initial Commission 
proposal and is largely of symbolic value, unless the Member State does not yet have 
regulations for admitting highly skilled third country nationals (mostly the new Member 
States). The Commission was hoping that a more substantial text would be passed by the 
Council, but soon realised that Member States were not willing to compromise on a few 
important points. Nonetheless, it was seen as a first step to create a body of EU legislation 
on the admission of economic migrants (Interview 1 Commission). Given that the 2001 
Economic Migration Directive was not adopted, expectations were low. In addition, in 
some Member States the Directive improves the rights of highly skilled third country 
nationals, which is a significant achievement. For example, in certain Member States, a 
third-country worker loses the residence permit once he or she gets laid off. The Blue Card 
Directive grants the Blue Card holder three months to find new employment. 
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Main Issues 
Member States did not want to give up their existing national schemes for admitting highly 
qualified workers and were only prepared to accept a Blue Card that would co-exist with 
national schemes and leave the number of admitted migrants in the hands of Member 
States. This point, in particular, was raised by Germany (Interview 1 European 
Commission, Interview European Council, Interview 1 Bundestag) (Associated Press 
Worldstream - German, 2008), but also by other Member States, such as Austria (Agence 
Europe, 2007a) and the Netherlands (Deutsche Welle, 2007; Finanzen.net, 2007) 
(Interview Council). 
 
Member States took issue with the definition of highly skilled workers, in particular, the 
minimum pay requirement, which was initially set at three times the minimum wage, or the 
salary that enables the Blue Card holder to receive social benefits. In the final version, this 
was increased to one and a half times the average salary of the respective Member State. 
Germany had a particularly strong opinion about the salary threshold and considered the 
threshold in the initial proposal as much too low (Agence Europe, 2007b; Hamburger 
Abendblatt, 2008). 
 
In addition, the ability of Blue Card holders to work in other Member States after a period 
of two years, as proposed by the initial proposal, was curtailed. This requirement 
necessitated the worker to apply for another Blue Card in the second Member State where 
he or she would like to work. Moreover, the second Member State has the right to refuse 
to issue the Blue Card. Germany voiced strong criticism about Blue Card holders being 
able to work in another Member State after two years without giving the second Member 
State the right to refuse entry. A concern was – which also relates to the salary threshold – 
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that a Member State with a lower standard of living would accept a migrant who would 
qualify as highly skilled in the first Member State but might not qualify as a highly skilled 
worker in Germany (Interview Think Thank) (Hamburger Abendblatt, 2008). 
 
Another issue, mostly articulated by the Czech Republic, but with the backing of the other 
new Member States, was that there should be no facilitated access for third country 
nationals through the Blue Card Directive while most Member States still had transitional 
restrictions in place for workers from the new Member States. Consequently, the Czech 
Presidency postponed the adoption of the Directive until the majority of Member States 
lifted the restriction in May 2009 (Agence Europe, 2008b, 2009) (Interview 1 European 
Commission). 
 
II. Germany’s Preferences 
The rules of the game were stipulated by the rules regulating the interministerial affairs of 
the federal government of Germany (Gemeinsame Geschäftsordnung der 
Bundesministerien). The Federal Ministry of the Interior was in charge of coordinating the 
different ministries whose areas of responsibilities were affected by the proposal 
(Bundestag, 2007). In total, nine ministries were involved, with the responsibilities of the 
Federal Ministry of the Interior and the Federal Ministry of Employment being the most 
affected and consequently becoming the most important. Additionally, the Federal Ministry 
of Economics and the Foreign Office played a significant role. Further ministries involved 
on specific issues were the Federal Ministry of Justice; the Federal Ministry of Family 
Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth; the Federal Ministry of Education and 
Research; and the Federal Ministry of Defence. The office of the Federal Representative 
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for Migration, Refugees and Integration also participated in the process, but mostly as an 
observer (Interview Ministry of Economics, Interview German Permanent Representation 
to the EU, Interview Ministry of the Interior, Communication MinJustice). In addition, the 
Bundestag and the Länder were involved by means of the Bundesrat, as they were 
consulted by the government about the current state of play. As there were no significant 
differences between the position of the government and the positions of the Bundestag 
and the Bundesrat, there was no necessity for the Bundestag or the Bundesrat to take any 
further action (Interview CDU/CSU Fraction, Interview Ministry of the Interior, Interview 2 
Bundestag) (Bundesrat, 2007; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2007b). On the interest 
group side, employer associations and trade unions were the relevant actors. 
 
Domestic Politics 
Misfit 
In the debate about the Blue Card Directive, there were frequent references to the 
predominance of national immigration policies (Interview 2 Bundestag, Interview 1 
Commission, Interview Council) (Associated Press Worldstream - German, 2008). It was 
clear from the beginning of the Blue Card debate that Germany was not prepared to agree 
to any EU measure that would overrule or significantly change its national regulations. 
Immigration to Germany is regulated by the Immigration Act (Zuwanderungsgesetz),64 
which also contains provisions on highly skilled migrants and came into force on 01 
January 2005. Paragraph 19 of the Aufenthaltsgesetz (which makes up Article 1 of the 
Zuwanderungsgesetz) states that highly skilled migrants in science and the private sector 
                                                
64 The Immigration Act (Zuwanderungsgesetz) can be found here: 
http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Gesetzestexte/DE/Zuwanderungsgesetz.pdf?__blob=publicationFile 
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can enter the German labour market provided they have a job offer, and, regarding 
workers in the private sector, if they earn a minimum salary that equals double the amount 
of the social security contribution ceiling of the compulsory health insurance 
(Beitragsbemessungsgrenze der gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung). In 2007, this 
equalled around €85,500 gross annual salary (Berliner Morgenpost, 2007; Die Welt, 
2007b). The workers that qualify are issued with a residence permit 
(Niederlassungserlaubnis) that entitles the holder to stay in Germany for an indefinite 
amount of time (regulated by Paragraph 9 of the Aufenthaltsgesetz) and is thus more 
generous than even the first Blue Card proposal. 
 
In light of the concepts of adaptation pressure (Héritier, 1996) and the costs of a misfit 
between national and EU regulations (Börzel, 2002; Börzel & Risse, 2003), a number of 
costs would have been involved if the first version of the Blue Card had been adopted. The 
perception that Germany was successful in attracting the best and brightest migrants was 
still prevalent amongst decision-makers. As a result, hardly any actor of significance in the 
German decision-making process officially acknowledged the need to increase the 
competitiveness of the EU as a whole in attracting such migrants by means of a concerted 
effort (Interview Ministry of Economics). Likely costs included the modification of the 
Immigration Act, which at that time had only been adopted recently; it had been 
implemented after fierce and difficult negotiations and constituted a precarious 
compromise. In addition, the German government issued a resolution at a convention of 
the German Cabinet (Bundeskabinett) in Meseberg close to Berlin, on 23/24 August 2007, 
which initiated the development of a concept to attract highly skilled foreign workers and to 
manage their migration to Germany. The resolution resulted in a programme of action that 
the federal government released on 16 July 2008 (Bundesregierung, 2008). Inter alia, the 
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programme of action lowered the minimum salary to around €65,500, as it was changed to 
equal the social security contribution ceiling of the general pension insurance 
(Beitragsbemessungsgrenze der allgemeinen Rentenversicherung). This provision entered 
into force on 01 January 2009. As these national measures began shortly before the Blue 
Card was proposed, changing or abandoning them would have been highly costly in terms 
of wasted Government resources. In addition, regarding public perception, it was important 
for the German government not to give up or significantly change these initiatives because 
of the Blue Card (Communication Foreign Office, Interview Ministry of Economics) 
(Hamburger Abendblatt, 2007). This would have also run the danger of providing a 
platform for anti-European and anti-immigrant groups to mobilise voters in the upcoming 
Länder elections, thus potentially weakening the federal government. 
 
In addition to these general adaptation costs, there was a significant misfit between the 
proposed Directive and the national regulations that also seemed to generate costs. Most 
notably, the entry-level gross annual salary requirement of the Blue Card would have been 
an estimated €40,000 to €50,000 (Die Welt, 2007b) which was much lower than the gross 
annual salary required by German legislation at that time (around €85,500) (see, also, 
Bundesrat, 2007). This, in combination with the right to move to another Member State 
after two years, scared German decision-makers, as they thought that a worker accepted 
by a much poorer state might not fall under the German definition of highly skilled, and 
these requirements would bring unneeded workers to the German labour market (Interview 
Think Tank) (cf. Hamburger Abendblatt, 2008). This concern was voiced, amongst others, 
by the German Federal Minister of the Interior at a meeting of the EU Interior and Justice 
Ministers in Brussels (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2007b). Thus, the red line (beyond 
which the government was not willing to compromise) for Germany was that the national 
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regulations would not be thwarted by the Blue Card Directive, or that the Directive would 
resemble the German immigration regulations, i.e., Germany would be able to upload its 
preferences to the EU level (cf. Börzel, 2002). There was no actor of significance in 
Germany that disputed this rationale. The final version of the Blue Card gave the German 
government the option to keep its national regulations, as Germany and the other Member 
States were successful in manipulating the Directive to accommodate, or at least tolerate, 
their national regulations. Therefore, the misfit is zero and the costs of supporting the 
Directive became insignificant. 
 
The nature of political contestation 
As indicated by Figure 4 and Figure 5 (to be found in Chapter Three), the political salience 
of immigration was fairly high when the German government formed its position on the 
Blue Card Directive. The development of the German position on the Blue Card shows a 
particularity: While the actual preference formation happened at the bureaucratic level, a 
number of high-level politicians were tempted by the sensitivity of the topic to voice 
concerns about the Directive publicly, without subjecting the proposal to thorough scrutiny 
by all relevant actors. More than a month before the Directive was proposed by the 
Commission in October 2007, Commissioner Frattini heralded the Directive in a speech65 
at a conference on legal migration in Lisbon, in which he also discussed the benefits of 
targeted migration to offset some of the problems facing Europe, such as demographic 
aging and the lack of certain kinds of workers. 
 
                                                
65 The speech of Commissioner Frattini given on 13 September 2007 in Lisbon, Portugal can be found here: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/07/526 
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This speech garnered a rather negative reaction by the German government, which at that 
time consisted of a Grand Coalition between the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the 
Social Democrats (SPD) (Kuczynski & Solka, 2009: 220). This negative reaction was an 
immediate backlash to the speech and was not the result of a rigorous analysis of the 
Directive, which had not been proposed at the time (Interview Ministry of Employment, 
Interview Ministry of the Interior). The reaction was negative and political, and it did not 
make any difference which party the commentators belonged to. Hence, the Social 
Democratic Minister of Employment, Franz Müntefering, and the Minister of the Economy, 
Michael Glos, from the Christian Social Union of Bavaria (CSU), both made very strong 
statements against the Directive. Müntefering was quoted two days after Frattini’s speech 
as saying that it was not possible to regulate this kind of thing at the EU level, and that it 
had to be under the responsibility of national political structures (Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Sonntagszeitung, 2007). Glos argued shortly after the speech that it was not possible to let 
a mass of immigrants into the country without employing the huge reservoir of unused 
domestic labour. Therewith, he called into question any need at all to accept immigrants 
into the country to fill labour shortages (Spiegel Online, 2007). 
 
When the Directive was eventually proposed, that reaction was echoed by Annette 
Schavan (CDU), the Minister for Education and Research, who argued that labour 
shortages had to be reduced predominantly by further education of German workers 
(Associated Press Worldstream - German, 2007b). Also, the federal government’s 
Representative for Immigration, Refugees, and Integration, Maria Böhmer, rejected the 
Directive immediately after it was officially proposed. She justified this with a categorical 
rejection of EU involvement in regulating economic migration. In her view, labour market 
needs of Member States were too different as to require harmonised measures (Presse-
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und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 2007). The Minister of the Interior, Christian 
Democrat Wolfgang Schäuble, also received the proposal unenthusiastically. However, he 
was more cautious and factual than Müntefering and Glos, and the concerns he voiced 
referred to certain aspects of the content of the Directive, rather than fundamental attacks 
on attempts to harmonise EU immigration policies or to instigate more open policies for 
accepting highly skilled workers. Schäuble was quoted by the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung as calling the proposal “not demanding enough” and “unclear” regarding its 
definition of “highly skilled” workers (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2007a). In a speech 
given in October 2007 in Berlin, a week before the Commission officially proposed the 
Directive, he said he was awaiting the Directive “with excitement – but also a degree of 
scepticism”.66 He also noted that it still had to be examined whether there was a need for 
this Directive (Schäuble, 2007). 
 
This initial rejection in light of the final outcome suggests that these commentators had in 
mind the coalition contract of the government, which stated that a European immigration 
policy must not curtail national employment policy (CDU, CSU, & SPD, 2005). Without 
knowing the exact details of the Blue Card, the immediate reaction shows a deep 
scepticism amongst German decision-makers with regard to EU-level regulation of 
immigration, and demonstrates the politically charged nature of the subject. 
 
When the Blue Card Directive was proposed and debated within the German government, 
domestic debate about immigration and integration was still taking place vividly in 
Germany and had not stopped since the year 2001 when the Economic Migration Directive 
was discussed. A number of developments kept the debate running, such as imposing a 
                                                
66 Translation by the author. 
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set of requirements by the state of Baden-Württemberg to make sure that Muslim 
immigrants wanting to immigrate to that state would agree to the principles of the German 
Basic Law (Grundgesetz). The questions immigrants had to answer spanned issues such 
as homosexuality and the September 11 attacks. The media continued to cover events 
inside and outside Germany that reflected concerns of the consequences immigration had 
on German society (Klusmeyer & Papademetriou, 2009: 270-271). The debate was also 
kept going by the elaboration of the national integration plan, publicly introduced by 
Chancellor Merkel on 12 July 2007. The plan was attacked by the four main Turkish 
organisations, which accused the reforms of being discriminatory against Muslim Turks 
and thus boycotted the event (Klusmeyer & Papademetriou, 2009: 280). Another attempt 
by the federal government to improve integration of Muslim migrants was the German 
Islam Conference (Deutsche Islamkonferenz) that aimed to engage directly with 
immigrants and in particular religious minorities. The Federal Minister of the Interior, 
Wolfgang Schäuble, was in charge of the conference. It first convened in September 2006 
and attracted a good deal of public attention. In addition, the convening of the second 
German Islam Conference was accompanied by a fervent debate on whether a veiled 
woman should be part of the panel of participants (Klusmeyer & Papademetriou, 2009: 
281). In addition, the German government incorporated some changes to the 2005 
Immigration Act. Inter alia, this included the transposition of the EU Directive on family 
reunification. Another driver of the debate was the newly introduced naturalisation test 
(Einbürgerungstest) (Stuttgarter Zeitung, 2008b). Highly skilled migration was covered in 
the press in a differentiated way from the general migration debate, and there were many 
articles referring to the need to facilitate the migration of highly skilled workers to Germany 
(see, for instance, ddp Basisdienst, 2008; Spiegel Online, 2008; Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 
2008). Hence, highly skilled migration had begun to be framed as being beneficial to fill 
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reported labour shortages. However, as the harsh reactions of Ministers Glos, 
Müntefering, and Schavan as well as the Migration Representative Böhmer show, there 
was a fine line between a policy measure being framed as only relating to highly skilled 
migration and discussions regarding more general issues of immigration, problems of 
integration, and the high number of domestic unemployed (see, for instance, Die Welt, 
2007a). Contrary to, for instance, the Europe Agreement with Poland, the Blue Card 
Directive could not be framed as being separate from the debate – at least not in public 
debate. The domestic debate continued the entire time the Blue Card Directive was 
discussed. Hence, the domestic political salience of immigration was fairly high. 
 
However, the decision-making process occurred on the technical level. There, discussion 
about the Blue Card Directive could be differentiated from the general migration debate. 
The rules of the game trumped the politicised contestation by redirecting the preference 
formation on the Directive to the technical level. In Germany, the preference formation 
process is given by the joint rules of internal procedure of the German federal ministries 
(Gemeinsame Geschäftsordnung der Bundesministerien) or GGO. Thus, these regulations 
represent the rules of the game for the preference formation of the German government. 
Paragraph 74(5) stipulates that the ministry in charge of the file needs to include all other 
ministries whose content is touched by the proposed EU measure, as well as the social 
partners. This needs to happen as soon as possible to allow sufficient time to scrutinise 
the proposal. In addition, paragraph 74(2) and (4) instruct that the Bundestag and the 
Bundesrat need to be consulted and included. As agreement on the position of the 
German government could be reached between the different actors involved, there was no 
need for the preference formation to involve levels beyond the technical level. In German 
bureaucratic jargon the process of calling upon the political level (secretary of state or 
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minister) to resolve a dispute between two ministries that could not be settled on the 
technical level is referred to as an escalation (Eskalieren). But this did not happen with 
regard to the Blue Card. Already determining the position of the German government 
without following the procedure outlined by the GGO would have meant an infringement of 
the relevant rules and procedures and would have been unlawful. Hence, the statements 
of Ministers Glos, Müntefering, and Schavan as well as of Migration Representative 
Böhmer were indeed political messages targeted at the general public to indicate a certain 
position in respect to immigration. The actual preference formation was based on an in-
depth scrutiny of the proposed Directive by the relevant actors.67 
 
In light of Hypothesis Three, the findings confirm that bureaucratic decision-making 
increases the likelihood of a government agreeing to support liberalisation of economic 
migration policies at the EU level. At the same time, they show that high political salience 
can induce high-level decision makers at the ministerial level to voice public claims about 
certain EU proposals. The initial response should be seen as an immediate reaction by 
politicians who felt the need to send a political message of being tough on immigration. In 
light of the high domestic salience of immigration this makes sense. The reactions should 
not be regarded as part of the actual governmental preference formation. At the time these 
statements were made, the Directive had not been scrutinised and thus neither of the 
speakers were aware of the exact content of the Directive; the speech was taken as a 
point of reference. The cautious rhetoric of Interior Minister Schäuble, whose ministry was 
in charge of the file, underpins this. 
 
                                                
67 This information was given by three different interviewees independently from each other. The interviewees 
would like to remain anonymous. 
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Of conceptual importance here is that Freeman’s mode of politics framework can also be 
used to explain the shift of the pattern of decision-making from a highly politicised 
contestation at the highest political level to a bureaucratic debate at the technical level. 
However, the explanation differs from the one given above, which differentiates between 
political rhetoric and the process of preference formation that follows the rules of the 
game. Accordingly, following the line of argument proposed by Freeman’s mode of politics 
framework, the change of pattern could be explained by a change in the mode of politics 
due to differences in the cost and benefits distribution, namely from entrepreneurial politics 
to majoritarian politics, once certain aspects of the policy proposal had been changed. In 
order to accommodate this, Freeman’s typology would need to be modified: in case actors 
face concentrated costs, it is not necessarily a case of an emerging policy entrepreneur, 
but an actual change of the policy proposal that in turn transforms the distribution of costs 
and benefits. 
 
If the mode of politics changed during the process of adopting a single policy proposal, the 
link between the categories of concentrated distributive, diffuse distributive, redistributive, 
and regulatory policies would be obsolete. While Freeman acknowledges that an 
immigration policy area can have characteristics of different kinds of categories or change 
from one kind to another (Freeman, 2006: 236-237), if a single policy proposal, such as 
the Blue Card, cannot be attributed to one specific category, the overall usefulness of the 
categorisation is dubious. It would be more useful to link solely the distribution and 
magnitude of costs and benefits to a certain mode of politics. However, to make sense it 
would be necessary to include not only non-governmental interest groups in the analysis, 
but also different governmental actors that together form the position of the federal 
government (see, for instance, criticism of Statham & Geddes, 2006).  
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However, this explanation has one important flaw: as argued above, the initial reactions do 
not constitute the actual preference formation on the Blue Card Directive. Rather, they 
were political messages aimed at a domestic electoral audience that lacked substantiation 
according to a rigorous analysis of the costs and benefits of the proposal. Hence, there 
was no change in the modes of politics as the preference formation did not include these 
public statements. This casts doubts upon the added value of applying Freeman’s 
framework to the liberalisation of economic migration at the EU level. In the case of 
liberalising economic migration at the EU level, the mode of politics is subject to less 
variation than Freeman’s framework suggests, but is largely determined by the relevant 
rules and regulations. With regard to the Blue Card Directive, after the politicised rhetoric, 
high-level decision-makers adhered to the rules of the game, which foresaw finding a 
governmental position by scrutinising the proposal by all ministries affected according to 
the content of the proposal. This is coherent with the explanations delivered in the 
preceding chapters, as the respective rules of the game remain a constant factor in all 
cases under investigation. In case the process of decision-making is moved from the 
technical to the political level (escalation), the mode of politics would change. However, 
this would be still in line with the rules of the game. 
 
International Politics 
Very similarly to the Economic Migration Directive, the Blue Card Directive does not relate 
to a particular sending country that has a particular foreign policy value or could undertake 
lobbying efforts for the Directive. In addition, political salience of immigration was high and 
there was a prolonged and heated debate about a large number of immigration-related 
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issues. Hence, the conditions for foreign policy factors to play a role in the process of 
preference formation were unfavourable; foreign policy considerations did not play a role in 
this case study. 
 
Labour Market Concerns 
If we look at Figure 16 and Figure 17, they clearly indicate that while the Directive was 
being proposed and negotiated (September 2007 until May 2009), Germany’s economic 
situation was declining. When the financial crisis began in mid-2008 and turned into an 
economic crisis, German exports were in freefall, taking economic production with them. 
This real annual GDP growth decreased from 2.5 percent in 2007 to a predicted -5 percent 
in 2009. Unemployment was slightly on the decrease, from 2005 until 2008, but remained 
at a high level and has been rising again since 2008. The unemployment rate amongst 
highly skilled workers was also quite high in Germany, for instance, exceeding 5 percent in 
2004 (European Commission, 2007a). Despite this, labour shortages for specialised 
workers were reported in certain areas of the labour market. According to a study by the 
employer-friendly Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Köln, German companies were unable 
to fill around 48,000 engineer vacancies (Koppel, 2007). Another publication of the Institut 
der deutschen Wirtschaft Köln calculated that in 2006, around 165,000 vacancies for 
highly skilled workers could not be filled because of a lack of applications. More than three 
quarters of these vacancies were technical positions. 
 
As a result of the economic crisis described above, the economic loss for the German 
economy is indicated as €18.5 billion, or 0.8 percent of the Gross Domestic Product 
(Koppel, 2008). A survey conducted in 2005 by the Association of German Chambers of 
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Industry and Commerce (Deutsche Industrie- und Handelskammertag or DIHK) found that 
16 percent of German companies indicated that they were, at least partially, unable to fill 
vacancies – despite high unemployment and relatively low recruitment (Deutscher 
Industrie- und Handelskammertag, 2005: 2). Furthermore, the European Commission, in 
its impact assessment accompanying the Blue Card Proposal, found that Germany was 
experiencing highly skilled shortages in the pharmaceutical industry, companies 
specialising in mechanical engineering, and vehicle construction (European Commission, 
2007a: 103). 
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Figure 16: Real GDP Growth in Germany, 2000-2009 
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Source: Eurostat 
 
Figure 17: Unemployment Rate in Germany, 2000-2009 
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The need to fill labour shortages in order to remain economically competitive was one of 
the major goals of the Blue Card Directive. This is clearly stated in the proposal for the 
Directive, issued by the Commission in October 2007 (European Commission, 2007b). 
The other two main arguments for the Directive were the need to compete for the best and 
brightest with countries such as the US, Canada, and Australia, which were depicted as 
doing a far better job than the EU countries in attracting foreign talent, and the ageing of 
the EU working population. Both the then EU Commissioner for Justice, Liberty and 
Security, Franco Frattini, and the Commission President, José Manuel Barroso, repeatedly 
stressed the aspirations of the Directive to provide a solution to the imminent problems 
associated with a lack of skilled labour in the EU (see, for instance, Berliner Zeitung, 2007; 
General-Anzeiger (Bonn), 2007; Tages-Anzeiger, 2007). 
 
The Federal Ministry of the Interior initially responded positively with regard to the Directive 
– as opposed to completely blocking it as happened with the 2001 Economic Migration 
Directive – and acknowledged that in the area of highly skilled immigrant workers there 
could be a need of or benefit from a concerted European effort. In particular, the Federal 
Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs was more concerned about the high number of 
domestic unemployed, and paid careful attention not to agree to anything that might be an 
overly generous measure of accepting foreign workers (Interview Federal Ministry of the 
Interior, Interview Office of Federal Representative of Migration). Economic interests and 
labour shortages were brought forward by the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs. 
However, there was general agreement that although there were labour shortages, and 
there was scope for further immigration of highly skilled workers, this should happen in a 
more targeted way at the national level (Interview Office of Federal Representative of 
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Migration, Interview Ministry of Economics). This is also mentioned in the coalition 
agreement between the CDU/CSU and the SPD (CDU, et al., 2005). The German 
government did not see any benefits that the Directive could offer over the national 
regulation of economic migration, and consequently associated EU-level involvement 
chiefly with increased costs, such as being unable to accept the workers most needed by 
the domestic labour market or disadvantaging the unemployed domestic work force. 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the interest groups that have the closest relationship with 
labour shortages are the business and employer associations. The most enthusiastic of 
these associations was the German Engineering Federation (Verband Deutscher 
Maschinen- und Anlagenbau or VDMA). The president of the Federation, Manfred 
Wittenstein, mentioned that according to a survey of the Federation, the German 
engineering and plant construction industry were lacking 9,000 engineers and several 
thousands of technicians. He stated that the Blue Card initiative was overdue, and 
stressed the importance of foreign workers for the industry of the Federation with 
reference to labour shortages on the German labour market (Associated Press 
Worldstream - German, 2007a; Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2008; Verband Deutscher 
Maschinen- und Anlagebau e.V., 2007). At the time of the VDMA’s first press release, the 
mood in Germany was rather hostile with regard to the Directive, as the negative 
statements from the highest political level were still resonating. The VDMA attempted to 
establish a targeted counterbalance with its comment (Interview VDMA EU Office). 
 
The President of the Federal Association for Information Technology, Telecommunications 
and New Media (Bundesverband Informationswirtschaft, Telekommunikation und neue 
Medien or BITKOM), August-Wilhelm Scheer, welcomed the Commission’s endeavour in 
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principal to open the EU’s labour market to highly qualified third country national workers; 
however, he also voiced some reservations. For instance, he warned that the final decision 
about such a sensitive topic needed to be made at the national level (Euro am Sonntag, 
2007). The Association of the Chambers of Industry and Commerce (Deutsche Industrie- 
und Handelskammertag – DIHK) made statements in a similar vein: support for the 
Commission’s initiative with the reservation that the final decision about who enters needs 
to rest in the power of the Member States (Agence France Presse - German, 2007a; 
Associated Press Worldstream - German, 2007b). 
 
While supporting a nationally regulated points system, the Federation of German Employer 
Associations (Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände or BDA), 
representing all sectors of the German economy, was not very positive with regard to the 
proposal and lobbied against it. It did not see any benefit in EU involvement in regulating 
skilled migration (interview BDA) (Agence France Presse - German, 2007b). In a press 
release of December 2007, the BDA announced that the current version of the Blue Card 
was not acceptable as it would obstruct more flexible regulations at the national level 
(Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände, 2007). 
 
Supporting voices for the Blue Card also came directly from German companies – 
especially those directly reporting labour shortages, such as the large export-orientated 
German motor and fan manufacturer ebm-papst, which released a press statement in 
support of the Blue Card and its potential to help the company meet its future demands for 
employees (ebm papst, 2007). However, smaller companies that were less integrated with 
the global economy tended to prefer domestic workers; they worried about the costs of 
training a foreign worker to be able to work with them – for example, small Freiburg-based 
 
 
264 
United Planted GmbH in Freiburg (Markt und Mittelstand, 2007) – or did not believe there 
were any foreign workers that could provide the specific skills needed, such as the Krefeld-
based machine construction company Jagenberg AG. 
 
Consequently, the picture is mixed regarding representatives of the German economy. 
While there was almost unanimous agreement about the benefits of immigration to fill 
labour shortages, enthusiastic embracement of the Blue Card only happened with regard 
to the VDMA. As there was no unanimous support from the German business lobby for 
this version of the Blue Card, together with a clear statement of the ruling coalition 
government in the coalition agreement, support for a Blue Card that would overrule 
national legislation was impossible to attain. However, the German government saw the 
benefit of a loose European framework within which Member States could fill their labour 
market needs (interview Ministry of Economics). The existence of a homogenous 
European labour market was widely denied and the necessity that a special domestic 
labour market needs had to be managed nationally was widely heralded (Interview 1 
Bundestag, Interview 2 Bundestag, Interview Ministry of Economics, Interview Migration 
Expert). 
 
As in the preceding chapters, labour shortages did not directly influence the decision-
making process on the Blue Card Directive. The benefits that EU-level regulation of highly 
skilled migration might have promised did not induce German decision-makers to support 
the Blue Card Directive (it was mostly associated with costs). 
 
This is a very notable point. With regard to the national level regulation, reference by the 
government to labour shortages induced the changes of the national immigration law that 
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opened a route, however small, for highly skilled economic migration to Germany 
(Bundesregierung, 2008). However, other factors, such as intensive employer lobbying, 
may have made the passing of these changes possible. The important point for this 
dissertation in relation to the misfit concept and Hypothesis Two is that a national 
regulation provided a small route for highly skilled migration to Germany. Given these 
developments, the German government was prepared to support an EU Directive that 
would not touch these national regulations. 
 
Bureaucratic Politics 
Executive 
The discussions between the responsible ministries were described as constructive and 
showed an absence of fierce turf wars. Thus agreement could be reached on the technical 
level. The different ministries restricted themselves to their respective areas of 
responsibility (Interview Ministry of Employment, Interview Ministry of the Interior, Interview 
Permanent Representation EU, Interview Ministry of Economics). With regard to cleavages 
within the government, the most significant faults have not run along party lines, but along 
intra-party camps that had a more pro-European, national, liberal, or restrictive stance 
(Interview Ministry of Employment, Interview CDU/CSU Fraction, Interview Migration 
Expert) (Stuttgarter Zeitung, 2008a). This could already be observed during the Schröder 
Government, when then social democratic Minister of the Interior, Otto Schily, adopted a 
rather conservative view on immigration issues after 2003 (Klusmeyer & Papademetriou, 
2009: 283). Hence, these cleavages cannot be chiefly attributed to the grand coalition 
between the CDU/CSU and the SPD. However, some differences existed between the 
ministries involved when the German government developed its position, which, as in 
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preceding chapters, can be explained with the “where you stand depends on where you 
sit” proposition of the bureaucratic politics framework. 
 
The Federal Ministry of the Interior’s main concern is generally to ensure security; it thus 
tends to take a rather restrictive stance in terms of immigration, and is also very reluctant 
to give away competencies regarding who enters the country to the EU level. The ministry 
saw the value added from a common EU framework to regulate migration of the highly 
qualified. However, due to the differences in the labour market, it was of the opinion that 
the national regulation of immigration must remain possible (Interview Ministry of the 
Interior). The initial version of the Directive would have posed strong and concentrated 
costs, in terms of security concerns, due to – according to the view of the German 
government – loss of complete sovereignty to control who enters the country. Promised 
advantages included moderate and diffuse benefits of having an EU framework of 
regulating migration. 
 
Another ministry that was involved and was very active was the Federal Ministry of 
Employment and Social Affairs (Interview 2 Commission). For instance, the so-called 
Jumbo-Council consisting of Justice and Home Affairs as well as the Employment 
Ministers that was held in December 2007, was summoned on German initiative (Interview 
Ministry of the Interior), and is an indicator of the prominence of the Employment Ministry 
in preference formation (see also, Deutsche Welle, 2007). The main target of the 
Employment Ministry was to use the domestic workforce to fill the reported labour 
shortages by means of education and training. Consequently, the number of workers that 
needed to be mobilised to pay unemployment benefits should be reduced (Interview 
Migration Representative). Hence, a Blue Card that would take power to regulate migration 
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away from the national government and open the door to a significant number of workers – 
especially with a definition of highly skilled workers that was not demanding enough – did 
not accord with this ministry (Interview Ministry of Employment, Interview Ministry of the 
Interior), and would have constituted strong and concentrated costs. 
 
The Federal Ministry of Economics concurred that Member States needed to determine 
who enters the country. If that was guaranteed, the Ministry was happy to support EU 
involvement. The action programme passed by the German Federal Cabinet in Meseberg 
played a role in this; the Ministry was reluctant to have a Blue Card measure that was too 
broad and would forbid a Member State to determine for itself whether its labour market 
was in need of a very specialised kind of profession, for instance, chemists (Interview 
Ministry of Economics). In that respect, the Ministry was in line with the BDA and other 
German employers and industry associations. As there had been regular meetings with 
business associations (Interview Ministry of Economics), the position of the Ministry and 
the BDA was likely to have converged to some degree. Hence, from its perspective, the 
costs that might have accrued due to the first Blue Card proposal would have been fairly 
concentrated and strong if the German government had lost the competency to accept 
only those highly skilled migrants that the labour market required. The benefits of the 
Directive were diffuse and not strong as the most important measures were those on the 
national level. 
 
The Foreign Office has the reputation of being more favourable towards European 
integration than the other ministries. For the Foreign Office, it was important that the 
German federal government was not perceived as a constant blocker with regard to 
economic migration initiatives at the EU level. This was because its area of responsibility 
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includes trade interests and relations with other countries (Interview Ministry of Economics, 
Interview Permanent Representation). Hence, had the federal government adopted a 
restrictive, overly aggressive stance that differed strongly from the bulk of other Member 
States, it might have had negative repercussions in other areas. From the point of view of 
the Foreign Office, there were possibly concentrated costs involved if the government 
rejected the proposal outright. The benefits of any decent version of the proposal 
eventually adopted would probably be diffuse in the form of friendly relations with other 
countries, and potentially concentrated, as these might be used in bargains concerning 
other EU initiatives. 
 
Länder 
The Länder were included in the preference formation as the Bundesrat issued a 
resolution with regard to the Blue Card.68 According to the Geschäftsordnung des 
Bundesrates (GO BR) that regulates the affairs of the Bundesrat, the federal government 
needed to factor in the position of the Bundesrat in its preference formation regarding the 
Blue Card. A Länder representative was also present at the Council negotiations (Interview 
Ministry of the Interior). Highlighted among the most important points of the resolution 
regarding the Blue Card was the national responsibility of Member States – in accordance 
with the subsidiary principle – to regulate their labour markets and the co-existence of the 
national systems. Also, the definition of highly qualified was criticised as too broad. 
Furthermore, the right of the Blue Card holder to move to other Member States was seen 
as too generous. The Bundesrat was generally in line with the federal government and 
there were no indications of any significant controversies (Interview Permanent 
                                                
68 Bundesrat, Drucksache 762/07 (Beschluss), 20.12.07. 
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Representation, Interview Ministry of the Interior). A Directive that would violate those 
concerns would have been regarded as highly costly. The increased competitiveness of 
the European Union in light of the Lisbon Strategy can be seen as constituting diffuse 
benefits. 
 
Interest Groups 
The employer and industry associations should – according to the proposal’s rationale – 
benefit from the Blue Card, as it should help them to recruit the best suited migrants for the 
vacancies they cannot fill from the domestic workforce. However, most associations, with 
only the VDMA most outspokenly in favour of the Blue Card, still preferred the national 
regulation of immigration and seemed happy with the initiatives taken by the government. 
However, most associations welcomed the Directive to some extent, in particular for its 
potential to further advance the debate at the national level. The association that was most 
active in lobbying the German government with regard to the Blue Card was the BDA 
(Interview VDMA EU, Interview Ministry of Employment). It was also the most powerful 
association due to both its official function of representing the German business sector in 
the government’s preference formation, and in its function as an umbrella organisation. 
Thus, this analysis will concentrate on the BDA. 
 
The BDA saw a further need to bring foreign workers to Germany, but given the 
particularities of the German labour market, preferred national legislation, namely a points 
system (Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände, 2007). As Germany at 
that time did not have a points system, the association might have feared that increased 
competencies at the EU level would distract or obliterate its plans to lobby for a German 
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points system (Interview BDA). Thus, the proposal offered some diffuse benefits by giving 
further momentum to the domestic debate about highly skilled labour migration. If the 
proposal had entered into force in the original version, the BDA would have suffered the 
costs of potential loss or postponement of a national points system and inflexibility in 
accepting the most desired workers. 
 
The BDA has access to the government through formal hearings during legislative 
deliberations (Menz, 2003: 538). Traditionally, it has a well established link with the 
Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs. Reasons for this are membership of civil servants in 
employer associations, personal interchange between the ministry and the associations, 
and regular contacts (Rudzio, 2003: 96). There were regular contacts between the BDA 
and the Federal Ministry of Economics regarding the Blue Card Directive (Interview 
Ministry of Economics). Thus, the positions of the BDA and the Federal Ministry of 
Economic Affairs seemed rather similar. The activity of the BDA seems more associated 
with the more direct feared costs than the more diffuse benefits. 
 
The equivalent of the BDA on the trade union side is the Confederation of German Trade 
Unions (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund or DGB). If no member union holds a particular 
interest regarding a certain EU Directive, the DGB is responsible for articulating trade 
union concerns regarding the Blue Card vis-à-vis the German government. This is what 
happened in the case of the Blue Card (Interview ver.di, Interview Ministry of 
Employment). The position of the DGB was developed by a process that took three to four 
months and included input of DGB member unions as well as relevant departments of the 
DGB (Interview DGB). 
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The DGB was of the opinion that there was a need for a general EU framework for 
admitting highly skilled migrants. However, the eventual decision as to who enters should 
rest with Member States and the Directive should not override national regulations. In 
addition, a chief worry and direct cost would have been a Blue Card that enabled migrant 
workers with fewer skills to enter the labour market. This was because the employment of 
migrant workers with lower skills might depress the wages of domestic workers, and could 
potentially increase the competition for domestic unemployed workers to re-enter the 
labour market, thus increasing the pressure on the domestic work force (Interview ver.di). 
A Blue Card with entry conditions that are too loose would thus constitute a direct cost for 
trade unions and their members. Hence, the DGB proposed to change the minimum salary 
requirements to one and a half times the value of the national gross annual salary in the 
industrial and service sectors, which would amount to around €63,600 (Interview DGB) 
(Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, 2008). In addition, the DGB thought that Member States 
should have the final say about who enters the country and that the Directive should not 
thwart the possibility of introducing a points system (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, 2008: 
9-10). As the Blue Card constituted a step towards managing the immigration of highly 
skilled migrants while upholding and improving migrant rights, the Directive offered some 
moderate benefits, both diffuse (benefits for the entire society) and concentrated 
(improvement in migrant rights). 
 
Regarding influencing the federal government, the DGB has strong links with the Ministry 
of Employment and Social Affairs (Menz, 2003: 545; Rudzio, 2003: 96), and both 
institutions generally want to improve the situation of the domestic workforce. With regard 
to the Blue Card Directive, the DGB was in contact with both the Federal Ministry of the 
Interior and the Federal Ministry of Employment (Interview DGB). According to Paragraph 
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41 of the Gemeinsamen Geschäftsordnung der Bundesministerien, the ministries are 
legally obliged to consult the social partners in the preference formation process. 
 
Arguably, the Ministry of the Interior was slightly advantaged in the decision-making 
process, because it was in charge of the file and responsible for integrating the respective 
positions of other relevant actors to form the German government’s position. Apart from 
that, no structural advantages can be found within the government. The executive actors 
have a more prominent position when compared to the non-executive actors, such as the 
Bundestag and the Bundesrat. The government has to take into account the position of the 
two bodies; however, in the departmental meetings where delegates of different ministries 
discuss their positions on the Directive, members of the Bundestag or Bundesrat generally 
do not participate. Only if disagreement is too pronounced will they consider further 
actions. Also, with regard to the relevant interest groups, the governmental actors are 
advantaged. Their positions are also to be taken into account by the ministry in charge of 
the file. However, the interest group actors also do not attend the departmental meetings. 
Their points of influence are more limited when compared with the executive actors. 
Consequently, the final position of the federal government reflects to a great degree the 
positions of the relevant ministries. 
 
Within the government there were some disagreements, but no major ones, and the final 
position could be established without the occurrence of pronounced inter-ministerial fights. 
Thus the pattern of preference formation resembles one of cooperation rather than hard-
nosed bargaining. There was quickly a domestic consensus that if the main issues (co-
existence of national system, definition of highly skilled and minimum salary, as well as 
allowing the Blue Card holder to work in other Member States after two years of legal 
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residence in the first Member State) could be addressed and if the proposal were modified 
accordingly, agreement would be possible. 
 
III. Conclusion 
German support for bestowing the EU with competencies to regulate highly skilled 
economic migration by means of the Blue Card Directive is linked to three themes held 
together analytically by the bureaucratic politics framework. Hypothesis One refers to the 
misfit between the national regulations and the EU-level measure. It is the single most 
important hypothesis for the explanation of this case study. By the time the Blue Card 
Directive was proposed, the German government had already introduced provisions that 
opened a route for skilled labour migrants to enter the German labour market. Shortly 
before the Directive was proposed, the government had adopted a special programme of 
action that relaxed these provisions further. The existence of such measures and a broad 
acceptance thereof made the federal government support the Blue Card, as long as it 
could continue to use the national regulations. As the final version of the Blue Card 
granted this point, support was attained. 
 
The high political salience of immigration, and the adoption of national legislation and 
regulations just before the Blue Card Directive was proposed, raised the political costs of 
supporting the Directive exponentially. This already alludes to Hypothesis Two, which 
suggests that a Member State supports EU-level liberalisation of economic migration if the 
political salience is either low or does not affect the decision-making process, and the 
bureaucratic governmental preference formation is not transformed into an open and 
politically loaded contestation. Political salience was high. When the Directive was first 
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proposed by EU Commissioner Frattini, the proposal was immediately drawn into the 
politicised migration debate and triggered political messages from a number of high-level 
politicians. However, soon after the rules of the game became the dominant pattern, i.e., 
when the actual preference formation started (as opposed to speaking to domestic 
audiences in an attempt to show a tough stance on immigration), the decision-making 
process could happen on the technical level. On that level, agreement was found soon and 
without much controversy. 
 
Contrary to the first two case studies of this dissertation, international politics and foreign 
policy considerations had no significant bearing on the decision-making process of the 
German government. The Blue Card did not relate to a particular sending country. Thus 
there was not a sending country that could be of high foreign policy value for the German 
government and lobby in favour of EU-level liberalisation of economic migration. In 
addition, the high political salience further diminished the possibility that foreign policy 
considerations would influence the government’s position on the Blue Card. 
 
Of particular conceptual importance are the initial political statements on the proposal 
compared to the bureaucratic nature of the decision-making process. The initial 
statements should not be seen as part of the preference formation. Consequently, there is 
no change in the mode of politics as an explanation informed by Freeman’s framework 
might suggest. Rather, the political statements aimed at showing a tough stance on 
immigration matters in light of the high domestic political salience of immigration. These 
political statements have to be differentiated from the actual process of preference 
formation. They were political messages that were not informed by a rigorous analysis of 
the Directive’s content by the appropriate ministries. The findings of this case study 
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suggest that political messaging by relevant political actors is not necessarily part of the 
actual process of preference formation, which happens according to rather inflexible rules 
and regulations. The political messages did not distinguish between the potential benefits 
of labour migration, but mixed up the Blue Card Directive with the general immigration 
debate. On the technical level the discussion could be differentiated from the politically 
salient migration debate. 
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Chapter Eight – Conclusion 
I. Findings 
Three themes have been advanced to explain why liberalisation of economic migration 
policy happens at the EU level (domestic politics, international politics, and labour market 
concerns). The themes are linked by a model of bureaucratic politics. The model provides 
a framework for tracing how the causal factors related to the three themes influence the 
relevant actors. Three main propositions are used for this. First, where an actor is located 
in the bureaucracy will strongly influence its position on the issue. Second, the magnitude 
of actors’ influence on the government depends on their power resources. Third, the 
negotiations are structured according to action-channels that preselect the main actors 
and determine particular advantages and disadvantages. We will return to the bureaucratic 
politics model after each of the three themes has been discussed. 
 
Domestic Politics 
This theme consists of two sub-themes – the fit/misfit between national and EU-level 
regulations, and the nature of the decision-making process. 
Fit/Misfit 
The empirical analysis has shown that the misfit between the relevant national legislation 
and the policy proposed at the EU level cannot be too pronounced, as this would involve 
costs the actors are not prepared to accept. In all the cases where the German 
government did support EU-level liberalisation of economic migration policies, the misfit 
was not too prominent. Regarding the Ankara Agreement, Germany had concluded 
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bilateral agreements beforehand that regulated the flow of workers between Turkey and 
Germany. The provisions of the Ankara Agreement were less detailed and did not infringe 
upon the bilateral regulations. Thus, there was no misfit that could have entailed costs for 
any of the actors involved. 
 
The provisions on freedom of movement and the right of establishment of the Europe 
Agreement with Poland were also preceded by a bilateral agreement between Germany 
and Poland for workers posted by subcontractor companies 
(Werksvertragsvereinbarungen). The Europe Agreement did not thwart this agreement; it 
even contained a clause that bilateral agreements would not be affected by the Europe 
Agreement. In addition, Germany had national regulations dealing with the inflow of foreign 
workers. The Europe Agreement could not touch these provisions. Given that the national 
and bilateral regulations were kept in place, there was no noteworthy misfit that threatened 
to imply costs for certain German actors. The fact that the provisions on the right of 
establishment did indeed impact on German law was not realised by German policy 
makers at that time. They regarded the provisions as largely toothless. 
 
The story is similar with regard to the Blue Card Directive. Accepting the initial proposal 
would have meant high costs for a number of actors, as it would have made access to the 
labour market easier for workers with certain qualifications. Thus, a necessary condition 
for support was that the national legislation could co-exist without suffering any 
confinements. 
 
The case of the Economic Migration Directive stands out because here the misfit was high. 
It concerned the general idea that immigration legislation should be more restrictive and its 
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regulation should remain in the hands of the government. In addition, there was also a 
specific misfit between two paradigms of how a measure that is intended to admit labour 
migrants should look. The German government at that time preferred to include a supply-
based system in the national immigration regulations, i.e., a point-based system, whereas 
the Directive only proposed a demand-side system of admissions. The substantial misfit 
made the relevant actors fear that the costs of adopting such a Directive would be too 
high. Hence, not enough support for the Directive could be mobilised among actors in 
Germany that would have rendered the final position of the German federal government 
sympathetic to the Proposal. Thus, in accordance with Hypothesis One, in order for a 
government to support an EU-level liberalisation of economic migration policies, the misfit 
cannot be too pronounced. 
 
Nature of the Decision-Making Process 
This investigation has shown that the nature of the political contestation, and in particular 
the political salience of immigration, impacts governmental preference formation on 
liberalising economic migration policies at the EU level. The empirical analysis of the 
Ankara Agreement reveals that the government formed its position on this agreement, and 
especially on the provisions relevant to migration, in an intra-ministerial way. Although 
immigration was a prevalent theme in the national debate due to regular recruitment of 
foreign guest workers, it was generally seen as having positive effects on the development 
of the national economy. Social problems – such as integration issues and the reluctance 
of workers to return to their country of origin – that were later associated with immigration 
did not feature in the discussion at the time. Hence, there were no significant political costs 
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involved in supporting the provisions that could have been due to a controversial and 
politicised national debate about immigration. 
 
The preference formation process on the relevant provisions of the Europe Agreement 
with Poland proceeded in a similarly bureaucratic way that meant consulting with 
governmental actors according to the predetermined channels. Neither of the actors 
involved feared the occurrence of significant costs as a result of the provisions in the 
agreement. There was public debate about immigration, but the Europe Agreement was 
not linked to this. It was instead framed as an agreement of trade and market liberalisation. 
This circumvented any potential politicisation of the debate about the provisions on 
freedom of movement or the right of establishment. 
 
Regarding the Blue Card Directive, the debate began with public outcries by a number of 
senior government figures. However, these statements related to a speech given by EU 
Commissioner Frattini that had introduced it. The statements were made without a 
rigorous analysis of the Blue Card proposal, and consequently also without a detailed 
knowledge of its exact content. Rather, they were statements intended to show the 
domestic electorate a particular position on migration. The actual preference formation of 
the German government on the Blue Card Directive happened on the bureaucratic level, 
as stipulated by the rules of the game. 
 
The case of the Economic Migration Directive was different. When the Commission 
publicised its proposal, domestic debate about immigration was very vivid. The debate was 
fuelled by a number of distinct issues related to immigration, such as debates about the 
Green Card, immigration and terrorism, the findings of the expert commission on 
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migration, and reform of the domestic immigration legislation. The preference formation 
regarding the Economic Migration Directive could not be separated from the highly political 
debate about the benefits and perils of immigration, and the political costs of supporting 
the proposal soared. No relevant actor expected to gain any benefits from adopting the 
Directive that would outweigh the costs involved. Thus, the empirical findings corroborate 
the predictions of Hypothesis Two that a bureaucratic debate will facilitate agreement to an 
EU-level liberalisation of economic migration policy, whereas increased political salience 
and a publicly contested as well as politicised debate make such support unlikely. 
 
Foreign Policy Factors 
When the German government came to the conclusion to support the provisions on 
freedom of movement of the Ankara Agreement, foreign political factors played an 
important role. Because of the high foreign policy value of Turkey and the relatively low 
political salience of immigration matters, the Turkish government could undertake 
successful lobbying efforts for the conclusion of an Agreement that included provisions on 
freedom of movement. It did so because it did not want to conclude an agreement that 
would be significantly less generous than the one the EEC had completed with Greece. A 
slimmer agreement would have meant an embarrassment for Turkey vis-à-vis its long-term 
rival Greece. Turkey had a high foreign policy value for the German government, as in the 
insecure climate of the early Cold War years it was a strategically important country; the 
West did not want it to be receptive to Soviet offers of economic assistance and ideology. 
The Political salience of immigration was low; economic migration was widely accepted as 
a necessity to keep the German economy pushing ahead at full throttle. 
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The picture is slightly different regarding the Europe Agreement with Poland. Poland had a 
significant foreign policy value for Germany, as after the collapse of the Iron Curtain 
Germany was very interested in having politically and economically stable countries to the 
east of its border. However, the foreign policy value was less pronounced than regarding 
Turkey. The threat the Soviet Union posed in the 1960s had disappeared after the USSR 
had imploded. Moreover, the political salience of immigration was higher. There was an 
intense debate about general immigration matters taking place, with particular regard to 
asylum, and rhetoric about potential immigration flows from Poland. Hence, the scope of 
the Polish government to influence the position of the German government was smaller 
than the Turkish government’s. Consequently, even the Polish push did not result in an 
official change of the German government’s view. Nonetheless, the insistence of the 
Polish government paid off eventually, as a more far-reaching version of the right of 
establishment provisions found their way into the final agreement. This could only happen 
because the German government underestimated the potential significance of the 
regulations for real immigration flows. 
 
In the preference formation regarding the Economic Migration Directive, foreign policy 
factors did not play a role. The proposal did not relate to a particular country, thus the 
concept of foreign policy value did not apply to the Directive, and there was no sending 
country government either that could have lobbied the German government for the 
Directive. In addition, political salience of immigration was very high. This further reduced 
the chances that foreign policy factors could impact on the decision-making process. 
 
A similar dynamic could be observed concerning the Blue Card Directive. The Directive did 
not relate to any particular country that could have foreign policy value for the German 
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government, or could lobby for support of the Directive. The political salience of 
immigration was arguably slightly less pronounced, as at least the great part of the reform 
of the national immigration legislation had happened before the Blue Card was debated. 
Nevertheless, the political salience of immigration was still high. Thus, the conditions were 
still not advantageous to foreign policy factors influencing the decision-making process of 
the German government. Hypothesis Three can consequently be confirmed if foreign 
policy value is high, domestic political salience of immigration is low, and a third country 
can influence the German government to be more favourable regarding EU-level 
liberalisation of economic migration. A precondition is that the proposed measure relates 
to a particular country or a group of countries. A country can have foreign policy value by, 
for instance, being an important ally in a geopolitical conflict with an adverse regime, or 
constituting an important emerging market that can be developed. 
 
Labour Market Factors 
Labour market factors did not play a direct role in the formation of Germany’s preference 
on the freedom of movement provisions of the Ankara Agreement. Although foreign 
political motivations also played a role in the conclusion of the bilateral labour recruitment 
agreement between the German and Turkish governments in 1961, the reported labour 
shortages on the German labour market were a necessary condition for the bilateral 
agreement’s conclusion. The bilateral agreement’s regulations were more specific and 
generous than the provisions of the Ankara Agreement; they were thus the instrument that 
regulated migration from Turkey to Germany. As discussed above, the agreement’s 
existence nullified the misfit between the national legislation and the measures that were 
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proposed at the EU level. This consequently paved the way for the German government to 
support the Ankara Agreement and its freedom of movement provisions. 
 
For the case of the Europe Agreement with Poland, there are indications from sources that 
labour shortages were reported on the German labour market. However, this did not make 
any difference in the position of the German government regarding the Agreement. In 
addition, the public debate about labour shortages, and immigration as a means to reduce 
them, was still in its infancy. In fact, the general debate about the German labour market 
was framed in a way that stressed the high unemployment rate and did not mention any 
labour shortages. Thus, the Europe Agreement was not framed as a means to reduce any 
labour shortages, and labour shortages did not influence the German government to 
support the provisions on freedom of movement and the right of establishment of the 
Europe Agreement in a direct way. 
 
Labour shortages were reported on the German labour market when the federal 
government formed its preferences on the Economic Migration Directive, and it brought 
under way measures to bring in specific migrants, for instance by means of the Green 
Card initiative and with attempts to reform domestic immigration legislation. However, 
there was no link made between these shortages and the need for liberalisation at the EU 
level, as policy makers did not doubt the national capacity to attract relevant third-country 
workers without EU involvement. Moreover, the necessity of filling the labour shortages 
translated into a supply-side paradigm popular amongst the Schröder government, which 
differed from the demand-side approach outlined by the Directive. Thus, the existence of 
labour shortages did not contribute to a favourable position of the government with regard 
to the Economic Migration Directive. 
 
 
284 
 
When the Blue Card Directive was proposed, it was widely stated in Germany that not all 
vacancies could be filled by the domestic workforce – in particular with regard to positions 
requiring highly specialised skills. Discussions about the benefits of highly skilled foreign 
labour had become well-established. However, the link between their existence and the 
necessity to liberalise economic migration policies at the EU level was not made by any 
actor – not even regarding highly skilled workers. 
 
Bureaucratic Politics 
The bureaucratic politics framework has been used to understand how the government 
forms its preferences, i.e., which actors are taking part in the process, what their likely 
positions are, and how well they are able to make those preferences heard amongst 
decision-makers. The rules of the game are determined by the German administrative 
regulations and practices (GGO). The rules are specific to the German political system. 
However, as the outcome of the final governmental preferences depends on the rules of 
the game, this implies that another country with the same rules would have reached the 
same outcome as Germany – under the condition that the causal factors of the three 
themes would have been the same. 
 
Role of the Chancellor 
The rules of internal procedure of the federal government of Germany (Geschäftsordnung 
der Bundesregierung or GOBReg) stipulate in paragraph 1 that the federal ministers are 
independently responsible to realise the guidelines of interior and foreign policies. The 
guidelines are given by the Chancellor. Paragraphs 16 and 17 of the GOBReg state that 
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the federal government must be informed whenever different ministries cannot agree on a 
certain position or issue. Thus, in case there is no disagreement or case of doubt, the 
ministry in charge is responsible for its particular portfolio. As this was not the case with 
regard to the migration relevant provisions in the sub-case studies of this dissertation, the 
Chancellor was not involved. Neither the archival material, nor interviews or other primary 
or secondary sources suggest otherwise. Interviewees working for a ministry in particular 
were asked whether the Chancellor was involved in the decision-making process. The 
interviewees gave a negative answer to this question. With regard to the Ankara 
Agreement and the Europe Agreement, the respective Chancellor was involved in the 
decision about the general agreements, but not with a particular view to the provisions 
relevant for migration. 
 
Actors’ positions on economic migration 
The positions that the different actors hold on liberalising economic migration at the EU 
level cannot be determined prima facie from their respective portfolio. It depends on the 
constellation of causal factors in relation to the content of the proposed policy measure. 
For instance, the Foreign Office was strongly in favour of including the provisions on 
freedom of movement in the Ankara Agreement because it deemed them important to 
concluding the Agreement for foreign political reasons. Whereas, for instance, with regard 
to the Economic Migration Directive, the Foreign Office was not in favour of accepting the 
Directive and was of the view that immigration was better regulated on the domestic level. 
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Determinants of what actor prevails 
It cannot be said ex ante which actor prevails. Which actors are most important is 
determined by the rules of the game (the GGO), which stipulates what ministry (or 
ministries) is in charge of the file and the causal factors advanced in Chapter Two. Thus 
the more a ministry’s area of responsibility overlaps with the content of the proposed policy 
measure, the more importance the respective ministry has, but in terms of coordinating the 
process and the power of making factual arguments. For instance, with regard to the 
Ankara Agreement, the Ministry of Economics and the Foreign Office shared the 
responsibility of generating the German position. The Foreign Office prevailed; not 
because it was the strongest ministry structurally, but because the arguments it advanced, 
i.e., the conclusion of the Agreement, was extremely important for foreign policy reasons 
and should not have collapsed because of opposition to the freedom of movement 
provisions requested by the Turkish government. For all sub-case studies the pattern of 
preference formation was one of cooperation rather than of hard-nosed bargaining. This 
point is further elaborated in the following section discussing the findings of the 
dissertation. 
 
What non-ministerial actors are part of the game? 
The actors involved are determined by the rules of the game, which in the case of 
Germany are the general rules of procedure (GGO and GOBReg). With regard to the 
Economic Migration Directive and the Blue Card Directive, the GGO in paragraph 41 
stipulates which non-ministerial actors need to be included in the process of preference 
formation on liberalising economic migration policy. The actors mentioned are the Länder 
and umbrella organisations representing the employers and trade unions at the federal 
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level. Consequently, the Federal Ministry of the Interior considered their views in the 
decision-making process. In the case of the Ankara Agreement and the Europe 
Agreement, the GGO (then called GGO II69) mentions the relevant actors to be included in 
the governmental preference formation. Paragraph 24 (regarding the Ankara Agreement) 
and paragraph 23 (regarding the Europe Agreement) state that the Länder needs to be 
included if their affairs are touched upon, which was not the case for foreign political 
matters, which the association agreements belonged to. There is no mention that interest 
groups need to be involved in matters of association agreements. As the discussions of 
the Ankara Agreement, and to some extent the Europe Agreement, have shown, there is 
an exception to the rules of the game determining the relevant actors. An extra-executive 
actor, for the cases of this study a third country government, can force its way into the 
decision-making process if the foreign policy value of the country is high and the political 
salience of immigration is low in the receiving country. It is conceivable that, under certain 
circumstances, further domestic actors, such as churches, other welfare groups and 
NGOs, can also force their way into the decision-making process; however, this could not 
be observed for the cases under investigation for this study. This might be the case if a 
policy measure is extremely contested resulting in very high costs and benefits for certain 
actors, as, for instance, stipulated by interest group politics. The media influence the 
decision-making process via the political salience channel. The preference formation was 
a governmental matter, so no non-governmental party influenced the process in a direct 
way (apart from influence via the Bundesrat). 
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Under what conditions and how do non-executive actors matter? 
The bureaucratic politics framework suggests that actors are active in the process when 
the proposed policy measure offers significant benefits or poses substantial costs. This 
was not the case for any of the non-executive actors that emerged on the playing field for 
the preference formation of one of the policy measures analysed by this dissertation. The 
empirical data gives no indication that from an early stage the positions of the non-
executive actor notably diverged from the government’s, and no significant influence is 
indicated. The position of the Länder, expressed via the Bundesrat, did not differ in a 
substantive way from the federal government’s. With regard to the Ankara Agreement and 
the Europe Agreement, the data does not suggest that the Länder was involved in the 
preference formation on the provisions relevant to migration (and the entire Agreements, in 
fact). Where the social partners are concerned, in line with what the GGO II indicates, the 
empirical material does not give any indication that employers or trade unions were 
involved in the process of preference formation. With regard to the Economic Migration 
Directive and the Blue Card Directive, the social partners were formally included in the 
decision-making process. However, neither the employer associations, nor the trade 
unions, thought to experience significant costs or benefits from either one of these 
Directives that would necessitate strong lobbying efforts. Thus, neither of the two actors 
had a significant influence on the preference formation process. 
 
Ankara Agreement 
Regarding the Ankara Agreement, the Ministry of Economics and the Foreign Office were 
jointly in charge of affairs relating to European Integration, which provided the ministries 
with an alleviated position to mould the final governmental preferences. Between the two 
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ministries, in the end the position of the Foreign Office prevailed. However, this was less a 
result of its superior structural power (as the bureaucratic politics framework might 
suggest), but rather due to the particular constellation of factors relating to international 
politics (high foreign policy value of Turkey, together with low political salience and 
determined lobbying efforts of the Turkish government) that increased the importance of 
the foreign policy rationale that the Foreign Office propagated. Other Ministries that were 
involved in the preference formation were the Interior, Justice, Family, Agriculture, and 
Employment. However, these were less important in the process. No reference could be 
found about a significant involvement of the Bundesrat and the Bundestag. Thus, if either 
of the two bodies was involved in the preference formation, it would have been likely to 
have had a similar stance as the final government position. Controversies would have 
manifested themselves in the governmental files. There is no indication that interest 
groups, such as employer associations and trade unions, were included in the process to a 
significant degree. 
 
Europe Agreement 
In the preference formation on the Europe Agreement, the Ministry of Economics and the 
Foreign Office were in charge of coordinating the process as well. This helped them to be 
influential in the decision-making process. Nonetheless, the Interior and the Employment 
Ministries also had a stake in the process. Each ministry represented the interests that 
related to its area of responsibility. Both ministries held a tough stance on labour market 
access, and were firmly against any provisions in the Europe Agreement that would allow 
Polish workers facilitated access to the German labour market. The Employment Ministry 
feared an overburdening of the German labour market, and the Interior Ministry was driven 
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by concerns related to access to German territory by foreign nationals. The Ministry of 
Economics and the Foreign Office were more favourably inclined to include provisions on 
freedom of movement (however, not very far-reaching ones). Both Ministries were rather 
influenced by the bigger picture of what a successful conclusion would mean for the 
region. In addition, in light of German reunification, the German government presented 
itself as open towards integrating the CEECs into Western Europe. This was particularly 
relevant to the Foreign Office. The Economics Ministry wanted to conclude the agreement 
due to the potential economic benefits of market access to Poland, an emerging market 
economy. No empirical data could be identified suggesting that interest groups, the 
Bundesrat, or the Bundestag played important roles in the process. The main reason for 
this is likely that their positions did not differ significantly from the federal government’s. 
 
Economic Migration Directive 
In the process of decision-making regarding the Economic Migration Directive, the rules of 
the game were advantageous to the Ministry of the Interior, as it was in charge of 
coordinating the ministerial process of preference formation. The Employment Ministry 
also played a prominent role. The Foreign Office was also involved, but only as one of the 
players, as the foreign political relevance of the Directive was low. The only immediate 
foreign policy significance of the Directive was the general impression the German 
delegation made on the other Member States during the negotiations in Brussels. For 
instance, if the German delegation was perceived as a constructive partner, this might 
have improved relations with some of the other Member States. Conversely, if the German 
delegation had been seen as the main obstructor in reaching an agreement, this might 
have had negative repercussions in terms of cooling relations with other Member States, 
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or reaching a consensus in policy areas where Germany would have liked to see rapid 
agreement in the Council. Furthermore, a few other ministries gave their input. The 
general line of the government emerged rather quickly, as there was strong scepticism 
about giving away control over the regulation of who is allowed to enter the German labour 
market to the EU level. In addition, the proposed Directive did not reflect the kind of 
immigration policy that was promulgated by the German government at that time, in 
particular by the Ministry of the Interior. 
 
The Bundesrat and the Bundestag were both consulted and their opinions were taken into 
account, but they did not differ in a fundamental way from the line that was emerging 
within the government. The Bundesrat was slightly more sceptical as regards delegating 
competencies on economic migration to the EU level, as well as liberalising immigration 
policies in general. This was because of a general reluctance of the Länder governments 
to delegate more competencies than absolutely necessary to the EU level. The main 
rationale for this was to safeguard its institutional competencies (see also, Halperin, et al., 
2006: 38). In addition, the significant presence of the more conservative CDU/CSU in the 
house might have played a role. Even though the cleavages with regard to economic 
migration cannot be clearly separated between the political left and right, centre-right 
parties tend to have more conservative views, by and large. Moreover, the SPD Länder 
governments often belong to the centre (rather than the left) wing of the party, decreasing 
the ideological differences with the CDU/CSU at the Länder level (Interview Ministry of 
Employment 1). 
 
According to the rules regulating governmental preference formation on EU matters, both 
employer associations and trade unions had to issue their position with regard to the 
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Directive, which the government was obliged to consider. The employer associations, 
which were represented by the BDA, were in favour of liberalising economic migration 
policies. However, they were sceptical about delegating competencies to the EU and 
providing immigrants with too many rights in terms of social security. The trade unions held 
a more positive view and were happy to support liberalisation of economic migration 
policies at the EU level, although in a less encompassing way than the Commission had 
proposed, and only if sufficient rights were guaranteed to the migrants. Regarding the 
employer associations, there was little difference between the position of the government 
and the position held by the BDA. 
 
Blue Card Directive 
In the case of the Blue Card Directive, the Ministry of the Interior was in charge of 
coordinating the process of governmental preference formation, again giving it a slightly 
advantageous position. The other most active ministries were Employment, Economics, 
and the Foreign Office. The Bundesrat and the Bundestag were also consulted, but there 
were no major differences between their position and the government’s. Most employer 
associations preferred the national regulation of economic migration but welcomed the 
proposal as giving further momentum to the national debate. The trade unions, 
represented by the DGB, saw the benefits of a general EU framework, but thought that the 
national government should decide on who enters the labour market. There was also 
concern that the Directive might allow migrants who would not qualify as highly skilled 
workers according to the German definition to enter the German labour market. Although 
there were minor differences in the positions of the different ministries, all ministries 
agreed that the Blue Card should not thwart the national regulations that were in place. 
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II. Discussion of the findings 
Domestic Factors 
Misfit 
The empirical analysis shows that the misfit between the national legislation and the 
proposed EU-level liberalisation cannot be too pronounced. This implies that the concept 
is applicable beyond the compliance literature on environmental regulations. The concept 
of uploading is also useful, but its explanatory power is more limited than the misfit 
concept. The ideal position of a government is to upload its preferences to the EU level, as 
this means there are no adaptation costs. However, this becomes more difficult when the 
number of Member States increases (Menz, 2009: 7). Hence, a more realistic approach is 
to avoid adaptation costs that are too high. The crucial point is not if the Member State 
was successful in uploading its preferences to the EU level, but if the misfit is not too high. 
For instance, with regard to the Ankara Agreement, the German government did not 
upload its preferences, but tolerated the freedom of movement provisions, as the misfit 
between the bilateral recruitment agreement and the provisions of the Ankara Agreement 
was small. Hence, the misfit can denote the line that cannot be passed if support of the 
national government for EU-level liberalisation of economic migration policy is desired. 
 
The question that now presents itself is how to specify the degree of the misfit in order to 
determine the area small enough for a government to agree to a policy measure. Existing 
studies assess the misfit as low if there is hardly any adaptation pressure, or as high if 
there is significant adaptation pressure. Risse et al. (2001: 8) state that “[i]f adaptation 
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pressures are very high, European institutions seriously challenge the identity, constitutive 
principles, core structures, and practices of national institutions.” Similarly, Duina (1999: 
117) describes significant adaptation pressure as a challenge to the national policy 
legacies, which are defined as the legal and administrative entities that exist in a country 
prior to and at the time that a directive is enacted. 
 
These accounts of what significant or high misfit amounts to are unsatisfactory because 
what constitutes a significant challenge to national policies is highly dependent on the 
context. In the three cases where the German government did support the EU-level 
liberalisation of economic migration (Ankara Agreement, Europe Agreement, and the Blue 
Card Directive), the proposed regulations posed no threat to national regulations. Thus, 
national regulations would still determine which migrants could enter the country. This did 
not constitute a misfit of any significance. The only case where the misfit was high was the 
Economic Migration Directive, where the proposal challenged the national paradigm of 
how migrants should be recruited. Had the Directive been adopted, its provisions would 
have determined which migrants would be issued a permit to work in the Union. 
Consequently, in the policy area of economic migration, the findings suggest that 
governmental support for EU-level liberalisation can only happen if the proposed policy is 
either less generous than the national policy (Ankara Agreement and Europe Agreement), 
or if it does not change the national policy (Blue Card Directive). This misfit cannot even be 
low; for the cases under investigation it needed to be zero. This was also the case when 
political salience was low and foreign policy influence high (Ankara Agreement). Hence, 
the misfit concept can be applied to the case of liberalisation of economic migration. This 
has important implications for the literature on EU policy-making on immigration, where the 
concept has so far not had a prominent role. 
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Nature of the Decision-Making Process 
Preference formation within and around the government is at the heart of this study. It 
matters if there is an open contestation, or if the process happens largely in a bureaucratic 
way that remains largely unnoticed by the general public. Here, several important findings 
emerged, i.e., the better applicability of the bureaucratic politics framework compared to 
the modes of politics model; the high relative importance of ministerial actors compared to 
interest groups; the importance of political salience; and the different kinds of costs and 
benefits accruing to actors. 
 
The analysis has contrasted Freeman’s modes of politics framework (Freeman, 2006) with 
the rules of the game proposition of the bureaucratic politics framework. The modes of 
politics framework stipulates that the political contestation follows a particular mode 
according to the cost and benefit distribution of the actors involved. Conversely, the rules 
of the game suggest that the decision-making process follows a particular pattern 
determined by governmental rules, regulations, and practices. 
 
The four cases have shown that the mode of politics tended to be similar in each case, 
and that governmental actors were considerably more important in forming the final 
position of the federal government when compared to interest groups. This could either be 
because the distribution of costs and benefits was very similar every time and thus 
induced a similar mode of politics, or the nature of the decision-making was predetermined 
by the rules of the game (cf.: Allison & Zelikow, 1999: 302) and was thus largely 
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prescribed by governmental regulations, leaving little room for variation on a case-by-case 
basis. 
 
As concluding association agreements is the responsibility of foreign politics, the Foreign 
Office and, in the case of the Ankara Agreement, the Ministry of Economics were the most 
important actors; interest groups were less important. The regulations that apply to the 
preference formation on EU directives, interest groups and the Länder have to be included 
in the process of preference formation. Thus, in the latter two cases of this dissertation, 
there were more actors involved. The distribution of costs and benefits was fairly similar 
across the four cases. Several actors feared to incur concentrated costs in case 
liberalisation of economic migration policies at the EU level happened too quickly, and was 
infringing too heavily upon national regulations (for instance, the Employment and Interior 
Ministries). This remained rather constant throughout the four cases. However, the Foreign 
Office accrued significantly more pronounced benefits in the cases of the two association 
agreements, which contributed to it being more assertive than with the Economic Migration 
Directive and the Blue Card Directive. Furthermore, the increased role of further interest 
groups in the latter two cases made the decision-making process more diversified, and 
created more possibility for the mode of politics to change. Thus, there was some variation 
in costs and benefits distribution and actors involved, but the mode did not change 
significantly. 
 
This suggests that the rules of the game did not allow too much flexibility in how the 
process of preference formation unfolded. The regulations attributed great significance to 
the ministerial bureaucracy, which only in exceptional circumstances might have led 
interest groups to mobilise vigorously to foster their aims. Consequently, the mode of 
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politics is fixed for the cases of economic migration policy-making at the EU level. It does 
not refute Freeman’s framework, but decreases the conceptual value it can add in 
analyses of this policy domain in a country such as Germany. The modes of politics 
framework has been created for the case of the US, where interest group politics are less 
regulated. Thus, its full applicability to any country and policy domain has to be 
questioned. As for the case of economic migration liberalisation at the EU level, the mode 
of politics does not vary freely from policy measure to policy measure. Hence, it is more 
useful to apply the predictions that are stipulated by the bureaucratic politics framework. 
 
However, there is a note of caution to be addressed. The only case where there was some 
variation in the nature of the contestation was with regard to the Blue Card Directive. 
Initially, there had been fierce statements at the highest political level, rejecting the 
Directive. However, they were soon calmed down as it was realised that the costs of the 
Directive could be kept rather low and the political messages were not necessary. Given 
that the statements were not preceded by a scrutiny of the Directive by the ministerial 
bureaucracy, these statements should not be assessed as constituting a change in the 
mode of politics; rather, they were reactions to the public announcement of the proposal by 
Commissioner Frattini that immediately added some salience to the debate. These 
statements were not part of the actual process of preference formation, but were 
messages to serve political ends. The preference formation happened on the technical 
level as stipulated by the rules of the game. 
 
Given the fixation of the mode of politics, the concept of political salience gains more 
prominence in finding out whether the debate is happening in a largely bureaucratic way or 
whether it is politicised, and if the process of preference formation is hence influenced by 
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dynamics related to a heated debate about migration that do not directly relate to the 
proposed measure (for instance, fishing for votes on the political right by political decision-
makers). Consequently, an EU policy measure can serve as a platform for political actors 
to make a point about their stance in the general immigration debate – as happened in the 
case of the Blue Card Directive. 
 
The political salience of migration is externally induced and is not endogenous to the 
process of preference formation on a certain EU policy measure, i.e., domestic political 
salience is not caused by such a proposal. As discussed in Chapter Three, several factors 
play a role in increasing the political salience. According to the findings of this study, a 
proposed EU directive alone is unlikely to have the importance to significantly shift the 
political salience from low to high. However, the discussion that follows the directive may 
contribute to increasing the political salience in Germany. Yet more important is that a 
proposal might coincide with a highly politicised domestic debate about immigration that 
had emerged independently from the proposal (for instance, because of national 
immigration reform or reports about xenophobic attacks on immigrants). As shown in the 
chapter on the Economic Migration Directive, the political salience of the immigration 
debate in Germany was a result of parallel debates on several topics, including reforming 
national immigration legislation in Germany, the Green Card Directive, and fearful links 
between immigration and terrorism amplified by 9/11. The increased salience then 
reinforced the political costs of supporting EU-level economic migration policies. In the 
words of a German civil servant: “Supporting the Economic Migration Directive would have 
meant political suicide.”70 
 
                                                
70 Translation by the author. 
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Regarding the distribution of costs and benefits across actors, it is useful to distinguish 
between political costs and benefits, and economic costs and benefits. For example, 
political costs and benefits relate to electoral approval or denegation. This happened with 
regard to the Economic Migration Directive. Economic costs can relate to the 
administrative costs of needing to change legislation due to new EU regulations, or the 
potential benefits of filling vacancies that could not be filled with the domestic work force. 
 
Foreign Policy Factors 
The analysis has shown that for the case of the two association agreements, foreign policy 
factors were important for the government to support the migration-relevant provisions of 
the agreements. Theoretically, the concepts of foreign policy value, political salience, and 
the pressure of the sending country (Rosenblum, 2004a, 2004b; Rudolph, 2003, 2006) 
explain the dynamics that induce actors’ support. This expands the empirical applicability 
of the concepts to also cover liberalising economic migration policies at the EU level. So 
far, the concepts have only been used in the context of national immigration policy-making, 
most notably US migration policy. If the conditions stipulated by the framework are in 
place, foreign policy factors can be forceful in inducing a government to support 
liberalisation of economic migration at the EU level. Thus, if these conditions are not in 
place, rallying support is significantly more difficult. This then begs the question: How 
relevant are foreign policy factors to EU policy measures other than association 
agreements? A crucial component of their influence is the lobbying effort of the sending 
country (or a group of sending countries). For the case of the association agreements, 
these countries are clearly denoted. However, for a directive that is applicable to all third 
country nationals that factor is no longer relevant. The absence of foreign lobbying makes 
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support more difficult. However, the framework is solid and if the above factors (foreign 
policy value, political salience, and the pressure of the sending country) are in place, 
foreign policy factors can also be relevant in the preference formation on policy measures, 
such as EU Directives. 
 
This is an interesting finding from a policy-making perspective. If a policy measure on 
liberalising economic migration policies at the EU level can be framed in a way that makes 
it relevant to foreign policy concerns, this would open another causal avenue that could 
rally support for the measure. It might offer another line of argument for domestic policy 
makers to justify support for the policy and thus increase the European added value – 
which has often been called into question with regard to common EU measures on 
economic migration (see, for instance, Ryan, 2007). In addition, even though directives 
such as the Economic Migration Directive or the Blue Card Directive do include nationals 
from any third country, this does not preclude a particular country (or several sending 
countries) from taking action to lobby Member State governments to support such a 
Directive. If a sending country has a high foreign policy value for one or several Member 
States, such an effort could indeed push a few Member States to take a more favourable 
stance towards EU-level liberalisation of economic migration policies. Finally, increased 
foreign policy relevance enhances the importance and influence of the Foreign Office in 
the decision-making process. The empirical analysis has shown that the Foreign Office 
tends to be more positively inclined to EU-level liberalisation of economic migration than 
other ministries, most notably the Interior, and Employment and Social Affairs. 
Consequently, it holds the potential to increase governmental support for such measures. 
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Labour Market Factors 
The analysis of this dissertation has shown that labour market factors, most notably labour 
shortages, do not have a direct influence; specifically, they do not make certain actors 
support the EU-level liberalisation of economic migration because they expect to realise 
political or economic benefits. Thus, labour shortages are not part of the causal factors 
that decide whether a government supports the EU-level liberalisation of economic 
migration. This is an important finding in light of the Commission’s reasoning for a common 
EU policy on economic migration, which included references to the benefits of EU-level 
cooperation and its ability to fill labour shortages in the Economic Migration Directive and 
the Blue Card Directive (Council of the European Union, 2009; European Commission, 
2001). This dissertation shows that this reasoning does not have a causal impact on 
governmental preferences on liberalising economic migration policies at the EU level. 
 
In line with Hypothesis Two, the dissertation suggests that the misfit between national 
legislation and the proposed EU policy measure has to be zero. Labour shortages are 
likely to be one of the factors that have an influence in inducing a government to 
implement national legislation on economic migration that provides channels for the 
immigration for third-country workers. Examples worth mentioning are the bilateral labour 
recruitment agreement Germany had concluded with Turkey in 1961, and articles 18 to 21 
of the Zuwanderungsgesetz. However, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to 
determine the exact role of labour shortages in determining the national level regulation of 
immigration. What matters for this study is the existence of national economic migration 
policy measures and their misfit in relation to the proposed EU-level measures.  
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Bureaucratic Politics 
The bureaucratic politics framework has proved to be a useful tool to analyse the process 
of governmental preference formation on liberalising economic migration policy at the EU 
level. This extends Allison’s important foreign policy framework (Allison, 1969; Allison & 
Halperin, 1972; Allison & Zelikow, 1999) to the formation of national preferences on 
economic migration policies. It has been applied to domestic politics but not yet to 
immigration policies (see, Brummer, 2009 to the reform of the German Federal Criminal 
Police Office). This poses a number of questions. Do the bureaucratic politics follow the 
same pattern in all cases, i.e., are the rules of the game the same for each policy 
measure? What are the limitations when applying the framework to EU economic 
migration policies, and could the framework be further developed? 
 
The rules of the game differ slightly, in particular between the two association agreements 
and the two proposed directives. This is because over time the rules and regulations of 
governmental preference formation have been modified. There are two main differences. 
First, with regard to the association agreements, the Foreign Office and the Ministry of 
Economics had a more advantageous position in the process. The Foreign Office, 
especially, has a track record of being more supportive to agreeing to liberalise economic 
migration policies at the EU level. This stands in contrast with the Ministry of the Interior, 
which is generally security-minded. Thus, the rules of the game made the conditions of the 
first two cases more favourable to supporting policy measures than the latter two cases. 
Second, involvement of non-executive actors was facilitated with regard to the two 
Directives. While in particular the Bundesrat tended to have a somewhat more 
conservative position, the trade unions were more favourable to EU-level liberalisation 
than the federal government. The employer associations had a similar line to the 
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government’s position. Even though the increased interest group involvement might have 
made government support more difficult, this was certainly not to a great extent. 
 
The “where you stand depends on where you sit” aphorism of the framework proved useful 
to predict the positions of the different actors. While Allison’s framework concentrates on 
individual actors, for this study it is more valuable to take organisations as the unit of 
analysis (see, for instance, Halperin, et al., 2006: 25-27), as in the governmental 
bureaucracy ministerial actors are determined as the main players and are frequently 
represented by different individuals on varying occasions. One of the most analytically 
valuable achievements of the bureaucratic politics approach is the generating of 
predictions about the position of respective actors applicable over time. This simplification 
greatly increases the analytical leverage of the model. Across the case studies, the 
Ministry of the Interior had the most restrictive position, given that its main area of 
responsibility is internal security. The Ministry of Employment tended to be reluctant due to 
the domestic work force being its chief concern. The Ministry of Economics can be more 
favourable to such measures if it estimates that the economic benefits of the policy 
surpass potential losses. This was, for instance, the case for the Europe Agreement with 
Poland. The Foreign Office tended to be the most favourable ministry, either because the 
policy measure promised foreign political benefits, or support would increase the standing 
of the Federal Republic amongst the other Member States. The Bundesrat tended to be 
marginally more sceptical than the federal government, due to feared loss of authorities by 
the Länder, and potentially due to an increased conservative presence in the House. The 
Bundestag's position did not differ fundamentally from the government’s. Employer 
associations tended to be more favourable to openness for immigrants than the 
government, but were in line with its view that the best regulation can be achieved on the 
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national level. Trade unions were slightly more in favour, given the condition that certain 
rights of immigrants were preserved. These stances remained rather constant across the 
cases. 
 
The original bureaucratic politics framework attributes great importance to bargaining in 
governmental preference formation. While the empirical data suggests there was some 
bargaining happening between the different actors, it was not the type of hard-nosed 
bargaining seen, for instance, in Council negotiations. If the process is put on a scale with 
bargaining on the one side and cooperation on the other, then the bargaining pattern 
becomes more pronounced with an increasing salience of the policy measure, i.e., the 
costs and benefits that are at stake are more concentrated, and the differences between 
the vantage points of the different actors are more striking. As stipulated by the rules and 
regulations that provide the framework for governmental preference formation, the ministry 
in charge of the file is responsible for incorporating other ministries’ and actors’ views 
according to their respective areas of responsibility. Hence, the general pattern of finding 
the position is better described as a coordination process or at times soft bargaining, 
rather than as a fiercely fought negotiation. For instance, with regard to the Ankara 
Agreement, not all actors were initially in favour of the foreign policy argument, i.e., that 
the Agreement should be concluded as good relations with Turkey and anchoring it in the 
West were very important from a foreign policy perspective. The view prevailed not 
because (or at least not only because) the Foreign Office asserted itself in the 
negotiations, but because the other ministries realised the validity of the argument and the 
foreign policy value of Turkey. If the bureaucratic politics framework is applied to the 
governmental preference formation of a country whose style of government is based on 
cooperation – as for instance, Germany with a parliamentary consensus democracy (cf. 
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Lijphart, 1999) – the pattern of preference formation resembles a coordination exercise 
rather than hard-nosed bargaining. This in turn increases the power of an argument in the 
preference formation. This factor should be included in the bureaucratic politics framework 
alongside the other sources of power, namely structural and individual power. 
 
A final important point with regard to the bureaucratic politics framework is the role of 
extra-executive actors in the decision-making process. The framework does acknowledge 
the possibility that actors, such as foreign officials, can take part in the game. However, it 
does not make any propositions on how this might happen. The cases of the Ankara and 
the Europe Agreements have shown that a government of a foreign sending country can 
indeed have an important bearing on the final governmental preferences, even though it is 
not formally included in the decision-making process by the rules of the game. However, if 
certain conditions are in place, namely high foreign policy value of the sending country and 
low political salience of migration matters domestically, a foreign government can include 
itself in the process of preference formation by exerting targeted pressure on the 
respective Member State government. 
 
III. Final Remarks 
Links between the four sub-case studies 
The thesis has treated the sub-case studies as different instances. There is a link between 
the Ankara Agreement and the Europe Agreement case study. The Federal Ministry of 
Economics, the Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry of the Interior warned against 
granting rights of freedom of movement to Polish nationals because of the experiences of 
the Ankara Agreement. The view of the ministries was that the Ankara Agreement had led 
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to a number of obligations for Member States to provide several rights to Turkish nationals 
and grant them preferential treatment in case a vacancy cannot be filled with a Community 
national. Thus, experiences from the Ankara Agreement informed the positions of certain 
actors in the process of preference formation for the Europe Agreement with Poland. 
However, these developments are a reflection of the general political climate of the 1990s 
and are not only related to the Ankara Agreement. That the consequences of the Ankara 
Agreement were seen as negative is more likely because the general attitude towards 
immigration had changed as economic, social, and political problems related to 
immigration had emerged, and immigration had become a politically salient issue in the 
1990s. An account on the change in the attitude can be found in Chapter Three. 
 
The data does not give any indication that the Europe Agreement and/or the Ankara 
Agreement had an influence on the preference formation with regard to the Economic 
Migration Directive and the Blue Card Directive. The two association agreements are 
different policy measures and were not associated with policy measures such as EU 
directives. Thus, the lack of a link is not surprising. 
 
The link between the Economic Migration Directive and the Blue Card Directive is a 
different matter. The rejection of the Economic Migration Directive was still a rather recent 
development when the Blue Card Directive was proposed. Hence, when the Blue Card 
Directive was proposed the initial negative reaction by a number of senior political figures 
(as discussed in Chapter Seven) may have been motivated by the fact that EU 
involvement in regulating economic migration – in the form of a binding directive – was not 
desired by the German government. However, as the discussion of the process of 
preference formation with regard to the Blue Card shows, the content of the Directive and 
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its relation to the content of the relevant national legislation were at the centre of the 
process of governmental preference formation. The empirical data does not give any 
indication that there is a direct causal link between the Economic Migration Directive and 
the federal government’s preferences on the Blue Card Directive. Rather, the beginning of 
the new millennium was characterised by a very tough German stance on any EU 
involvement in legal migration matters. This is also reflected by the position Germany held 
with regard to the directives on family reunification71 and third country nationals as long-
term residents.72 
 
From a bird’s eye view, the thesis provides a confirmation of Germany’s enthusiastic 
support for the European project in the early years of European Integration, and its later 
restrictive stance with regard to EU involvement in its national policies. This view was 
particularly visible after the Tampere Programme gave an impetus to creating a common 
EU policy on immigration. The first paradigm of economic migration, which dominated the 
years of guest worker recruitment, can be characterised as what today would be labelled a 
naive and simplistic view of the economic benefits of migration that does not take into 
account the economic, social, and political consequences. With increasing public 
scepticism of immigration and its benefits, Germany’s role also became more sceptical of 
EU involvement in economic migration matters. To remain in control over who enters the 
country and the German labour market became a top priority of German immigration 
policy. Any EU-level measure that may have infringed upon this national prerogative was 
seen with the utmost scepticism. This is reflected in the finding that the German 
government will only support EU-level involvement in economic migration if the misfit 
between the national legislation and the measures that are proposed at the EU level is 
                                                
71 Council Directive 2003/86/EC 
72 Council Directive 2003/109/EC 
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zero. The sceptical view of the benefits of common EU policy measures contrasts starkly 
with the role of motor of European Integration (together with France) throughout most of 
the 20th century. 
 
Generalisability of the findings 
The dissertation has developed a number of hypotheses – clustered in three themes – that 
under the umbrella of the bureaucratic politics framework answer why and under what 
conditions a Member State supports the liberalisation of economic migration policies at the 
EU level. It has drawn upon a plethora of different literatures and concepts that have not 
been married in the same explanatory framework before. It has suggested a number of 
modifications and highlighted the limitations of certain approaches to explain the cases 
under investigation here. The study does not claim that its findings can be applied to any 
other country or policy measures. What it does hope, however, is that its findings will be 
tested by other studies for different scenarios, and that they can serve as a theoretical 
starting point for the analyses, even though further modifications might be necessary to 
enhance the scope of this study. 
 
The dissertation has detected for the case of Germany a number of causal patterns and 
factors for the liberalisation of economic migration policies at the EU level. This poses 
questions concerning the comparability of the findings. Regarding comparability with other 
countries, this approach can serve as a starting point at the very least. The rules of the 
game that applied to Germany will not be the same for other countries. For instance, in 
other countries the Ministry of Employment is in charge of coordinating the governmental 
preference formation on economic migration. The alleviated role of the Employment 
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Ministry might give a greater importance to migrant rights, compared to the strong security 
focus the Interior Ministries tend to have. However, the general structure of the dissertation 
is likely to translate to other countries, i.e., the bureaucratic politics framework with its 
three main stipulations (“where you stand depends on where you sit”, differences in power 
resources, and rules of the game) in combination with three causal themes (domestic 
politics, foreign policy factors, and labour market concerns). Of course, there would be 
differences in the relevance of these three causal factors for other countries. Nevertheless, 
with regard to economic migration liberalisation at the EU level, the three causal themes 
are highly likely to also play a role in other countries. But even if a causal factor might play 
out differently in another country, or other factors that have not played a role in the 
German case become significant, the framework is broad enough to accommodate such 
modifications. For instance, the political salience of migration and the misfit are likely to 
vary across countries. However, there is nothing that can be said a priori which would 
suggest that a variation of these factors would render the dissertation’s framework 
inapplicable. Even if one of the themes would need to be amended, the framework still 
works. 
 
Similarly, as the framework is likely to translate to other countries, it might also apply to 
other policy areas. With regard to other policy areas, the causal themes are likely to 
require more modification than when applying the framework to different countries within 
the same policy area. For instance, with regard to asylum policy, it might matter what 
reference to asylum is made in the constitution of a country (or basic law for the case of 
Germany) and if this can be enforced by national courts. Hence, in that case, the judiciary 
would be part of the rules of the game. Nevertheless, the bureaucratic politics framework 
would still be applicable in combination with a number of causal themes, such as domestic 
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politics and foreign policy concerns – but not labour market concerns. Again, this would 
not invalidate the applicability of the framework to other cases. Thus the transferable 
substance of the framework consists of the three stipulations of bureaucratic politics 
complemented by a number of causal themes which can vary across cases. To test the 
findings of this study for other countries and policy areas is a promising avenue for future 
research. 
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the United Kingdom to the European Union, Brussels, 04/07/07 
22. Interview Finish Permanent Rep: interview Permanent Representation of Finland to 
the European Union, Brussels, 04/07/07 
23. Interview Diplomat: phone interview with diplomat who prefers to stay anonymous, 
30/04/2008 
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1. Interview 1 Bundestag, Member of German Parliament, SPD, phone interview, 
26/01/2010 
2. Interview 2 Bundestag, Member of German Parliament, FDP, phone interview, 
16/02/2010 
3. Interview CDU/CSU Fraction: CDU/CSU Fraction of the Bundestag, phone 
interview 01/02/2010 
4. Interview 1 Commission: European Commission, DG JLS, phone interview, 
03/02/2010 
5. Interview 2 Commission, European Commission, DG Employment, phone 
interview, 02/02/2010 
6. Interview Council: Council of the European Union, interview, Brussels, 21/01/2010 
7. Interview EP: Secretariat of the European Parliament, phone interview, 26/01/2010 
8. Interview Ministry of Economcis: Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs, phone 
interview, 22/01/2010 
9. Interview 1 Permanent Representation: interview Permanent Representation of the 
Federal Republic of Germany to the European Union, Brussels, 21/01/2010 
10. Interview 1 Ministry of Employment: Federal Ministry of Employment and Social 
Affairs, interview, Berlin, 13/01/2010 
11. Interview Ministry of the Interior: Federal Ministry of the Interior, phone interview, 
08/01/2010 
12. Communication Foreign Office: Foreign Office, personal communication, 
11/01/2010 
13. Communication MinJustice: Federal Ministry of Justice, personal communication, 
08/01/2010 
14. Interview Migration Representative: Office of Federal Representative for Migration, 
Refugees and Integration, interview, Berlin, 15/01/2010 
15. Interview VDMA EU, interview with European Office of the Verband Deutscher 
Maschinen- und Anlagebau e.V., Brussels, 19/01/2010 
16. Interview BDA: Federation of German Employer Associations (Bundesvereinigung 
der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände or BDA), phone interview, 25/01/2010 
17. Interview DGB: Confederation of German Trade Unions Deutscher 
Gewerkschaftsbund, phone interview, 02/02/2010 
18. Interview ver.di: United Service Union (Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft), 
interview, Berlin, 13/01/2010 
19. Interview Migration Expert: migration expert in Germany, phone interview, 
02/02/2010 
20. Interview Think Tank, phone interview, Brussels, 26/01/2010 
 
 
 
